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PREFACE 
For the ninth consecutive year, this transitional justice-themed opening chapter of the annual 
human rights report of the Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago de Chile, has been prepared by 
the Transitional Justice Observatory, Observatorio de Justicia Transicional.1 Founded in 2008, the 
Observatorio publishes regular e-bulletins, studies, and reports drawing on its ongoing research 
and engagement with trials and other transitional justice developments in Chile and around Latin 
America.  This chapter covers developments related to truth, justice, reparations and guarantees 
of non-repetition in Chile, with a particular focus on measuring progress or backsliding with 
regard to Chile’s international human rights commitments. The detailed tracking and 
comparative statistical analysis in the report covers the twelve months from July 2018 to June 
2019, inclusive. Later developments are covered qualitatively up to and including late August or 
early September 2019 (the report is published in late October or early November each year). 
 
INTRODUCTION   
In recent years, the transitional justice field has tended to expand both the time horizons and the 
thematic focus of its concerns.  Today, it is more likely than previously to address the mid and 
long-term impacts of the human, social and environmental catastrophes left behind by political 
violence, human rights violations, and infractions of international humanitarian law.  Post-
authoritarian Chile has always tended to downplay its truth and justice concerns, or even attempt 
to declare them a thing of the past.  They nonetheless re-irrupt time and again into national 
public life.  The impact of the 1973-90 dictatorship era and its violence is not, moreover, limited 
to the generations who most visibly or most directly lived through it: it also explains many of 
today’s social, political and economic faultlines.  This year’s report accordingly focuses on the 
economic, social and cultural rights legacies of the dictatorship, and on the unfinished business 
of reparations.  It does so at a time when national life is demonstrably under strain, suffering the 
negative and dangerous consequences of belligerent public discourse that cares little for the 
truth, and tends toward selective amnesia about the recent past. 
 
 
1 Chapter co-authored by Cath Collins, Professor of Transitional Justice at Ulster University, Northern Ireland and 
founding director of the Observatorio; and a team consisting of: Observatorio associates Daniela Accatino, 
Francisco Bustos, Boris Hau, Andrea Ordóñez, Francisco Ugás, and Loreto López; invited experts Karen Cea, 
Bernadita García, Karinna Fernández, María José Jorquera, Natalia Labbé, and Daniela Méndez; and UDP research 
assistants Felipe Álvarez, Nadia Marchant and Elisa Franco.  Thanks to all interviewees and to Open Society 
Foundations, who support the line of research that informs the section on search for the disappeared.  This edition 
is dedicated to Pepe Aldunate, S.J., 1917-2019. 
    3 
 
In 2017, outgoing UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff published a global report on the state 
of transitional justice thinking and practice.2  He signalled achievements including the 
development of a broad notion of justice, one which adds truth, reparations, and guarantees of 
non-repetition to the criminal justice agenda.  He also celebrated the growing recognition of truth 
as a social right - not only the preserve of victims, relatives or survivors - and an increased 
appreciation that participation is not only a moral and ethical imperative but also a prerequisite 
for successful transitional justice.  The report called for interventions that promise to change 
personal and cultural dispositions. It pointed out the preventive potential of civil society 
strengthening, while criticising an entrenched tendency on the part of states to establish 
relations of mistrust or even antagonism with civil society.3  
All these observations offer a strong challenge to Chile’s current transitional justice trajectory, 
where measures have been isolated one from another; announced policies or priorities have 
been reversed or quietly abandoned, and the state-civil society divide has been jealously 
guarded. These defects have prevented existing measures from delivering on their full promise 
or potential.  Chile has also been stubbornly blind to the need for personal and cultural change, 
to move beyond sterile antagonisms.  Otherwise there is a very real risk that the present regional 
and international landscape will exacerbate the verbal and symbolic violence that is too often 
present in discussions and representations of the recent past. 
The new UN Special Rapporteur for transitional justice issues, Fabian Salvioli, has meanwhile 
echoed previous UN pronouncements by emphasising the need to attend to economic, social and 
cultural rights (henceforth, ECOSOC).4  Already in 2006, the UNHCHR signalled the need for 
transitional justice to support the transformation of oppressed societies, by facing up to 
economic and social justice questions.5  In 2010, a UNSG guidance note on transitional justice 
recommended that states ensure transitional justice processes and mechanisms take into 
consideration the underlying causes of a conflict or period of repressive government, and the full 
range of rights violations committed, including to ECOSOC.6  Chilean transitional justice 
nonetheless continues to marginalise ECOSOC, despite having suffered authoritarian violence 
with a particularly regressive impact on equality.  
According to expert Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Chile stands out for three characteristics of its pre and 
post transition. First, having been the poster child for the notion that violent suppression of the 
social costs of economic ‘liberalisation’ might be necessary or even warranted.  Second, for the 
official lie that economic transformation had happened without large-scale corruption or looting.  
 
2 UN Document A/HRC/36/50/Add.1, UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence on his global study on transitional Justice, 7 August 2017. Authored 
by Pablo de Greiff. 
3 All direct quotes are taken from UN Document A/HRC/36/50/Add.1, op. cit. 
4 A/73/336, UN Document ONU, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and 
guarantees of non-recurrence, 23 August 2018.  Authored by Fabián Salvioli, who replaced outgoing rapporteur Pablo 
de Greiff on 1 May 2018, after Mr. De Greiff completed two full consecutive periods in the post. 
5 Louise Arbour, “Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition”, Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice, Working Paper 10, 2006.  
6 UN, Guidance note of the Secretary-General. United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, 2010.  
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Third, for its silence about private sector complicity, and the ways in which dictatorship-era 
economic policy contributed to Chile’s human rights catastrophe.7  
Chile’s transitional justice processes, particularly the official ones, have nonetheless 
concentrated on the physical violence of the regime and its violation of civil and political rights.  
More attention is needed to the cultural and structural violence perpetrated by the dictatorship 
and perpetuated since, mitigation of which is vital for any genuinely transformative transition.8  
In an effort to contribute to this agenda, this year’s report places particular emphasis on this 
issue.  We review Chile’s major transitional justice actions from an ECOSOC perspective, and 
enumerate the grave and serious violations of ECOSOC that were committed during the 
dictatorship and are often overlooked.  In section 3.5.5, we also summarise the main arguments 
of a recent, comprehensive national study of the issue.    
1. MAJOR THEMES in 2019       
1.1 Normative framework and general balance 
1.1.1 The UPE and other reports presented by Chile before the UN Human Rights System  
In January 2019, Chile presented its third Universal Periodic Exam (UPE) before the UN Human 
Rights Council.  Chile accepted 211 of the 266 recommendations that were made by the 
participating states on the basis of the preliminary official, complementary, and alternative 
(“shadow”) reports prepared, respectively, by the government, the national Human Rights 
Institute, INDH, and civil society groups.9 Another 37 recommendations were partially or wholly 
“taken note of” (meaning that their contents were contested, corrected, or otherwise not 
recognised).10  Eighteen of the recommendations were not accepted or not considered, some 
because they had been emitted by Venezuela, “a regime not recognised as legitimate by the 
Chilean government”.11 This outcome meant that Chile accepted 10% fewer of the presented 
recommendations than in its previous EPU, in 2014.12  
 
Amongst the recommendations making specific reference to truth, justice, and reparations for 
dictatorship-era crimes, a first group (nos. 125.2 y 125.3), exhorted Chile to ratify the 1968 
 
7 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “La tardía centralidad de la dimensión económica en la justicia transicional”, in Bohoslavsky 
et al (eds.), Complicidad económica con la dictadura chilena: Un país desigual a la fuerza, Santiago, LOM, 2019, 
pp.47 y 48. 
8 Johan Galtung, Tras la violencia, 3R: reconstrucción, reconciliación, resolución. Afrontando los efectos visibles e 
invisibles de la guerra y la violencia, Bilbao, Red Gernika, 1998. In Chile the Fundación Sol, which has researched 
the structural violence legacy of the dictatorship, makes special mention of the ‘reforms’ that were imposed in 
education, health, and social security. Fundación Sol: “La violencia estructural y cotidiana a 40 años del Golpe: los 
11 pilares dictatoriales que sostienen el modelo”, 12 September 2013. 
9 The recommendations can be found in their entirety in UN Document A/HRC/41/6, Report of the Working Group 
on the Universal Periodic Review: Chile, 2 April 2019. Each recommendation only represents the view of the state 
which formulated it.  
10 In the first ever EPR cycle, states were also permitted to “reject” recommendations, but this category of reply 
was later withdrawn on the grounds that states which have opted to form part of the universal human rights 
system cannot then refuse the obligations that come with membership.  
11 A/HRC/41/6/Add.1, op.cit., p. 41. 
12 “Observaciones a respuesta de Chile a EPU 2019”, public declaration published on the website of the Centro de 
DDHH of the Universidad de Chile, 4 July 2019, http://www.uchile.cl/noticias/155353/observaciones-a-respuesta-
de-chile-a-epu-2019. 
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Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity.   Chile chose only to “take note” of these, arguing that it could not commit to a date 
for ratification because the approval of the legislature would be required.  A collective civil 
society analysis of the EPU published by the Universidad de Chile however pointed out that states 
appear before international organisations as a single entity, and “cannot therefore excuse 
[themselves] from meeting … international obligations by arguing that these depend on the 
actions of one of [their] own constituent parts”.13 A draft Bill to enact the required ratification, 
Boletín 1265-10, has been before parliament for a decade and a half.  However, in the half decade 
since 2014 it has not been assigned the ‘urgent’ status that is virtually a prerequisite for any draft 
bill to actually stand a chance of becoming law. Recommendations 125.21 to 125.24, which were 
all accepted, encourage Chile to implement the National Human Rights Action Plan that was 
promised and even published by the previous administration (Michelle Bachelet, 2014-2018) but 
which was apparently not validly in force at time of writing [July 2019].14 Chile “took note of” 
recommendation 125.52, which invited it to derogate the 1978 Amnesty Decree Law,  arguing 
that the Supreme Court has in recent years disapplied the law.  The response however failed to 
mention that this change, as long as it remains solely interpretative, is perfectly reversible, not 
least since jurisprudence is not considered a source of binding precedent in Chile.  The 
government’s position also omitted to acknowledge the fact that this same recommendation has 
been made repeatedly by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and a range of other 
regional and international organisations. 
Recommendations 125.83 and 125.84 - urging trials and proportionate sanctions for dictatorship-
era crimes - and 123.85, suggesting that Chile “continue addressing” transitional justice, were 
accepted.  The state’s response to recommendation 125.82, establishment of a permanent 
mechanism for recognising victims’ right to reparations, was however limited to “taking note”, 
signalling its intention to [instead] “continue implementing … existing measures” (State reply, 
para. 22).  In fact, there is an urgent need for a permanent mechanism or body that would not 
just administer but improve existing measures, and would have the power to examine and 
accredit previously unrecognised cases.  This measure, promised in 2018, is just one of various 
firm commitments made by the outgoing (2014-2018) government that its inheritor has failed to 
honour, as we will see below.  Chile also took note of only part of recommendation 125.85, 
objecting to the statement that many victims or relatives had “not yet received adequate 
reparation”, on the grounds that this failed to take note of Chile’s “efforts to make progress” 
(para. 37).  This objection confuses efforts with outcomes, since it is evident that what has been 
achieved to date falls far short of what is required.15 
Recommendation 125.81 urged Chile to continue to investigate cases of persons still 
disappeared, in dialogue with the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary 
Disappearances. Chile “took note” of this recommendation, rather than accepting it, arguing that 
“the current law(s) contain mechanisms that allow for timely, impartial and effective 
investigation of reports of enforced disappearances” (A/HRC/41/6 Add.1 para. 21).  This reply did 
 
13 “Observaciones a respuesta de Chile a EPU 2019”, op.cit. 
14 See below, section 3.6.1. 
15 See section 5 of this report, and the equivalent themed section from previous editions. 
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not acknowledge that the typification of enforced disappearance as an autonomous offence 
under the criminal code, something that is required by the relevant international treaties to 
which Chile is a party, has been pending before the legislature since 2017. The draft bill 
concerned, presented in 2014, has never received executive sponsorship, without which it is 
highly unlikely to ever become law.  Its text proposes to typify, as a (serious) common crime, 
enforced disappearances that do not meet the criteria of systematicity or a widespread nature 
that would place them in the category of crimes against humanity.  This new category of crime 
would therefore apply to cases such as those of José Huenante, José Vergara or Hugo Arispe, 
victims of disappearance at the hands of agents of the state, occurring after transition, ie since 
1990, during the most recent period of democratic government.16 Enforced disappearance as a 
crime against humanity is already defined as a criminal offence by Law 20.357, passed in 2009, 
albeit the definition is deficient.17  However, Law 20.357 does not apply to recent cases that do 
not constitute crimes against humanity, while its post hoc application to dictatorship-era crimes 
would also appear to be ruled out following the non-retroactivity principle adopted by the 1998 
Rome Statute. 
Chile also presented two thematic reports to the UN system during the period covered by the 
present report (principally, July 2018-June 2019 inclusive).  The first, on torture, was presented 
to the UN Committee Against Torture, CAT, in July 2018, three years after the date on which it 
was due.  The CAT’s final observations on the process underlined Chile’s failure to accept or fully 
implement previous recommendations classified as high priority.18 These include the derogation 
of the article of Law 19.992 (which establishes a 50 year embargo on the records of the country’s 
second truth commission, the Valech Commission); legislation to dissolve the effects of the 1978 
Amnesty Decree Law (which is technically still in force); the establishment of a permanent body 
to acknowledge new cases of victims and survivors, and the improvement of existing reparations.  
Both the CAT and the INDH observed that, while Law 20.968 has introduced an improved 
definition of torture - previous versions, contained in Arts. 150A and 150B of the criminal code, 
did not even use the term “torture” – the penalties that are set down remain insufficient to the 
gravity of the crime.19  The CAT welcomed the fact that the Chilean judiciary currently recognises 
that administrative reparations do not preclude the award of civil indemnization, while 
acknowledging that civil claims, like criminal actions, are exempt from statutes of limitation 
where crimes against humanity have been committed.  This exemption, currently recognised by 
a majority of the members of the Supreme Court’s Criminal Bench, was also supported by the 
 
16 These are the three generally recognised cases to date of enforced disappearance occurring in democracy (after 
1990). The UN Committee, and the INDH, have however alluded to a possible fourth case, that of Ricardo Harex, as 
well as to recent denunciations of ‘irregular adoptions’ (appropriation of infants and children) committed during 
and after the dictatorship.  See section 1.3.  
17 The deficiencies include an allusion to a “long period” of detention, which runs counter to international 
jurisprudence rejecting the applicability of a minimum time duration (see, inter alia, UN Document 
CED/C/10/D/1/2013, Yrusta versus Argentina). 
18 CAT/C/CHL/CO/R.6, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Chile, English translation published 
28 August 2018, para. 9. 
19 CAT/C/CHL/CO/R.6, ONU, op. cit., and INDH, Informe Complementario, op.cit. para. 4. 
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights in late 2018 in the case Ordenes Guerra et al vs. Chile.20 A 
second case along the same lines, brought by the family of a victim of enforced disappearance, 
is currently before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, having been declared 
admissible.21   
The CAT also called for a complete derogation of statutes of limitation on torture, whether or not 
committed in a context constituting crimes against humanity.  It also remarked that the Chilean 
state had provided scant information about current trials for past torture, their outcomes, and 
whether sentences imposed were actually being served.22. In the Observatory’s opinion, this lack 
of information is exacerbated by the fact that the main state body charged with prosecuting 
dictatorship-era crimes against humanity – the Human Rights Programme Unit of the Ministry of 
Justice and Human Rights – only acts in cases of enforced disappearance or extrajudicial 
execution, and abandoned some years ago, the production and publication of data allowing even 
those cases to be monitored. The CAT also called for the strengthening of preventive measures, 
principally the National Torture Prevention Mechanism required under the Optional Protocol, to 
which Chile is a signatory.  Eight months later, on 25 April 2019, the National Human Rights 
Institute was designated as the prevention mechanism, by Law 21.154.  
1.1.2 Transitional Justice in Chile from an ECOSOC perspective  
Chile’s 1973-90 civil-military regime committed grave violations of both civil and political rights, 
and ECOSOC. The economic model that was imposed during the dictatorship included regressive 
measures in education, health, and social security. The right to strike and the right to organise in 
trades unions were simply abolished. The period also saw massive unjustified sackings, 
discriminatory clauses in social services entitlement,  enforced displacement, and the censoring 
of cultural expression (including harassment and arrest of writers and artists, and the burning of 
books).23  This constitutes the worst possible form of rejection of the obligations to respect for, 
and progressive realisation of, ECOSOC, acquired by the Chilean state before the 1973 military 
coup.24  Nonetheless, examination of Chilean transitional justice initiatives from an ECOSOC 
perspective betrays an almost complete lack of acknowledgement of ECOSOC violations. These 
harms are mentioned, if at all, as contextual factors or collateral consequences of the regime.  
While certain attempts at reparation can be observed in relation to a small number of ECOSOC 
violations, in general the response has undoubtedly been inadequate to the real scale of harm. 
 
20 IACtHR, Caso Órdenes Guerra y Otros versus Chile, Sentencia Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. 29 November 2018. 
See also también sections 1.2.2 and 3.1, below. 
21 IACHR, Informe No. 5/19, Petición 1560-08. Admisibilidad. Juan Paredes Barrientos y Familia versus Chile. 31 
January 2019. 
22 UN Document CAT/C/CHL/CO/R.6, op.cit., párr. 11. This same point was emphasised by the INDH in its 
complementary report: Informe Complementario, 18 June 2018, paras. 7 and 8, where it is pointed out that the 
statutes of limitations periods set down by Law 20.968 range from as few as 5 years, to a maximum of ten. 
23 UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution No. 34/179, 7 February 1980, 4.d; UNGA Resolution No. 46/161, 4 
December 1986 9.k; UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) E/C.12/1988/4, Report on the 
2nd Period of Sessions (Chile), 8-25 February1988, paras. 202, 206.  
24 At the date of the coup Chile had signed and ratified the International Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
The instrument was not, however, published in the official newspaper [a pre-requisite for any measure to formally 
pass into Chilean law] until the last year of the dictatorship, via Decree 326/1989, 27 May 1989.  
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The Rettig Commission, for example, was limited by mandate to considering violations of the 
right to life and physical integrity, despite its own reference to the indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights.25 Both the Rettig report and the report of the first Valech 
Commission totally omitted mention of violations such as the forced displacement of entire 
populations, or large-scale sale of forestry lands, often located in indigenous territory.26  
Intervention in trades unions, and the closing down or censorship of media outlets and 
educational curricula, are portrayed as mere consequences of, or methods for, the violation of 
civil and political rights.27  The limited mandate of the truth commissions thereby played into a 
partial narrative of the past, focused on physical violence and relativizing or ignoring cultural and 
structural violence.  Although the Rettig commission did recognise that the crisis that preceded 
the coup had socio-economic roots, it signalled that a deeper exploration of these was beyond 
its scope.28  This represented a lost opportunity to analyse the dynamics that permitted a social 
polarisation that began before the coup, and was deepened and widened after it. 
  
Although the Chilean truth commissions had a limited vision of ECOSOC, they were capable of 
acknowledging the impact of grave physical violations on the quality of life of direct victims and 
their immediate circle. This impact included catastrophic consequences on physical and mental 
health, the loss of jobs, homes, access to study, and etc. Accordingly, some forms of reparation 
were recommended that would have a positive effect on ECOSOC. These included certain 
pension and social security entitlements, health support, and study scholarships.29  Nonetheless, 
the exclusion of direct consideration of ECOSOC can also be observed in the judicial dimension 
of transitional justice.  The Observatorio is not aware of a single judicial verdict to date that makes 
direct reference to violations of ECOSOC during the dictatorship.  This omission is in part a 
product of the aforementioned emphasis on physical violence, exacerbated by the general 
reluctance of the state to shoulder its ex officio duties to prosecute of grave violations.  It also 
reflects the limited justiciability of ECOSOC in Chile in general, and the narrowness of most 
juridical conceptualisations of their nature.30 
The absence of an ECOSOC perspective is also evident in the area of institutional reform, an 
essential component of guarantees of non-repetition.  The dictatorship imposed a rigid 
normative, institutional, constitutional, and economic system, in the form of regressive and 
discriminatory measures such as the deregulation work, the elimination of collective rights, the 
weakening of labour protections, and the ‘reform’ (privatisation) of most health, social security, 
 
25 Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, Informe Rettig, 1991, Vol. I, Tomo I, Segunda Parte, Capítulo II, A.1. 
26 Decree Law 701/1974 permitted forced relocation: land confiscated in this way was sold or simply divided up 
amongst military personnel (El Mostrador.cl: “Investigación revela el real valor simbólico de la Villa San Luis”. 2 
August 2018).  The specific, differential impact of dictatorial practices on indigenous communities, and their 
connection with current conflict and repression in the south of the country, has not been sufficiently researched.  
27 Informe Rettig, ibíd., Vol I, Tomo I, Segunda Parte, Capítulo II, A.3.b.1. b.3; Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política 
y Tortura, Informe Valech, 2004, Capítulo III, pp.184-185, Capítulo IV p. 207, Capítulos V-VIII, pp. 239-503. 
28 Informe Rettig, ibíd., Vol. I, Tomo I, Segunda Parte, Capítulo I, 27. 
29 Informe Rettig, op.cit., Vol. I, Tomo II, Cuarta Parte, Capítulo I, D y Capítulo II, B, C, D; Informe Valech, op.cit., 
Capítulos VIII y IX. 
30 The lack of justiciability of ECOSOC in Chile has been criticised by the UN CESCR: E/C.12/CHL/CO/4, CESCR, 
Concluding Observations-Chile, 6 July 2015, para. C. 
    9 
 
and educational provision.31 Post-dictatorship administrations have maintained this system, 
introducing only minor modifications.32 Those few structural reforms that have taken place have 
mainly been the result of social movement mobilisations.  The fragmentary and sporadic nature 
of the resulting change falls far short of the definitive break with the dictatorship-era model of 
growth that some have predicted or called for.33  
Existing reparations measures, for all their defects, are those that have given most space to 
ECOSOC-related concerns.  They allowed certain groups of survivors and relatives access to 
particular services in health, housing and education,34 and partially mitigated harm caused by 
unfair dismissal, via the partial restitution of pension credits.35  Some individuals, unions, and 
political parties who suffered forcible expropriation or confiscation of assets received 
compensation and/or the restitution of their property.36  These measures however reach to only 
a small proportion of those whose ECOSOC rights were violated, moreover providing only very 
modest entitlements. Collective restitution, implemented in other contexts such as Peru, has not 
featured in Chilean reparations measures.  In fact, in one of the few cases in which the violation 
of rights was clearly collective in nature - the confiscation of land from “exonerados de tierra” - 
reparation took the exclusively individual and pecuniary form of personal pensions.    
There has been some progress in the courts since 2014, taking the form of a growing recognition 
of relatives’ and survivor’s’ rights to seek reparation for moral harms by the judicial route, 
combined with a recognition of the compatibility of civil demands with takeup of administrative 
reparations. Nonetheless, as we have observed, judicialisation in Chile is predominantly centred 
on individuals who suffered extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearance, or torture. Far from 
challenging the emphasis on the violation of the right to physical and psychological integrity, 
court-based actions therefore tend if anything to reproduce and even accentuate this emphasis.  
At the same time, reparation by the judicial route is regressive in the sense that it favours those 
who possess greater tangible and intangible resources enabling them to access the justice 
system. This latter inequality is accentuated by the fact that the Human Rights Programme Unit 
of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the only state entity that offers specialised legal 
advice over dictatorship-era crimes, does not take any action whatsoever - civil or criminal - on 
behalf of survivors.  Nor does it support civil claim aspects of the criminal cases for enforced 
disappearance or extrajudicial execution in which it acts.  Moreover, a separate state legal entity, 
the Consejo de Defensa del Estado, actively opposes civil indemnization claims brought by 
relatives or survivors (see below, section 5).  Both civil claims and existing administrative 
 
31 DL 2756/1979; DL 3500/1980; Decree with Force of Law  N°3/1981; Law 18620; Law 18962; and see Informe 
2015. 
32 Kirsten Sehnbruch and Peter Siavelis (eds.), Democratic Chile: The Politics and Policies of a Historic Coalition, 
1990–2010. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014. 
33 See, for example, Alberto Mayol, El derrumbe del modelo, Santiago, LOM, 2013; or Fernando Atria et al, El otro 
modelo, Santiago, Debate, 2013; 2nd edition 2019.  
34 Laws 19.123; 19.287; and 19.992, and see Observatorio de Justicia Transicional, Tabla leyes y medidas de 
reparación en Chile, 2011, available via www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl.   
35 Laws 19.234, 19.582, and 19.881, on pension rights of persons sacked or blacklisted for political motives. 
36 Law 19.568: “dispone la restitución o indemnización por bienes confiscados y adquiridos por el Estado a través de 
los Decretos Leyes Nºs 12, 77 y 133, de 1973; 1.697, de 1977, y 2.346, de 1978.”  
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reparations measures moreover consist of direct or indirect economic transfers (payments, study 
scholarships, or the replacement of lost pension credits). This encourages victims to quantify 
harm, and/or to access the market in order to buy goods or services necessary to alleviate the 
effects of the violation of their rights. The measures thereby embody a mercantilist, individualist, 
and/or privatising spirit which for many indelibly associated precisely with the dictatorship 
project. 
The categorisation of some of the aforementioned measures as ‘reparations’ must moreover be 
questioned given that, as we have mentioned in previous reports, reparations strictu sensu must 
contain an explicit quota of recognition of what happened, and the responsibility of the state for 
it. They must also offer to the rightsholder something distinct from, and additional to, what he 
or she would already be entitled to via the guarantee of other fundamental rights. This 
requirement of specificity implies that it is not entirely licit, for example, to count as reparation 
the provision of adequate health services tailored to the needs of certain user populations, 
whether or not those needs are the product of human rights violations. The broader introduction 
of fee-free access to higher education for certain socio-economic groups similarly cannot 
substitute for or pre-empt the need for the concern with restoring lost opportunities that 
motivated the establishment of study scholarships for Rettig relatives or Valech survivors. 
In conclusion, on analysing the outstanding moral and social debts that Chilean transitional 
justice must seek to address from an ECOSOC perspective, the starting premise must be that 
Chilean society as a whole suffered a profound and sustained violation of its ECOSOC. In the 
present day, the consequences of that violation are still lived out by millions of Chileans in the 
form of profound inequalities in access to health, and in entirely insufficient and meagre 
pensions.37  A recent study, based on access to thousands of previously secret documents, also 
serves of as evidence of a deliberately authoritarianising transformation of school education, 
carried out between 1979 and 1990.38 Despite the widespread nature of this harm, transitional 
justice in Chile has tried to maintain a firm dichotomy between ‘victims’ and ‘society’, as a result 
of which campaigns by relatives and survivors are viewed by many as a distant and private 
concern, rather than as a necessary reaction to a profound rupture of the social pact, one that 
affected us all.39 We also observe how neoliberal rationality, premised on the notion of homo 
economicus, has infused the design of existing measures: reparations are shot through with a 
market logic. Monetary transfers, while they may be necessary, do not satisfy the symbolic 
dimensions and the need for recognition that are inherent in fuller concepts of reparation. 
 
37 According to an INDH-commissioned public opinion poll, when asked which right they considered to be today most 
often violated, the rights to health, and to a dignified retirement and pension were the ones most frequently 
mentioned by respondents, attracting 20.7% and 16.8% of all mentions, respectively. (Instituto Nacional de Derechos 
Humanos, Resultados de la IV Encuesta Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2018, November 2018). According to the 
Fundación Sol, the average amount paid out by the compulsory, privatised, pension schemes known as AFP at July 
2015 was CLP128,696 a month.  91% of all retirement pensions paid out by AFP amounted to less than CLP150,519 
a month. 
38 Mauricio Weibel, “Prácticas sociales genocidas: La transformación de la educación escolar chilena entre los años 
1979 y 1990”. Revista Austral de Ciencias Sociales, (36), 2019, pp. 251-274. 
39 See Daniela Accatino, “¿Por qué no a la impunidad? Una mirada desde las teorías comunicativas al papel de la 
persecución penal en la justicia de transición”, Política Criminal, 14(27), 2019, pp.14-64. 
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Reparation by the judicial route is meanwhile limited by the same inequalities that affect access 
to justice in general. Moreover, the state continues to actively oppose civil demands. Finally, and 
perhaps most worryingly, economic rationality, which relegates considerations of equity and the 
common good to second place, has undermined the quality of Chilean democracy.  In its three 
decades of existence this democracy, the result of a pacted transition, has produced a society 
with serious defects of social equity. 
1.2 Major Themes in the 2018-19 Period  
1.2.1 Study of mortality among survivors  
An important study of mortality survivors of torture and political imprisonment in Chile was 
carried out in 2017 and 2018.  The research, carried out at the Universidad de Chile, sought to 
explore concerns expressed by relatives and survivors’ associations, NGOs, and health 
professionals associated with the PRAIS health reparations programme, that survivors were 
showing an unusually high incidence of mortality and morbidity compared to their age cohort.40 
The research also drew on recent discoveries in neuroscience, suggesting increased mortality 
rates among individual subject to chronic stress.41  Taking torture as one paradigmatic expression 
of the psychosocial trauma proceeding from extreme life experiences suffered during the 
dictatorship, the research analysed rates of mortality among the total of 38,254 people 
acknowledged by the Valech commission iterations as survivors of torture or political 
imprisonment in Chile. Outcomes include a mortality profile identifying the most prevalent 
pathologies, aimed at facilitating targeted interventions to enhance the prevention and 
management of risk among the subsets of this population designated as vulnerable. The study 
promises to generate, for the first time, detailed information on life expectancy of survivors of 
political imprisonment and torture in Chile. Currently in the final phase of statistical analysis, the 
study is due for imminent publication. Preliminary results have already been presented by the 
research team and survivors’ organisations to relevant professional bodies, PRAIS teams, etc.  
 
1.2.2 Civil claims 
A range of international treaty law that is binding on Chile, together with ius cogens norms, 
establish the rights of victims of grave, massive and systematic violations of human rights to 
reparation, establishing a corresponding duty on the part of states to provide it.  Some of the 
relevant international conventions also specify that the reparation should contain a range of 
components: restitution, compensation, satisfaction, rehabilitation, and guarantees of non-
repetition; and that reparation should be just, adequate, and timely. Soft law norms, developed 
particularly by the universal system of human rights protection, develop the content of this right, 
enunciating and defining standards. These include that reparation should be effective, that it 
should promote justice, and that it should be proportional to the harm caused. They also 
establish that states that are part of the universal system of human rights protection must offer 
reparation to the victims of conduct attributable to states, that constitutes manifest violation of 
 
40 The research team behind the Conicyt-funded project was psychologist María José Jorquera (lead researcher) 
plus psychiatrists Carlos Madariaga y Rubén Alvarado. 
41 La literatura sugiere una prevalencia elevada de patologías incluyendo cáncer, el infarto agudo del miocardio, los 
accidentes cerebrovasculares, las infecciones respiratorias, la depresión, el alcoholismo y el suicidio. 
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international norms.42 It follows that reparation should not be understood as a benefit, but as a 
right, and that the state and public bodies are mandated to optimise its effective satisfaction. 
This gives right to a complex obligation, with the corresponding rights held by victims.43 
 
We focus here on indemnization (compensation) as a component of reparation. According to the 
UN’s Basic principles and guidelines on the right to remedy and reparation for victims of gross 
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian 
law, compensation:  
“should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and 
proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, 
resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, such as: 
(a) Physical or mental harm; 
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits; 
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential; 
(d) Moral damage; 
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, 
and psychological and social services.”.44 
Compensation should therefore be provided for affectations not only of civil and political rights, 
but also of ECOSOC rights. As we have seen, the second dimension has generally gone 
unaddressed by the Chilean state. In this sense, monetary compensation ordered by the courts 
is an extremely relevant juridical and judicial route, necessary to alleviate, at least in part, the 
deficits or vacuums left by administrative measures.  In recent years, the domestic courts have 
resolved a number of civil demands directed against the Chilean Treasury, requiring 
compensation for moral harm caused to relatives of victims of execution and disappearance, and 
to survivors.  Domestic jurisprudence has evolved beyond a first stage in which civil demands 
were usually rejected, invoking the exception of prescription (statutes of limitation). More 
recently, verdicts have accepted civil demands, abiding by relevant international principles and 
rejecting the defence presented by the Consejo de Defensa del Estado, CDE, whose job it is to 
represent the Treasury before the court. The Supreme Court, in particular its second bench 
(criminal bench) has played a fundamental role in this change since 2014, when it became the 
 
42 UN AG Resolución 60/147, of 2005, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law. See also IACtHR Comunidad Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni versus Nicaragua, sentence of 31 August 2001, 
series C No. 79, para. 163; Cesti Hurtado versus Perú: Reparations, sentence of 31 May 2001, series C No. 78, para. 
32; and “Niños de la Calle” (Villagrán Morales and other) versus Guatemala, Reparations: sentence of 26 May 
2001, series C No. 77, para. 59.  
43 UN GA Resolution 60/147, of 2005, Principle VII, no. 11:  11. Remedies for gross violations of international human 
rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law include the victim’s right to the following as 
provided for under international law: (…) (b) Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered (…)” 
44 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in UN GA Resolution 60/147, 2005, Principle IX.20. 
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sole venue for all compensation demands that were elevated to the Supreme Court.45  
In the case Órdenes Guerra et al vs. Chile, in November 2018, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, IACtHR, declared that Chile had breached the rights to judicial protection and judicial 
guarantees of seven groups of relatives of victims of disappearance and execution, by rejecting 
the civil demands presented by the relatives, declaring them subject to prescription Avenue laid 
down in the Chilean civil code. In its presentencing report, submitted in February 2018, the 
Chilean state acknowledged its responsibility invoking, inter alia, the same jurisprudential criteria 
that are currently visible in Supreme Court verdicts. Recognising and positively valuing this 
convergence among the parties, the IACtHR considered that controversy to be at an end, 
proceeding directly to determine adequate measures of reparation. Notwithstanding, the CDE 
has continued to oppose recognition, by the courts, of the right to reparation by the judicial 
route. The CDE invokes the argument that the harm caused has already been fully repaired by 
pensions and other administrative measures, both pecuniary and symbolic; and claims that 
receipt of such measures is incompatible with the subsequent receipt of judicially defined 
reparations.  In the face of this argument, the Supreme Court has instead recognised the 
complementary character of these two routes to reparation, accepting that the assignment of 
pensions does not prevent relatives or survivors from presenting a civil demand for 
compensation of moral harm.46 the court also cites arguments enshrined in relevant reparations 
laws, such as article 24 of Law 19.123; and Article 4 of Law 19.992.47 
The establishment of suitable amounts for compensation established by the judicial route 
generally are left to the criteria of judges.  According to Órdenes Guerra, criteria used include the 
type of affective bond involved, and the relationship of each affected relative to the aggressions, 
violations and torture that were committed.  Explicit mention is made of the fact that due to the 
inherently subjective nature of moral harm, it cannot be subjected to the same rules used to 
determine or quantify material harm.48 as regards demands brought by survivors, domestic 
 
45 On this evolution see Observatorio de Justicia Transicional, Jurisprudential milestones in human rights cases: 
Chile 1990-2019 Santiago, Universidad Diego Portales, 2019. 
46 According to the Supreme Court: “the Treasury’s contention that compensation is not appropriate because the 
claimants have obtained reparations pensions (…) contravenes international norms (…) which cannot be 
contravened on the basis of other precepts of national law.  The regulations to which the Treasury makes reference 
– which only establish a system of welfare pensions – is in no way incompatible with the compensation that is sought 
here, and it is not appropriate to assume that these [pensions] were intended to repair all moral harm causes to 
victims of human rights violations, since these constitute different forms of reparation”.  Corte Suprema, Segunda 
Sala, Rol. 173-2016, 20 June 2016.  
47 According to Art. 24 of Law 19.123: “The reparations pension shall be compatible with any other pension, of any 
nature whatsoever, that the beneficiary may also receive or to which they are also entitled. It shall also be 
compatible with any other social security benefit as set down in law”.  Under art. 4 of Law 19.992: “(…) the pension 
established by this law shall be compatible with any other pension, of any nature whatsoever, that the beneficiary 
may also receive or to which they are also entitled, including the welfare pensions established by Decree Law Nº 
869, of 1975. They shall also be compatible with any other social security benefit as set down in law”. 
48 IACtHR, Órdenes Guerra and others versus Chile. Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas. Sentence of 29 November 2018. 
Series C No. 372, para. 122. 
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judiciary takes into account the pain, suffering, and distress caused, and the form taken by the 
rights violations at issue.49 
Overall, the changing criteria of the Supreme Court from 2014 has produced an increase in 
demands for compensation in cases where criminal charges had previously been brought without 
the inclusion of a civil demand.  Cases have also arisen where different relatives of the same 
victim exercise their right to reparation at different times, generating more than one final verdict 
with regard to the same victim. One example is the case of Rodolfo González Pérez, a conscript 
forcibly disappeared in 1974, at the age of 19, as a punishment for helping political prisoners 
while on guard duty at a military hospital.  The criminal case for his enforced disappearance was 
completed in 2015, including recognition of the right to reparation for one of Rodolfo’s 
sisters.50  Three additional civil demands were later presented and resolved, on different dates, 
by other siblings.51  The 2014 changing criteria reduced relative disadvantage for those whose 
civil demands had been resolved before the change, at a time when the courts still accepted the 
application of the statute of limitation.  Those affected by this change were prevented from 
presenting new demands by the principle of double jeopardy (cosa juzgada).  One example is the 
case of Juan Paredes Barrientos, whose relatives presented a complaint to the IACtHR after their 
civil demand, presented in 1997, was denied by the Supreme Court in 2007 despite having been 
accepted at lower court level. The reversal was due to an appeal presented by the CDE. We 
cannot but reiterate our objection to the fact that the CDE continues to defend the interests of 
the state in such a questionable manner, even after the unfavourable verdict of the IACtHR in the 
Órdenes Guerra case was supposedly accepted by the Chilean state (see also section 5.1.1, 
below).   
1.2.3 Situation of Survivors 
The shameful abandonment of the rights of survivors of political imprisonment torture exile and 
other grave violations of human rights has been an issue of constant concern in this report. In 
the present period, as in previous ones, hope that the creation within the Ministry of Justice of a 
Sub-secretariat of Human Rights would produce a new response has not been realised.  An 
example of this continuing failure can be seen in an official response sent by the Minister to the 
president of the lower legislative chamber on 11 April 2019. The document confirms that the 
ministry “has neither sought, nor intends to seek” the reactivation of a draft bill - submitted by 
the outgoing administration and immediately withdrawn by the incoming one - that would have 
established a one-off payment to persons acknowledged by the Valech commission.52  The 
proposed payment constituted a partial and always inadequate response a 10 point agenda that 
associations are former political prisoners have spent years presenting before various 
administrations.  High-level dialogue established in 2015 produced supposed agreements on the 
issue, which were however never honoured, leading to representations by the then 
representative of the UN High Commission for Human Rights before then president Michelle 
 
49 Corte Suprema Rol. 20.362-2018, 15 January 2019. 
50 Corte Suprema, Rol. 22.343-2014, 26 February 2015. 
51 Corte Suprema, Rol. 8105-2018, 13 June 2018; Rol 29.463-2018, 26 March 2019; Rol. 31.766-2018, 28 May 2019.  
52 Ordinario Nº 2213, sent by Ministro Hernán Larraín Fernández to Iván Flores García, President of the Chamber of 
Deputies, dated 11 April 2019, in reply to Oficio 2098, sent on 22 January 2019. 
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Bachelet on 29 September 2017.  His letter has still received no reply, despite ongoing attempts 
to activate a response.  
 
In the same ministerial communication referred to above, the Minister reports that “despite our 
interest” in establishing a mechanism for the permanent consideration of victim status -a 
measure recommended by multiple national and international bodies – “for the present there 
are no advances to report”.  The letter alludes to supposed progress in making contact with those 
who have never made use of the rights that their acknowledgement by the Valech commission 
entails.  All other measures mentioned in the letter however refer to generic symbolic reparation 
(monuments and memorials); merely informational initiatives (in regard to rights to housing 
subsidy), and supposed ‘deepening’ of the search for justice. The example offered for this latter 
is the modernisation of the IT system of the Human Rights Programme Unit, whose legal advice 
and legal representation work however completely exclude survivors. 
Meanwhile, as ever, a range of survivors’ associations have been active and proactive in defence 
of their rights. They submitted alternative reports to the UN system in regard to Chile’s various 
appearances before committees, mentioned above, and more associations joined national 
coordination instances the Mesa Coordinadora and Comando Unitario. These bodies maintain 
permanent dialogue with all political parties and lobby before relevant legislative committees, 
including appearing before the Constitutional Tribunal to submit an opinion on the draft bill on 
early release (see below). Survivors have also continued to meet with the National human rights 
Institute to discuss judicial access to the content of the ballot archives. The positive work carried 
out in association with the Civil Registry, commented upon in last year’s report, continues to bear 
fruit, although it has thrown up the disturbing statistic that a full 25% of those people at some 
time recognised by the Valech Commission as survivors are now deceased. This represents a 
number equivalent to the entire list of those recognised by Valech II in 2011. 
1.3 Enforced Disappearance  
1.3.1 Chile’s Long Overdue Report to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
On the ninth and 10th of April 2019, Chile appeared before the UN Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances (CED), to discuss a report presented five years late. The substantial official 
report, received by the committee on 30 November 2018, listed a long catalogue of draft bills 
that, according to the state, showed that Chile was advancing towards an ever more complete 
compliance with the International Convention for the protection of all persons against enforced 
and involuntary disappearance.  However, complementary and/or alternative reports submitted 
by the National Human Rights Institute and by civil society organisations pointed out that the 
majority of the listed draft bills have been before parliament for between four and five years, 
most showing no recent signs of advance.53  Two of them (Boletines 9958-17, prohibition of the 
elimination of documentation by the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, and public security 
 
53 Inter alia, Draft Bills (Boletines) 9748-07 (inapplicability of statutes of limitation and amnesty to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity); 9773-07 (‘harmonisation’ of the amnesty law with other dispositions); 10883-17 (fall and 
direct judicial access to the archives of the Valech commission); 9958-17 (prohibition of the elimination of 
documentation by the Ministry of Defence, Armed Forces, and public security forces); and 9818-17 (typification of 
enforced disappearance as an ordinary crime). 
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forces; and 9818-17 (typification of enforced disappearance as an ordinary crime) were moreover 
introduced at the initiative of individual parliamentarians, never having had official executive 
sponsorship.  The contention in the official state report that draft bills 9748-07 and 9773-07 
“have been prioritised” by the government, forming part of “a set of draft bills prioritised by the 
human rights of secretariat” is difficult to understand, given that the priority (“ extremely 
urgent”) status previously assigned to each was reduced to “simple” in 2015.54   Mention in the 
subsequent paragraph of the official report that a draft bill to ratify the convention on the 
inapplicability of statutes of limitation and amnesty to war crimes and crimes against humanity 
“was presented” suggests allusion to a recent initiative. Such an interpretation would however 
be misleading, given that the draft bill in question, Boletín 1265-10, was actually introduced in 
1994, reporting no movement since 2004. 
 
The official state report suggests that the right and corresponding duty of full participation is 
satisfied by the state having “facilitated” a single meeting between an international expert and 
some associations in February 2017, as well as having “presented” its official report to these 
associations once completed. The complementary report provided by the INDH however 
correctly signals that such activities should be considered utterly insufficient for the purposes of 
complying with the participation requirement.55 The state report asserts that the typification of 
enforced disappearance contained in law 20.537 brings domestic legislation into line with the 
Rome statute, omitting mention of the deficiencies and omissions that the legislation contains 
(principally, by introducing a parameter of minimum time detention not contained in the statute 
definition, and in failing to specify aggravating circumstances and other special protections for 
vulnerable groups).  Both deficiencies are corrected in draft bill Boletín 9819-17, mentioned 
above, which was approved in the lower chamber two years ago but has seen no subsequent 
movement.  The state does acknowledge the nonstate origins of  this bill, which came about via 
social pressure, but asserts that it is now part of the legislative agenda of the subsequent at 
human rights.  As examples of “measures” supposedly taken by the sub Secretariat to promote 
the draft bills timely adoption, the report mentions “monitoring (seguimiento) and the 
presentation of “observations” during drafting stages of drafting of the text toward its current 
wording.56  in the continuing absence of an adequate typification, the state report offers a list of 
‘other criminal figures ‘ which it suggests are “similar”, and applicable to the enforced 
disappearances practised by the dictatorship. The list however contains, by the state’s own 
admission, many figures which are wholly inadequate and carry excessively low penalties, none 
of which moreover includes the element of failure to provide information which is a constituent 
of part of the specific criminal figure of enforced disappearance.  Moreover, after the official 
state report had been presented, but before it was discussed before the CED, the executive 
branch introduced a draft bill, in December 2018, that would allow post-sentencing benefits to 
be offered indistinctly to those responsible for ‘ordinary ‘ crimes and those sentenced for crimes 
 
54 Informe del Estado, para. 83. 
55 INDH, Complementary Report (Informe Complementario al Comité contra las Desapariciones Forzadas de 
Naciones Unidas, Primer Informe Periódico del Estado de Chile) approved by the INDH board on 11 March 2019.  
56 CED/C/CHL/1 op.cit., para 39, fn.35.  The observations of the Committe on Enforced Disappearances, by 
contrast, require the State to “accelerate” the process, (CED/C/CHL/CO/1, ONU, Observaciones finales sobre el 
Informe presentado por Chile versión inicial. 18 April 2019). 
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against humanity (Boletín 12345-07).  The Constitutional Tribunal, for its part, raised objections 
to an element of another draft bill, today passed into law, which sought to increase the minimum 
requirements for the concession of parole to perpetrators of crimes against humanity.57  Both of 
these developments militate against the state’s compliance with its duty to apply penalties 
proportional to the seriousness of the offence, a duty to which the CED drew the state’s 
attention, manifesting its concern at the current practices of concession of mitigating 
circumstances, half statute of limitations, early release, etc. The CED exhorted the state to 
instead guarantee that perpetrators “are always subject to appropriate penalties that take 
account of the extreme gravity of the crime”.58  the CED’s other recommendations include the 
provision of judicial access to the Valech archives, given the potential relevance to the resolution 
of outstanding disappearances; specific regular training for justice system operators and police 
officers about the convention against enforced disappearance; and for reparations, including 
access to truth and compensation, for all persons who have suffered direct harm.59  The CED 
recognised progress in the courts in acknowledging, on a majority basis, the inapplicability of 
statutes of limitation to civil claims and the inapplicability of amnesty, while warning of the 
potential reversibility of both interpretations if not backed up by legislative change. The 
committee also “lamented” the state’s information that the creation of a permanent commission 
for classification of victims -long promised and often recommended – “is not a priority”.60 It 
exhorted the state to expand the existing legal figure of “absent by reason of enforced 
disappearance (ausente por razón de desaparición forzada)” so that it can be applied to 
contemporary cases; and also recommended the intensification of search efforts, introducing 
effective participation and proactively protecting sites where the possible presence of remains 
of the disappeared is suspected.61 
In regard to the matter of intensification of search efforts, the state report alluded at various 
points to the “investigation and search team (Equipo de Investigación y Búsqueda)” that it 
declared had been created, in 2017, within the existing Human Rights Programme Unit. The 
official report also acknowledged that the Human Rights Subsecretariat, to which the Unit 
belongs, is the entity responsible for the formulation of public policy in this area.62  It mentioned 
that search is subordinated “for now” (por ahora)  to judicial processes (criminal investigations), 
and asserted that the Subsecretariat is seeking to establish an “administrative institution to 
support search” (para. 174).  Taken together, these comments might inspire hope that the 
National Search Plan once promised might come to pass, a step that has already been taken in 
countries including Peru and El Salvador, complementing judicial search with administrative 
measures. However, such an interpretation is not borne out by more recent information provided 
by the sub Secretariat to the Observatorio, suggesting instead that no such plan will be created 
and that the role of the mentioned team will be limited to taking “actions” to assist justice system 
 
57 The project, in modified form, became Law 21.124, in force since 8 January 2019. See below. 
58 CED/C/CHL/CO/1, op. cit., paras. 10 and 11. 
59 Ibíd., paras. 17, 21, 23, 25. 
60 CED/C/CHL/CO/1, op. cit., para. 24. 
61 Ibíd., paras. 28 and 29. 
62 CED/C/CHL/1. op.cit., para. 50. 
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organs and/or the legal work already undertaken by the Unit.63  The state report also mentions 
the Unit as evidence of measures that have been taken by the state to “provide all possible 
assistance to the relatives of victims of enforced disappearance in discovering their fate and 
whereabouts”.64  This claim is clearly at odds with the perception of relatives’ associations, as set 
out in their alternative report presented to the CED.  It moreover risks reducing the state’s duties 
to the provision of assistance to third parties to resolve something that is presented as a private 
problem. In fact, it is of course both a juridical and moral duty for the state that was responsible 
for the disappearances to be accountable for its previous aberrant conduct, independently of 
whether each individual victim has still-living relatives actively searching for answers. 
1.3.2 Search, Identification and Restitution of the Disappeared  
In response to an enquiry from the Observatorio, the Human Rights Unit of Chile’s state forensic 
and coroners service, the Servicio Médico Legal, SML, informed us that a total of 307 validated 
identifications have been carried out by or in association with the service between 1990 and June 
2019; were validated identifications refers to those that have been underwritten by the courts 
and accepted as definitive.65 This universe of 307 individuals includes three people whose 
remains were discovered in Patio 29 of the Santiago General Cemetery, but who do not figure on 
the lists of victims of disappearance or extrajudicial execution officially recognised by Chile’s 
truth commissions.   Accordingly, 304 of the total of 3,216 people currently officially 
acknowledged as victims of those crimes currently have a valid identification.66 This total of 304 
corresponds to 155 people initially classified as disappeared, and 149 classified as victims of 
extrajudicial execution “without the handing over of remains” (sin entrega de restos).67 Five of 
the 304 individuals were identified en Argentina: three of these were deceased, the other two 
were abducted children who survived, and recovered their birth identities as adults. Therefore 
299 officially recognised victims have been identified in Chile, 182 using DNA techniques (nuclear 
DNA, in 167 cases, or mitochondrial DNA, in the case of the remaining 15). A further 116 people 
were identified using older forensic methods, with one more identified by judicial resolution.   
 
63 Meeting and written correspondence 21 June 2019, subsequent electronic correspondence (15 and 31 July 
2019). 
64 State’s report (Informe del Estado), para. 173. 
65 The Unit is a new entity that brings together the work of the Specialised Forensic Identification Unit, UEIF, and 
other parts of the service (see below, section 3.6.2). It should be noted that official identification can only be done 
by the judiciary, who work on the basis of reports submitted by the SML. 
66 The total of 3,216 has been produced by the Observatorio, in an effort to reconcile, correct and update initial 
state lists on the basis of subsequent verified happenings (such as the 2008 appearance, alive and well, of German 
Cofré). The INDH and memory site Londres 38 both mention, in their respective reports to the UN CED, that even 
supposedly official figures on the total numbers of people acknowledged, found, and/or identified by the state 
today vary according to the source consulted.  This constitutes yet another powerful reason for the creation of a 
single, consolidated, transparent and up to date register.  
67 This latter category is a peculiar historical construct almost exclusive to Chile. The differentiation between these 
persons and those classed as ‘disappeared’ (detenidas-desaparecidas) is done on the grounds that those classed as 
executed without the handing over of remains were certified and/or widely acknowledged, at the time or in the 
early years of transition, to have been killed; even though their remains had not been located or could not be 
recovered.  One example affected people whose deaths were known to, and even sometimes officially certified by, 
the dictatorship, but who were buried anonymously or en masse in cemeteries or other places.  Families were 
sometimes not informed – and therefore continued to search for someone who they considered to be disappeared 
– or were notified, but denied more information or the chance to organise or even attend a funeral or burial.  
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The SML indicated that while their work presents multiple technical challenges, the main 
impediment to the generation of new finds - the most significant recent discovery of remains 
having been in 2006 - has been eminently human factors: the “pact of silence” established and 
maintained by perpetrators, and deliberate acts of cover-up or destruction of remains  
(Operación Retiro de Televisores and similar episodes).68 This information underlines two 
important truths: firstly, search is not solely a technical, juridical, or judicial undertaking; and, 
secondly, the social harm occasioned by enforced disappearance cannot be resolved exclusively 
through search. Instead, it requires additional public policy aimed at revealing more truth, 
repairing some of the perennial and new harm caused, and implementing genuine efforts at non-
repetition, something that would imply, amongst other things, breaking the current habit of 
official secrecy that surrounds the issue of the serving of custodial sentences.69   
As regards the current judicial mode of search that prevails in Chile, overseen by investigative 
magistrates, one positive development is the new impulse given in late 2018 to an intersectoral 
roundtable, Mesa Intersectorial, a space that gathers together the main state institutions that 
assist the judicial branch in search and identification within the context of criminal prosecutions. 
The Mesa originated in 2015-2016, as part a research project carried out by members of the 
SML’s Special Forensic Identification Unit, UEIF, in association with Ulster University.70  Later 
falling under the judicial branch’s purview, the roundtable was founded to promote mutual 
training and provide a forum for the sharing of information, to improve the responses and advice 
that the Civil Registry, the detective police (PDI), uniformed police (Carabineros), the state 
Human Rights Programme and other relevant institutions were able to offer to judicial requests 
and/or when faced with finds of remains. During 2017-18 the instance entered a period of de 
facto abeyance, while a draft protocol that it had drawn up was considered by the participating 
institutions.  The Mesa recommenced its sessions on 19 December 2018, and again on 6 March 
2019, in order to revisit the texts of the protocol, incorporating proposed modifications. On 19 
June 2019 a meeting was held on the Supreme Court premises, with invitees from relatives’ 
associations and academic institutions, to incorporate observations made by investigative 
magistrates currently in charge of human rights cases. The Observatorio understands that subject 
to the incorporation of those observations by the Human Rights sub Secretariat, a member of 
the instance, the protocol will be adopted and will come into effect. 
The protocol, and the valuable work that it represents and promises, are oriented to improving 
aspects of the present mode of judicial search. Neither the protocol nor the Mesa itself aim, or 
have the mandate, to provide a response to the other duties and needs mentioned above, nor 
can they generate a motu proprio new search initiatives or strategies.  The Mesa does not either 
contemplate, at least in its current configuration, the kind of permanent participation from civil 
society that international standards require, and whose absence has been repeatedly signalled 
 
68 Source: Written report supplied by the SML Human Rights Unit to the Observatorio.  
69 The keeping of up to date registers of detained persons, and their openness to scrutiny, is spelt out in the 
respective International Convention as a duty of states.  
70 Newton-Picarte Project, co-financed by the SML and the British Council, 2015-16. 
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as one of the major deficiencies of the Chilean state’s current response.71 another deficiency is 
without a doubt, the absence of a figure that typifies enforced disappearance as an ordinary 
crime . It is worth remembering that this crime contemplates the criminalisation of the failure to 
provide relevant information, including by those who played no direct part in the initiation of the 
disappearance.72  
Over the statistical period that this report addresses (July 2018-June 2019, inclusive) there were 
four new identifications of victims classified by the state as disappeared (detenidos-
desaparecidos, DD), plus two identifications of individuals classified as victims of extrajudicial 
execution (ejecutados politicos, EP), even though the remains had not at the time been found 
and/or released to their families.73 At the close of the current edition (August 2019), the remains 
of five of the six aforementioned persons had been handed back to their families: Pedro Segundo 
Pedreros Ferreira (a 48 year old labourer, forcibly disappeared from Chihuio, since October 
1973); Pedro Segundo Opazo Parra, extrajudicially executed aged 39; José Fernando Pavez 
Espinoza, extrajudicially executed aged 30; Abelardo (“Jecho”) Quinteros Miranda, a Communist 
Youth League activist who was forcibly disappeared at the age of 21 alongside his brother  
Eduardo, who was extrajudicially executed, and Sergio Alberto Gajardo Hidalgo, a 15 year old boy 
forcibly disappeared the day after the 1973 coup when he left the house to try and take bread to 
his sister’s house nearby. Luis Horacio Soto Silva, forcibly disappeared at the age of 19, had yet 
to be laid to rest at time of writing.  All of the aforementioned persons, with the exception of 
Pedro Pedreros, had been buried secretly by the dictatorship in Patio 29 under the legend “NN”, 
standing for ‘name unknown’.  Although some of them had an effect not been identified, in other 
cases the authorities simply chose to hide the news of the death from their families. From 1991, 
when the registers of autopsies carried out by the SML during the dictatorship were reviewed, it 
was possible to establish that some of those individuals had met their deaths, without at the time 
being able to recover or correctly identify their mortal remains. These were the circumstances in 
which the first truth commission, the Rettig commission, classified them as victims of 
extrajudicial execution even in the absence of their remains.  
A total of 19 restitution ceremonies were carried out by the SML’s UEIF between July 2018 and 
the beginning of August 2019.  One of them restored the remains of an unborn child, a member 
of the Soto Troncoso family, identified during an investigation of illegal adoptions.  The others 
included the five people already mentioned above, as well as (in 2018): Archivaldo Morales 
 
71 For the general requirement see CED/C/7, Principios rectores para la búsqueda de personas desaparecidas, 
adopted by the UN CED in session 16 April 2019, and in whose preparation Cath Collins took part. On the noting of 
deficiencies in participation in Chile, see above, section 1.3.1. 
72 The concealment of information and/or of remains has already given rise to at least one bringing of criminal 
charges in Chile, in 2015, against a contractor who apparently uncovered remains possibly belonging to 
disappearance victim Ruperto Oriol Torres, while carrying out building work on a police station.  The contractor 
was accused of having hidden the remains again, to avoid a halt being called to the renovations, fearing possible 
financial loss.  The charges were however later dropped.  Ruperto is still missing. 
73 For example, José Pávez Espinoza, who was correctly identified by the then Instituto Médico Legal, IML (now 
SML) at the date of his death in Octubre de 1973, was nonetheless buried anonymously in Patio 29 of the Santiago 
General Cementery. His family was not told of his death.  In 1991, when the records of dictatorship-era autopsy 
reports done by the IML were reviewed, the certification of his death came to light, and his family was notified.  
His remains were however not recovered at that time. 
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Villanueva; Nicomedes Correa Rodríguez; Félix Figueras Ubach; Armando Castro Contreras; 
Manuel Catalán Paillal; José Ananías Zapata Carrasco and Víctor Ortega Cuevas. Between January 
and early August 2019: Sergio Flores Durán; Rene Claudio Carrasco Maldonado; Rudy Vidal 
Pereira; Guido Quintanilla Palominos, Ricardo Ruiz Rodríguez, and unidentified fragmentary 
remains associated with the Chihuio case.74  The SML informed us that in cases such as these, 
where fragmentary remains cannot be identified with existing scientific techniques, careful 
discussion and reflection takes place, involving the relatives associations closest to the case,  and 
the investigative magistrate overseeing it, in order to determine how best to proceed. In four 
cases, such remains have been laid to rest in the memorials placed at each site (Calama, Chihuio, 
Lonquén y Paine), with the relatives associations taking on the role of family members to assure 
a dignified reception and burial. Scientific records are kept, in case future advances allow further 
certainty to be achieved. Situations have also risen in which families who have already recovered 
their loved one indicated they do not wish to be subjected to a new cycle of grief should later 
identification of additional fragmentary remains occur.  Such situations are resolved on a case-
by-case basis, seeking always to ensure the dignity of the person and reparatory treatment of 
their surviving relatives. Remains that are still held by the SML are safeguarded under conditions 
of maximum care and security.75  
1.3.3 Beyond Forensics: Acknowledging the Social and Political Catastrophe of Enforced 
Disappearance  
Advances that could allow the identification of remains already recovered do not necessarily 
require new scientific discovery: there are still 300 acknowledged victims of disappearance or 
execution for whom no reference samples exist. The samples, supplied by biological relatives, 
could allow for the identification of any future remains found, or of remains already held.  This 
makes it imperative to periodically repeat public information campaigns aimed at encouraging 
relatives to approach the SML to offer samples. The international nature of oppression, via the 
state-to-state criminal conspiracy known as Plan Cóndor, also makes it necessary to share 
information and cross-reference finds with other Southern Cone countries.76  this requires efforts 
and contributions that go beyond the competence of the SML, which  works on these issues as 
an auxiliary entity to the judicial branch. In countries such as Argentina, it has been the 
government of the day - irrespective of its political colours - which has taken on the role of 
transforming the collection of samples and the search for the disappeared into a shared societal 
goal.  This represents one of many urgent challenges that could be addressed by a national search 
entity, able to take on the numerous civic, administrative, preparatory, preventive, and symbolic 
duties that the regional and international conventions to which Chile is a signatory require. 
 
 
74 Source: Information provided by the Human Rights Unit of the SML to the Observatorio, op. cit. We are grateful, 
as always, for the generous collaboration of Marisol Intriago and the Unit team. 
75 This the situation, for example, of some bone fragments found in Fuerte Arteaga that could not be successfully 
identified in the most recent round of testing, since in this case there is no memorial in which they could be 
inhumed with due ceremony. 
76 The State report presented to the UN Committee against Enforced Disappearance in 2017 makes generic 
reference to memoranda of understanding signed with Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (in 2014), and with 
MERCOSUR, but gives no details about how, if at all, these have been used successfully to search for, locate, or 
identify disappeared persons. CED/C/CHL/1, op.cit., paras. 119 and 120. 
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This is the sense in which what is required is not simply an accentuation of existing forensic and 
judicial efforts, but rather comprehension of the magnitude of the social catastrophe that 
enforced disappearance represents, and action to mitigate it. To offer one example, the 
maintenance of up-to-date registers of detained persons, and the provision of access to them to 
any person with a legitimate interest, is one of the responsibilities in the area of non-repetition 
that are enshrined in the relevant international norms. Another is the typification of the crime of 
enforced disappearance, and the updating of other relevant laws.77  These are matters for prison 
service, the core legislative powers, and other administrative State institutions. Comprehensive 
public policy is therefore required to identify and address the distinct kinds of fault lines that 
disappearance produces in families and in society, and to deliver on the right to participation.  
For these reasons it is particularly disappointing that the promised national search plan - implying 
an entity where these international duties, to date comprehensively ignored, could be addressed 
- seems to have been abandoned. 
2. TRUTH         
2.1 Normative framework 
As mentioned in the introduction, current conceptions of the right to truth view it as not simply 
a matter for victims and relatives, nor something that can be realised by a truth commission or 
even a series of criminal investigations.  Rather, it requires that relatives, survivors and the 
general public can seek out and acquire information about grave violations, including about the 
fate and current location of still-disappeared victims; but also regarding the process of 
authorization, planning and commission.  The corresponding state duties include the 
establishment of institutions, mechanisms and procedures for collating such information and 
making it public. The UN Special Rapporteur report previously cited also emphasises the 
particular importance of such measures in post-authoritarian societies, to overcome secretism 
and the official lies carefully constructed by such regimes.78  In Chile, by contrast, a deeply-rooted 
culture of hiding, retaining or withholding information that ought to be public still prevails. This 
does not just fail to comply with the duty to proactively supply information, but also obliges 
citizens to repeatedly insist, via tortuous bureaucratic procedures, on having their rights 
respected.  In the face of practices that do not stand up to public scrutiny, authorities prefer to 
shore up secretism rather than changing those practices.  The end result of repeated insistence 
before the courts could be read in a positive light, since judicial practice today tends to support 
the principle of access to information. However, the fact that repeated resort to the Council for 
Transparency and the courts is necessary, speaks of the failure to install a culture of transparency.  
Other developments during the period of this report meanwhile raise questions about the duty 
of veracity that applies to private bodies, including the communications media (see section 2.3). 
 
2.2 Presidential Pardons: Transparency and Exemption from Scrutiny   
In the 2018 version of this report we analysed the figure of presidential pardon, with particular 
reference to the oversight that is supposed to be exercised by the Comptroller General of the 
Republic, Contraloría.  On that occasion, the requirement for oversight was responsible for 
 
77 Such as reform to the Law on Divorce, incorporating ‘absent by reason of enforced disappearance’ as a 
recognised cause of dissolution of marriage. 
78 UN A/HRC/36/50/Add.1, op.cit., section III. 
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delaying ratification of the presidential pardon conceded to perpetrator René Cardemil until after 
the latter’s death.  Shortly afterwards, the requirement was temporarily suspended by 
Resolution 13/18, of 11 May de 2018, which established that the office of the Comptroller 
General would not be required to confirm concessions of presidential pardons until at least 15 
May 2019.  A few days before the measure was due to expire, it was extended for a further six 
weeks (by Resolution 12/19, 6 May 2019). This suspension both sped up the process of conceding 
a pardon and removed one of the possible methods of supervision and possible objection to it. 
 
Another method of social monitoring and supervision of the use of pardons is provided by public 
awareness of their use.  In pursuit of this principle of publicity, a writ was presented on 18 July 
2018 before the national Council for Transparency, CPLT, denouncing the fact that the 
Subsecretariat of Justice of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights had not published the 
pardon conceded to Cardemil.79 The writ argued for the importance of making pardons public, 
since knowledge of the putative reasons for their concession is essential for taking action, should 
it prove necessary, against any inappropriate use of the power.80 The CPLT accepted the motion, 
ruling that all pardons, irrespective of the crimes for which they are conceded, must be made 
public, with only sensitive personal data withheld.81  This ruling provoked a complaint of illegality 
before the Santiago Court of Appeal, alleging, amongst other grounds, a putative ‘right to be 
forgotten’. The third bench of the appeals court rejected the complaints, determining that the 
CPLT had acted within its mandate, respecting the principle of the divisibility of information (that 
is, ordering that information that is in the public interest he handed over, while allowing for the 
reduction of personal and sensitive data). The court added that complete withholding of the 
identity of someone to whom a pardon had been conceded would “denature the whole 
institution of pardon which is, by its nature, inherently personalised.”.82 The court moreover 
shared the CPLT’s interpretation that pardon only remits or commutes the penalty, without 
dissolving the guilt of the perpetrator assigned to the guilty.  The court added that “it must 
moreover be considered (…) that a benefit so singular as the pardon, whose origins are 
questionable from the point of view of the Republican system that we now enjoy, and which 
must therefore be considered quite exceptional, should not be awarded even greater 
exceptionalism through conceding a secretive character that is quite unjustified”.83 The court 
accordingly established that information on pardons, once conceded, must be published: in this 
case, within a 10 day period. The given period duly expired, causing the CPLYT to have to notify 
the Subsecretariat of Justice of the penalties established for non-compliance, in order to obtain 
 
79 Law 20.285, the Access to Public Information law, establishes that state administrative bodies must maintain 
certain information permanently available on its website.  This includes “acts and resolutions that have impact on 
third parties” (art. 7 g) – in the case at hand, the impact is on the person to whom the pardon was conceded and, 
above all, on society as a whole. 
80 There are regional precedents, such as the pardon conceded in Peru in late 2017 to Alberto Fujimori, which was 
revoked in 2018 due to its illegality. 
81 CPLT. Amparo Rol. C3210-18, 9 October 2018. 
82 Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago. Rol. 474-2018 (contencioso administrativo). Ministerio de Justicia y DDHH con 
CPLT. 12 June 2019, considerando 3º. 
83 Ibid.  
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the publication of the relevant notice on the active transparency section of the ministerial 
website.84 
2.3 Civil Settlement Rulings: against the newspaper La Tercera, for refusing to retract fake 
news, and in favour of a daughter wishing to establish her right of descendance  
in April 2019, the Santiago appeals court upheld a writ of protection seeking an order against the 
newspaper La Tercera that would oblige it to rectify fake news published on 2 October 1973. On 
the date in question, the newspaper published an article referring to the “execution” of Jorge 
Oyarzún Escobar and Juan Escobar Camus, who had purportedly carried out an armed attack on 
a military housing district.  The first bench unanimously upheld the writ presented by Paola 
Oyarzún Escobar, daughter and niece, respectively, of the supposed ‘subversives’.  The case was 
investigated by judge Hernán Crisosto, who managed to establish, in 2016, that 
Jorge and Juan had actually been victims of a crime against humanity.  The rectification was 
requested by the family in 2018, but the newspaper failed to reply. The recent verdict declared 
that: “the newspaper firm Copesa S.A. must proceed, by way of its La Tercera newspaper, to 
publish the rectification that was requested of it … in the terms that were requested; that is to 
say, with a public apology and in the same tone as the 1973 publication, with the same 
prominence and visibility”.”85  
On the same date, the Supreme Court upheld a writ presented by the INDH, ordering the civil 
registry to inscribe Tamara Lagos as the natural daughter of Mario Lagos Rodríguez. Mr. 
Rodríguez was extrajudicially executed by secret police agents in 1984, a few months before 
Tamara was born.  In 1993 verdict, the court had recognised Tamara as the daughter of Mario 
Lagos, for the purposes of entitlement to administrative reparations.86  the present rate 
nonetheless argued that the civil registry had not duly considered or incorporated this verdict. 
The Santiago appeals court initially rejected the rate, arguing that the 1993 verdict did not 
require the registry to inscribe Tamara as the daughter of Mario Lagos, and holding that the 
registry did not have independent legal faculties to make such a determination in the absence of 
an explicit judicial order.  The Third Bench however decided in April that the relevant inscription 
should be carried out, adding that, irrespective of the date of birth or inscription of an individual, 
the categories of “natural” and/or “illegitimate” offspring should no longer be used. This latter 
arose because Law 19.585, of 2004, abolish the terms, replacing them with terms referring to 
 
84 Oficio no. 001275, Directora de Fiscalización (s) del Consejo para la Transparencia al Sr. Subsecretario de Justicia, 
9 July 2019. 
85 Rol 84.116-2018, 12 April 2019.  On 17 September the Supreme Court confirmed the sentence in respect of the 
obligation to rectify the previous statement in similar terms, and in a similarly prominent place of publication, but 
without the public apology: Rol 11.044-2019, 17 September 2019. 
86 The Court declared Tamara to be her father’s “illegitimate” daughter, for the purposes of recognising her right to 
a reparations pension. However, 25 years later, she was denied the right to be party to a civil claim, as it was 
considered that her standing to do so had not been established. Judge Aldana issued a first instance verdict for the 
homicides of Mario Lagos and other victims on 4 May 2018 (Rol. 11-2009). In the civil component of the case, the 
judge considered that neither Tamara nor her mother had successfully establised active legitimation (the necessary 
relationship between persons who request the action of the justice system, and the situation that they are 
denouncing).  
    25 
 
children born inside or outside of matrimony; and establishing that both categories should 
moreover be given the same rights.  Although the new law was passed subsequently to the events 
in question, the bench considered unanimously that the new terminology, and the treatment 
that it lays down, should be respected from a perspective of equality before the law. 87 
2.4 Legislative Impasse Surrounding the Valech Secrecy Law Continues: INDH Provides Data to 
Postulants and, Within the Terms of the Existing Law, to the Courts  
The hapless process of post hoc legislation that sought to impose a 50-year secrecy law on the 
data compiled by the Valech Commissions continues to take its toll, as we have seen above with 
regard to recommendations made to Chile by the UN human rights system during the period.  
We are grateful to the INDH, legal custodian of the Valech archive, for having provided a very 
complete summary of the relevant laws, its own efforts to clarify and operationalise them, and 
the current state of affairs.88  Specific legislation and subsequent actions have been discussed in 
previous editions of the present report, and in the annual reports of the INDH itself.  In regard to 
the current situation, we have been informed that the work of preserving the documentation, 
which was begun in 2014, continues, using a dedicated standalone IT system with strictly 
controlled access for INDH staff.  Physical conservation and digital backup had covered a total of 
one third of the available documentation by May 2019, with a total of 22,551 files processed.  
Moreover, as we have previously communicated, the institution began in September 2016 to 
provide postulants to either iteration of the Valech commission with copies of all of the 
documentation contained in their personal file.89  As of 31 May 2019, a total of 1831 files of this 
nature had been handed over to individuals.  The majority of these requests (1,156) came from 
postulants to Valech I; with the remaining 675 corresponding to postulants to Valech II.  Around 
28% of the total requests received (506 of 1,831) came from persons who were not, in the final 
analysis, acknowledged by the commission as survivors.90 
 
Regarding requests by the courts, the current interpretation of the legal situation, as ratified by 
the Comptroller General’s office in 2014, is that the information collated by Valech I is still subject 
to an absolute prohibition, valid until 2054. In relation to Valech II, about which the office 
abstained from pronouncing, the INDH has chosen to directly release information to the courts 
subject to a written court order.  This information is given independent of whether the named 
persons were classified or not as survivors.  The INDH also examines the files of the former Nazi 
sect ‘Colonia Dignidad’ - copies of which are also held by the INDH - in order to add any pertinent 
information.  Between 2016 and mid-2019, the INDH had replied to 186 requests from the judicial 
branch. 62 of these could not be complied with, because they referred to postulants to Valech I; 
 
87 Sentence Rol. 2.771-2019, 12 April 2019. 
88 Written communication entitled ‘Situación Archivo Valech y Otros’, sent by the INDH on 14 June 2019, in 
response to queries from the Observatorio. 
89 Hasta entonces, se entregaba solamente aquella porción de la carpeta que había sido proporcionada por el o la 
titular, más otros documentos que podrían considerarse públicos, reservando otra documentación.  Hoy, 
solamente se reservan o se tarjan contenidos que podrían vulnerar los derechos de otros declarantes u otras 
personas víctimas de violaciones. 
90 A total of 43.5% of the postulants to both iterations fall into this category.  Observatorio figures, produced from 
official data.  The percentages of applicants whose cases were recognised was 79.4% for Valech I, but only 30.8% 
for Valech II. 
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13 could not be responded to for lack of information; and eight related to individuals classified 
by the Rettig commission (whose archive is today in the hands of the Human Rights Programme 
Unit).  Accordingly, in only 55.4% of cases was it possible to supply all or part of the requested 
material.91  these positive responses led to the handing over of 974 Valech II files. Around 65% 
of these referred to individuals who were not classified by the commission, underlining the 
importance of establishing an administrative body that can rectify previous errors or omissions 
in classification, such as in the case that a subsequent judicial investigation determined that an 
individual ought to have been so classified. 
2.5 Press revelations about civilian CNI employees incorporated into Army ranks 
In January 2019, CNN Chile published the names of 1,119 plainclothes agents of the National 
Centre for Information, CNI - the dictatorship-era intelligence and repressive agency that 
replaced the DINA secret police - who were incorporated into regular army ranks by direct order 
of then dictator Augusto Pinochet just a month before Patricio Aylwin took over as elected 
president of the Republic. Most of the former agents were directly incorporated to the new army 
intelligence agency the DINE, without any application process, vetting, or training for their new 
role.  Although almost 3 decades has gone by, and various of these individuals have now died, 
repeated recourse to the national transparency law has failed to achieve access to this list by 
conventional means. TV channel CNN Chile leaked a copy of the list, establishing moreover that 
as of late 2018, nine of those named continued in active service. The Minister of Defence 
acknowledged that both the CNI and predecessor the DINA had constituted completely 
unjustifiable and unacceptable repressive organisations, and made assurances that all the course 
of 2019 the nine individuals would all be due to retire.  It should however be recalled that in the 
past, individuals retired and/or removed from the Armed Forces due to their associations with 
past human rights violations have been subsequently rehired in consultancy roles. 
 
3. JUSTICE    
3.1 The Interamerican Human Rights System  
in addition to mentions of the Interamerican commission court elsewhere in this report, it should 
be mentioned that the December 2018 verdict in Órdenes Guerra vs. Chile represents the fourth 
Interamerican court sentence finding Chile in breach of its international obligations in a case 
related to dictatorship era violations. The second and third such sentences (García Lucero, 2013, 
and Maldonado, 2015) have been complied with at least as regards actions to be taken in favour 
of the cases direct petitioners. Nonetheless, in both cases the opportunity to expand the general 
principle to other similar situations, using the sentences to improve public policy, has not been 
taken.  In García Lucero, for example the state has ignored the verdict’s reaffirmation of its ex 
officio responsibilities to investigate and prosecute the crime of torture. 
 
The Maldonado case meanwhile ordered the state to provide a mechanism allowing rectification 
of spurious convictions imposed by military courts and political prisoners. The state’s chosen 
mechanism has required individual survivors and other relatives to initiate the vision on a case-
by-case basis. Yet another example came on 27 May 2019, when the Supreme Court annulled 
 
91 The requests that were only partly answered requested information about individuals who had applied to Valech 
I and others who had applied to Valech II. Replies could only be given for those related to Valech II.  
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sentences imposed by wartime courts martial in Antofagasta and Pisagua in 1974.92   Regarding 
Órdenes Guerra, the judicial branch had already played its part, changing its practice with regard 
to the statute of limitation in civil claims even before the final sentence was issued. What remains 
is to reverse the relative injustice thereby suffered by claimbringers whose cases were rejected, 
and whose right to reparation by the judicial route was therefore denied, before the change in 
criteria.  The legislation referred to in the sentence also needs to be passed (see section 1.2.2).  
However, it is the Almonacid case, from 2006, which continues to present the most egregious 
and longest running failure to comply: legislation to remove the validity and effects of the 
amnesty decree law of 1978 has never been introduced.  This requirement was reiterated in the 
García Lucero verdict, and in a high proportion of recent interactions by the state with the 
universal system (see section 1.1.1).   
The Observatorio understands that there are currently at least three actions against the state of 
Chile in preparation are currently under consideration by the commission. One, already 
mentioned, deals again with denial of civil compensation (in the case of Juan Paredes Barrientos); 
one, with the concession of parole to perpetrators, and the third was presented by survivor.  The 
government was prompted by these and various other complaints still pending before the 
regional human rights system to take the unprecedented step of naming an adjunct to their 
diplomatic mission in Washington especially to monitor the progress of these cases. The move 
came three months after the government signed a letter questioning the commission’s purpose, 
underlining the principle of subsidiarity, and exhorting the commission to avoid “invading” 
spheres proper to state sovereignty. The letter, also signed by the authorities of Argentina, Brasil, 
Colombia and Paraguay, caused controversy, since it was seen as an attempt to weaken the 
IACHR.  Meanwhile the court, which receives cases that could not be resolved before the 
commission and in which the commission believes there is prima facie evidence of a possible 
violation of the American Convention, accepted the case of Daniel Urrutia.  Urrutia is a Chilean 
judge who was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for preparing academic report criticising the 
actions of the judiciary during the dictatorship.93 the case is ongoing. 
  
 
92 Supreme Court, Roles 8.745-2018 and 15.074-2018. 
93 Case 12.995, Daniel Urrutia Laubreaux versus Chile, referred on 1 February 2019. 
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3.2 Domestic Courts  
Fig. 1. Numbers of final verdicts emitted by the criminal bench of the Supreme Court between 
July 2010 and June 2019 (inclusive) in cases for dictatorship-era human rights violations, by 
twelve-month period 
 Number of human rights cases 
finalised before the Criminal Bench 
of the Supreme Court   
July 2010 - June 2011 23 
July 2011 - June 2012 18 
July 2012 - June 2013 4 
July 2013 - June 2014   12* 
July 2014 - June 2015   44** 
July 2015 - June 2016 58˚ 
July 2016 - June 2017 55ˣ 
July 2017 - June 2018 37ˣ 
July 2018 - June 2019 44˚ 
* One of these dealing solely with civil liability 
** Four of these dealing solely with civil liability  
˚ 16 of these dealing solely with civil liability  
ˣ Six of these dealing solely with civil liability  
Source: Authors’ own production, using data obtained from judicial verdicts.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Detail of the 44 final verdicts emitted by the criminal bench of the Supreme Court 
between July 2019 and June 2019, inclusive, in cases for dictatorship-era human rights 
violations  
Causa Fecha fallo Rol 
1. Civil claim José Emiliano Cuevas Cuevas, 
 victim of enforced disappearance 
5.07.2018 Rol 1013-2018 
2. Aggravated kidnap of Luis Eduardo Durán Rivas (episode 
Operación Colombo) 
6.07.2018 Rol 38682-2017 
3. Homicide of Macarena Torres Tello 9.07.2018 Rol 37770-2017 
4. Aggravated kidnap of Gervasio Huaiquil Calviqueo 25.07.2018 Rol 44633-2017 
5. Aggravated kidnap of Pedro Vergara Inostroza 25.07.2018 Rol 35736-2017 
6. Aggravated kidnap of María Cristina  
López Stewart (episode Operación Colombo) 
7.08.2018 Rol 84785-2016 
7. Aggravated kidnap of Álvaro Modesto  
Vallejos Villagrán 
7.08.2018 Rol 19127-2017 
8. Aggravated homicide of José Domingo  
Quiroz Opazo 
7.08.2018 Rol 33750-2017 
9. Aggravated homicide of Iván Alfredo 
Quinteros Martínez 
7.08.2018 Rol 41554-2017 
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10. Aggravated homicide of Arturo Alejandro  
Navarrete Leiva 
9.08.2018 Rol 40774-2017 
11. Aggravated kidnap of Jorge Arturo Grez Aburto (episode 
Operación Colombo) 
14.08.2018 Rol 45911-2016 
12. Crime of ‘application of torment’ [torture] leading to the 
death of Héctor Fernando Velásquez Molina. 
16.08.2018 Rol 3382-2018 
13. Aggravated kidnap of Arturo Barría Araneda  
(episode Operación Colombo). 
24.08.2018 Rol 34185-2017 
14. Civil claim José Gregorio Araneda Riquelme,  
victim of extrajudicial execution 
28.08.2018 Rol 762-2018 
15. Aggravated kidnap of Bernardo Araya Zulueta and 
María Flores Araya, case Calle Conferencia 
5.09.2018 Rol 36332-2017 
16. Crime of exercise of violence against a detained person, 
with the aim of forcing a confession,  
leading to the death of Jorge Alejandro  
Cabedo Aguilera 
6.09.2018 Rol 34579-2017 
17. Crime of ‘illicit pressure’ [torture] causing the death of  
José Victorino Martínez Rojas 
24.09.2018 Rol 16914-2018 
18. Civil claim Juan Antonio Ruz Díaz,  
victim of extrajudicial execution 
24.09.2018 Rol 17010-2018 
19. Civil claim Luis Jorge Almonacid Dumenez,  
victim of enforced disappearance 
26.09.2018 Rol 19069-2018 
20. Aggravated kidnap of Sergio Arturo Flores Ponce  
(episode Operación Colombo) 
26.09.2018 Rol 36731-2017 
21. Civil claim Héctor Roberto Rodríguez Cárcamo,  
victim of enforced disappearance 
27.09.2018 Rol 14903-2018 
22. Civil claim Atiliano Hernández Hernández,  
ex political prisoner (survivor) 
28.09.2018 Rol 19301-2018 
23. ‘Caso fusilados’: Aggravated homicide of Jorge Eduardo 
Oyarzún Escobar, Juan Joaquín Escobar Camus and José 
Sergio Muñoz González 
4.10.2018 Rol 43113-2017 
24. Kidnap and aggravated homicide of Blanca Marina 
Carrasco Peña, victim of extrajudicial execution 
16.10.2018 Rol 43142-2017 
25. Aggravated kidnap causing seriously bodily harm to Eva 
Eugenia Palominos Rojas and Patricia del Carmen Zúñiga 
Barrios, former political prisoners (survivors) 
22.10.2018 Rol 40168-2017 
26. Aggravated homicide of Claudio Rodríguez Muñoz 23.10.2018 Rol 1376-2018 
27. Air Force Academy case (Caso Academia Guerra Aérea): 
Aggravated kidnap of José Luis Baeza Cruces; 
aggravated homicide of Alfonso Carreño Díaz, and the 
kidnap of 11 former political prisoners (survivors): Rosa 
Barrera Pérez, Jacinto Nazal Quiroz, Agueda Jara Avaca, 
Senator Jorge Montes Moraga, Guillermo Teiller del Valle, 
Magdalena Contreras Weise, Rosa María Montes Miranda, 
Diana Montes Miranda, María Josefina Miranda Tejías, 
José Canales Pérez and Guillermina Fresia Cervantes. 
5.11.2018 Rol 39628-2017 
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Source: Authors’ own production, using data obtained from judicial verdicts  
3.2.1 Investigative Magistrates and Coordination of Dictatorship-era Human Rights Cases  
During the period of the present report, Supreme Court judge Ricardo Blanco took over the role 
of coordination of human rights cases to which he had been assigned in May 2018, replacing 
Judge Sergio Muñoz.  Judge Blanco sees his role as one of continuing to build on existing 
foundations, to create a robust structure around human rights cases, which can continue to 
function independently of the rotation of the coordinator’s role. To this end, under the umbrella 
of the existing Study Directorate (Dirección de Estudios) of the Supreme Court, a plan of work for 
2019 was drawn up, and approved by a full sitting of the court on 13 May 2019.94  The new office, 
under the leadership of lawyer Cristián Sánchez, will continue to implement and improve an IT 
 
94 Document entitled Coordinación Nacional Causas Derechos Humanos del Poder Judicial, Modelo de Trabajo 
2019, copy on file with the Observatorio. 
28. Homicide of José Espinoza Santic 22.11.2018 Rol 1231-2018 
29. Aggravated homicide of Marcelino  
Marchandon Valenzuela. 
7.12.2018 Rol 4080-2018 
30. Aggravated kidnap of Félix Edmundo Lebrecht Díaz-Pinto 
(survivor of Operación Colombo) 
13.12.2018 Rol 38766-2017 
31. Civil claim Jorge Bernabé Yáñez Olave,  
victim of enforced disappearance 
26.12.2018 Rol 15298-2018 
32. Civil claim Carlos Luis Cubillos Gálvez,  
victim of enforced disappearance. 
31.12.2018 Rol 29454-2018 
33. Civil claim Carlos Bastías Kessi,  
ex political prisoner (survivor) 
21.01.2019 Rol 20362-2018 
34. Homicide of Sergio Ramírez Peña 24.01.2019 Rol 43531-2017 
35. Aggravated homicide of José Hernán  
Carrasco Vásquez 
18.02.2019 Rol 4567-2018  
36. Civil claim Newton Morales Saavedra,  
victim of enforced disappearance 
20.02.2019 Rol 12636-2018 
37. Civil claim II, Juan of Dios Salinas Salinas,  
victim of enforced disappearance 
22.02.2019 Rol 12715-2018 
38. Civil claim, victims of extrajudicial execution,  
Chihuío case 
7.03.2019 Rol 29251-2018 
39. Aggravated homicide of Miguel Estol Mery 25.03.2019 Rol 34392-2016 
40. Civil claim II, Rodolfo Valentín González Pérez, 
victim of enforced disappearance 
26.03.2019 
 
Rol 29463-2018 
41. Civil claim José Julián Peña Maltés, 
victim of enforced disappearance 
1.04.2019 Rol 29944-2018 
42. Homicide of Gabriel Salinas Martínez 19.05.2019 Rol 4568-2018 
43. Civil claim Mario Morris Barrios,  
victim of extrajudicial execution 
23.05.2019 Rol 31605-2018 
44. Civil claim III, Rodolfo Valentín González Pérez,  
victim of enforced disappearance 
28.05.2019 Rol 31766-2018 
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system associated to a database of completed and ongoing cases. Once operational, the system 
will allow alerts to be sent to investigative magistrates informing them of possible duplication in 
caseload, witnesses, or suspects; which should allow a more efficient case distribution and/or 
more effective use of existing information and witness statements.  
 
It is also foreseen that the office, to be known as the ‘National Coordination [Office] for Human 
Rights Cases’ (Coordinación nacional en causas de derechos humanos) will function as a hub 
coordinating the efforts of auxiliary agencies: alerting magistrates, for example, if a suspect fails 
to attend a scheduled evaluation appointment with the SML.  One immediately welcome 
initiative was the calling of a meeting between investigative magistrates and auxiliary agencies, 
in June 2019, part of which was also attended by representatives of some relative associations 
and academic institutions.  In response to concerns about the slow progress of cases, expressed 
at the meeting and on other opportunities, a series of measures were announced by a full sitting 
of the Supreme Court on 6 August, acting on a report submitted by Judge Blanco.  The measures 
are aimed at facilitating the passage of human rights cases through appeals courts, creating a 
special system of monitoring, designating a rapporteur for each court, whose job it is to oversee 
the smooth progress of these cases, and establish a preferential place for them on the court’s 
docket.  Special measures were decreed to avoid self-recusal by any sitting member of the bench 
leading to undue delay in the hearing of any case.95 Lawyers currently litigating such cases 
generally expressed a favourable opinion about the measures, when consulted by the 
Observatorio. 
The measures are consonant with a desire to have the new office’s work assist in overcoming 
bottlenecks that continue to impede a final resolution in cases that have often been ongoing for 
decades.  Another goal is therefore to unify the criteria used by investigative magistrates to 
report on their caseloads; while there is also a plan to add full details of the early stages of the 
case (first instance and appeals court) to the records held for cases currently before the Supreme 
Court. Once completed, this data stream will allow analysis of the mean and median time that 
cases spend at each level; as well as potentially allowing the identification of differences in the 
speed with which different appeals courts around the country deal with cases.  While such 
differences can have many valid reasons, including variations in the complexity and reach of each 
case, monitoring will allow corroboration of the fact that differences are indeed due only to 
technical considerations, as well as the design of strategies to assist where necessary.  Issues 
such as the correct form of notification of final sentences also require consideration: although 
the principle of publicity needs to be respected, there is also a potential drawback for the efficacy 
of justice if sentences are notified and published before measures can be taken to ensure that 
perpetrators do not evade justice by becoming fugitives. 
Some of the delays that commonly affect human rights cases are moreover only partially 
susceptible to administrative solutions, since they have their roots in the content of applicable 
laws.  To take one example, the requirement that all suspects above a certain age are evaluated 
for their fitness to stand trial, combined with the fact that existing norms do not allow anyone 
other than the SML to carry out these valuations, has created a bottleneck that can only be 
 
95 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Resolución AD 1253-2019, 6 August 2019. 
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resolved by legal reforms.  Another example is the continuing absence of a proper system for the 
supervision of sentences, something which has been the subject of numerous representations by 
the judicial branch over the course of various government administrations.  Nonetheless, Judge 
Blanco and his office have affirmed their intention to require, and place in the public domain, 
suitable information allowing the monitoring of effective serving sentences by perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity (information whose publication and/or supply has repeatedly been 
denied to us by other state offices and institutions). 
The first line of response by the courts to their historical debt in providing justice for these cases 
today rest in the hands of 13 special investigative magistrates, who between them investigate 
almost 1500 ongoing cases, across the length and breadth of the country (see below, section 
3.2.4 for more detail).  Although there is a common perception that Judge Carrozza – currently 
nominated to one of the vacancies on the Supreme Court - is the special magistrate with the 
largest caseload, in fact judge Arancibia, of the Valparaiso appeals court, was overseeing 443 
cases as of 30th of April 2019, 409 of them in active investigation stage (estado de sumario).  Judge 
Carrozza had 295 cases on his books, a similar number to those being investigated by Judge 
Marianela Cifuentes, in San Miguel (280).  The next highest number, 205, are under the purview 
of judge Mesa, based in Temuco (and also covering cases from Valdivia, Puerto Montt, and 
Coyhaique).96  although the mere total cases can hide significant variation in their size and 
complexity, judges Cifuentes, Mesa, and Arancibia were also faced with a higher proportion of 
the cases still in the active investigation stage (over three quarters, for each of them, compared 
to 55% in the case of Judge Carrozza).  All of the judges mentioned have been exclusively assigned 
to these cases, i.e. relieved of the additional duties that would be usual for an appeals court 
judge, until the end of 2019 (renewable). Judge Vicente Hormazábal, who has a total of 80 cases, 
70 of them at investigatory stage, also has exclusive designation.  Judge Aldana, of the 
Concepción appeals court, appears to be the only one of the special magistrates who still pursues 
a strict and narrow definition of “human rights cases”, seeing only cases for enforced 
disappearance or extrajudicial execution. His work has therefore been complemented by that of 
judge Yolanda Méndez, designated by the Supreme Court on 1 August 2018 to investigate 
criminal complaints brought by survivors, mostly for torture and arbitrary detention.97 One final 
noteworthy observation regarding the kinds of cases that investigative magistrates consider 
when they report to the National Coordination office on their human rights caseload, is that the 
lists supplied mention two cases whose date of commission, and nonstate perpetration, do not 
fit the strict definition mentioned above.98 
 
96 Source: Oficina de Coordinación Nacional DDHH del Poder Judicial. 
97 Full sitting (Pleno) de la Corte Suprema, Resolución AD-739-2010, 1 August 2018.  Although the wording of the 
resolution is somewhat ambiguous, it seems to convey that the judge is also mandated to investigate irregular 
adoption and/or appropriation of children that occurred during the dictatorship, as long as these affected women 
political prisoners. (Similar crimes without any evident connection to political violence are the concern of the 
respective ordinary jurisdictions).  
98 “[T]error attack on a political authority, resulting in death”, and “terrorist kidnap” (sic.).  The crimes concerned 
are the killing of Jaime Guzmán and the (survived) kidnap of Cristián Edwards, both committed in 1991 by 
members of the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez. Mauricio Hernández Norambuena was extraditeed from 
Brazil on 21 August 2019, to continue serving sentences in Chile for both crimes. 
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3.2.2 Legislative Change Relevant to Sentencing Practice: Parole Bill (libertad condicional), and 
Draft Bill on Non-Custodial Sentencing Alternatives  
In last year’s report, we discussed the controversy occasioned by concessions of parole that led 
to the early release of five perpetrators of crimes against humanity, despite unfavourable 
psychosocial reports presented to prison parole boards.  The Supreme Court adduced, as reasons 
for its concession, a presumption of automaticity, treating parole not as a benefit but as a right. 
The episode prompted an unsuccessful attempt to impeach the Supreme Court justices involved.  
During the course of the impeachment hearing, one of the arguments presented was that the co-
legislative powers, rather than the judicial branch, could be held to have failed to fulfil their 
responsibilities.  This in reference to the absence of serious legislative efforts to replace the 
current parole regime, which is clearly obsolete (having been established in 1925, by decree law 
321). 
 
In response to this criticism, an existing draft bill was revived. Boletín 10.696-07, first introduced 
by a parliamentary motion in 2016, sought to replace DL 321 with a new text which, in its initial 
formulation, made no specific reference to grave human rights violations or their perpetrators. 
In October 2016, Communist Party deputy Hugo Gutiérrez, and other parliamentarians, had 
attempted but failed to introduce a modification that would have completely prohibited the 
concession of parole in such cases. Instead, the executive branch proposed a different set of 
modifications to the cross-party parliamentary commission that was in charge of studying the 
bill. The Executive’s modifications would have shaped the bill according to Rome Statute 
principles.99 The Parliamentary commission did not accept all of the executive’s modifications, 
adjusted others, and added some new ones of its own. On 14  October 2018, the commission 
proposed a text that would establish three special requirements for the concession of parole to 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity. These were, in essence: to have served more than two 
thirds of the original sentence tariff; to have provided substantial collaboration to resolve the 
crime in question or other similar crimes, and to have “expressed remorse in the form of a public 
declaration” (haber manifestado su arrepentimiento mediante una declaración pública).100  
This third requirement raised objections from some right-wing parliamentarians, who considered 
that it restricted freedom of conscience. Some concern was also expressed about the whole 
notion of requiring acknowledgement of one’s guilt, and how this might be held to affect the 
right not to incriminate oneself.  However, the text was subsequently approved in the lower 
house, on 20 November 2018, by a relatively slender margin (72 votes to 63).  Immediately 
thereafter, and before the bill had been signed into law by the president, an application was 
made to the Constitutional Tribunal (which presently has the power of preventive control over 
new legal precepts).  Human rights organisations asked the tribunal to hold public hearings 
before arriving at its determination (the tribunal can, but is not obliged to, hold such hearings 
over any matter that is before it).  The tribunal acceded to the request, and the date was set for 
the hearings. Approximately 17 groups applied to take part, representing positions both in favour 
of and against the aspects of the text that were at issue. Hearings were held on 19 December 
 
99 Which do not completely rule out the concession of benefits, although they do establish special considerations. 
100 Boletín 10.696-07, versión available via the Historia de la Ley tool on the website of the Library of Congress, 
Biblioteca Nacional del Congreso: https://www.bcn.cl/historiadelaley.  
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2018. Participants included representatives of the Socialist party; Sofía Prats Cuthbert (daughter 
of the army general assassinated by the dictatorship); figures associated with right-wing politics; 
a lawyer who defends perpetrators, and a range of human rights associations.  The participatory 
nature of the exercise, and the range of human rights groups which took part, should be 
positively valued insofar as it represents a growing disposition on the part of such groups to be 
proactive in legislative and legal matters. As regards the substance of the hearing, the tribunal 
finally declined unconstitutional the requirement of public expression of remorse, which was 
therefore removed from the final text of the law.  The requirements to cooperate with justice 
and/or acknowledge the crimes were retained, and the bill became law 21.124, which came into 
force on 18 January 2019. 
In June 2018, the government announced the presentation of a draft bill, described as 
humanitarian in nature, whose objectives were, according to press sources: “to redefine 
presidential pardons such that in future, they be awarded by the judicial branch”.101 according to 
the same source, the Justice Minister, Hernán Larraín,  stated that “our desire, rather than to 
continue awarding such pardons, is to generate (…) And all that allows the judicial process to 
define who, when, and by what means can apply for [a pardon] if they are terminally ill or become 
severely disabled”.102 the announcement took effect at the end of 2018, just after the lower 
chamber approved the modification to DL 321 mentioned above.  Accordingly, on 28 December 
2018, presidential message No. 212-366 submitted draft bill 12.345-07 to the consideration of 
the Senate.  The draft bill is entitled “Regulation of the substitution of custodial sentencing for 
humanitarian reasons for the categories of person here indicated”.   
It proposes to modify both the criminal code and the criminal procedure code, in the name of 
protecting the dignity of persons deprived of their liberty. It proposes that such persons may 
request the substitution of their imprisonment by full house arrest, in three circumstances: 
terminal illness, serious and irreversible physical limitations that produce severe dependency; 
and, reaching the age of 75 years of age or more, having completed a certain proportion of one’s 
sentence.  The accompanying presidential message mentions a range of previous messages and 
motions that had attempted to regulate the same issue, and signals that the project is based on 
“respect for and protection of human rights”, “one of the foundations and bases of our 
institutionality and that of international human rights law”.  It cites, amongst its normative 
foundations, the international covenant on civil and political rights, art. 10.1; the American 
Convention on human rights, art. 5.2); Principles and good practice guidelines for the protection 
of persons deprived of liberty in the Americas, by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights; and the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, adopted by the UNGA in Resolution 43/173, 9 December 1988. The draft bill 
asserts that, although the mentioned texts are already applicable to the Chilean state, there are 
holes in existing domestic legislation.103 
 
101 Radio Cooperativa: “Ley humanitaria: el proyecto del Gobierno que reabre polémica sobre indulto”. 26 June 
2018. 
102 Radio Cooperativa, op.cit. The phrase “these pardons” (‘estos indultos’) refers to three pardons conceded by 
presidente Piñera at the beginning of 2018, one of them to former agente René Cardemil. 
103 Direct quotes from the draft bill Boletín 12.345-07, version submitted on 28 December 2018.  
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The project goes on to argue that it is particularly difficult for custodial sentences to fulfil their 
objectives when imposed on persons with the described characteristics, since such persons 
cannot meaningfully participate in programmes designed for social rehabilitation.  It also cites 
the principle of equality before the law, which permits the adoption of special measures to 
protect the rights of certain collective groups. The delegation of responsibilities to the judicial 
branch is justified by the observation that, since it is within the court’s exclusive purview to 
ensure that their judgements are put into effect, it is only proper that they should have oversight 
of matters that arise during the serving of sentences. 
The three conditions proposed for concession of a non-custodial sentencing alternative are, in 
detail:  
i) Prisoners who have been diagnosed with an illness in a terminal phase: reference is 
made to the “right to live with dignity until the moment of death”, recognised in article 
16 of law 20.584, which stipulates “the right to palliative care that makes the effects of 
an illness more bearable [and] to be accompanied by one’s relatives or caregivers”.  
According to the presidential message that accompanies the Bill, this “makes clear the 
need for persons in a terminal phase (…) to serve their sentence in their own home”.104 
ii) Prisoners with a serious and irreversible physical limitation that produces severe 
dependence:  the draft bill mentions that current legislation refers only to prisoners who 
become seriously mentally ill while serving a sentence, while making no reference to 
those who lose physical autonomy. It therefore proposes that parole can be applied for 
in any of three situations: serious and irreversible physical limitation, severe dependency, 
and/or a causal relation between the two. 
iii) Prisoners of 75 years of age or more, who have completed at least half of their final 
sentence: the project makes reference to “the right to live with dignity in old age, 
recognised by article 6 of the Inter-American Convention on the protection of the human 
rights of older persons”; and to article 5 of the same Convention, which mandates a 
specific focus on persons in conditions of vulnerability, mentioning, among these, persons 
deprived of liberty. The draft bill adds that article 13 of the same Convention mandates 
“alternatives to the deprivation of liberty”, and asserts that “minimal conditions of 
humanity (…) [require] avoiding the need for such persons to live in an atmosphere that 
may accelerate their physical, psychic, and social deterioration”.105 As well as 
international human rights law, examples are drawn from other criminal law and criminal 
procedural law.  It is proposed that, in addition to the minimum age mentioned, the 
person must have served half of their sentence or, if sentenced to life imprisonment or a 
whole life tariff, must have served a minimum of 20 or 40 years, respectively. 
Should this bill become law, any prisoner who fits the profile can make a request before the 
court, which must then “request a psychological and social report from the prison service, which 
must contain a technical opinion in regard to risk factors and the risk of recidivism on the part of 
 
104 Mensaje Presidencial Nº 212-366, op.cit. 
105 Boletín 12.345-07, op.cit. 
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the applicant” (draft bill art 468b(i)). Those who apply on the basis of terminal illness or physical 
dependence must obtain a report from the SML (art. 468 b(ii)). In order for the petition to be 
conceded, in each case the report must support the view of either “a fatal short-term prognosis” 
or “a permanent affliction with no possibility of recovery”. 
The parliamentary commission on human rights, nationality, and citizenship (henceforth, ‘human 
rights commission’) requested an opinion from the Supreme Court in January 2019. The court 
responded that the updating of these dispositions is long overdue.106 It nonetheless expressed 
reservations, including about the fact that the bill does not specify which court or jurisdictional 
organ will exercise the mentioned faculties, something which underlines once more, the need 
for the creation in Chile of the figure of judges to oversee sentence completion (“jueces de 
ejecución de la pena”).107 The court also made reference to the lack of further precision in the 
use of the terms “terminal illness” and the notion of “short term” in regard to a fatal prognosis. 
Mention was also made of the difficulties of specifying that all evaluations should be carried out 
by the SML, without first resolving the well-known backlog that the institution currently has in 
the issuing of similar kinds of report.  Judges Muñoz, Dahm and Silva Cancino moreover were of 
the view that the concession of this benefit should be discretionary for the courts, adding that 
any eventual legislation would have to be applied and interpreted in the light of other 
international conventions ratified by Chile, making particular reference to article 110 of the Rome 
Statute.108  
The Parliamentary human rights commission began hearings on this issue in March 2019.109, 
Subsecretary of human rights Lorena Recabarren, representing the executive, insisted that “it is 
a primordial preoccupation of this government to guarantee respect for human rights and the 
dignity of all persons, and to advance toward a more compassionate and more humanitarian 
society”.110  Asked about which members of the current prison population would, by virtue of 
their age, be prima facie beneficiaries of the project in its current form, the Subsecretary alluded 
to some 107 individuals, almost 2/3 of whom (69 individuals) are perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity.  She estimated that a further 15 to 22 persons would qualify under the criteria of 
terminal illness and/or physical dependence, without stating what proportion were perpetrators 
of crimes against humanity.111 At time of writing the bill was in its first stage, and had not been 
given priority status by the executive. 
From the point of view of international standards, the project deals with two major themes: the 
rights of persons deprived of liberty, and obligations regarding the proportionate sanction of 
 
106 Corte Suprema, Cuenta Oficio Nº 22-2019, considerando decimotercero. 7 February 2019.  
107 Ibid., considerando decimoquinto. 
108 Article that mentions special care and consideration that should be taken in considering conceding benefits to 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity. 
109 Including the Fundación Paz Ciudadana, the Defensoría Penal Pública, the Corporación Estadio Nacional 
Memoria Nacional ex Prisioneros Políticos, the Corporación de Familiares de Ex Prisioneros Políticos Fallecidos, Dr. 
Claudia Cárdenas of the Universidad de Chile, the Fundación Jaime Guzmán, and the Agrupación de Familiares de 
Ejecutados Políticos (AFEP). 
110 Oral presentation by the Undersecretary to the Commission, which can be viewed on Tvsenado.cl: “Proyecto de 
Ley Humanitaria”, 18 March 2019. 
111 Id. 
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crimes against humanity, today considered an imperative norm in international law.  The Rome 
statute, although it makes no mention of parole, does contemplate the concession of sentence 
reduction, with requisites that include effective cooperation with justice, as well as changes in 
the perpetrator’s health or other circumstances.112 Rule 223 of the statute adds that the guilty 
party must have demonstrated “disassociation” from the crime, and orders judges to take into 
account both the possibility of successful rehabilitation, and the potentially negative effect of 
excarceration on society, victims, and are the relatives of those disappeared or killed. 
Accordingly, in the opinion of the ICC, “the obligation to provide sanction for crimes against 
humanity is, in principle incompatible with sentence reduction [or]… The concession of non-
custodial alternatives […] The special requisites are evidence of the tension between the dignity 
of perpetrators and their possibility for rehabilitation, on the one hand, and the rights of victims 
and the need for social peace, on the other.”.113 taken together, these considerations suggest 
the need for differential considerations in cases of crimes against humanity, something that is 
not allowed for by the present draft bill, as was pointed out by two civil society groups that 
appeared before the Parliamentary commission. One of these, the relatives’ association AFEP, 
proposed the incorporation of three special requirements: the obligation to give information 
about the whereabouts of victims, in the case of perpetrators of enforced disappearance 
(kidnap); substantial cooperation both with the investigation and with the carrying out the 
sentence, and repentance not only with regard to the crimes for which the individual was 
convicted, but with regard to their context i.e. the grave massive and systematic human rights 
violations committed in Chile between 1973 and 1990. This latter to avoid future public apologia, 
denialism, or open trivialisation of crimes against humanity. 
 
3.2.3.1 Overall Trends in Supreme Court verdicts in human rights cases  
Table A: Dictatorship-era human rights cases definitively resolved by domestic higher courts 
between 1995 and 30 June 2019 
 
Total number of cases/ 
breakdown by type 
426 
Civil claim  61  
Criminal case 365 
 
 
  
 
112 Rome Statute, Art. 110. 
113 National Library of Congress Technical Parliamentary Consultant’s report (Asesoría Técnica Parlamentaria) 
“Alternativas a la reclusión por razones humanitarias: derecho internacional y legislación extranjera. Con especial 
atención a la cuestión de los condenados por delitos de lesa humanidad”. April, 2019, p. 6. 
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Table B: Types of victimhood addressed by criminal cases definitively resolved by domestic 
higher courts between 1995 and 30 June 2019  
 Total number of criminal cases   365 cases 
Cases de victims of enforced disappearance   163 
Cases de victims of extrajudicial execution  159 
Combined cases involving victims of extrajudicial execution, 
victims of enforced disappearance and/or survivors 
 22 
Cases for torture and other crimes committed against survivors  18 
Cases solely for illicit association  
(asociación ilícita)* 
  1 
Cases solely for illegal disposal of human remains  
(exhumación ilegal)* 
  1 
Cases solely for infractions of weapons laws*   1 
* The cases mentioned in the other rows of the table may also include this charge alongside others. For 
the purposes of the table, cases are classified according to the most serious offence included in the 
charge sheet  
  
Table C: Numbers of absent (dead or disappeared) victims and survivors represented in 
criminal cases for dictatorship-era violations resolved between 1995 and 30 June 2019 
 
Total number of absent victims/ 
breakdown by type 
747 
Victims of enforced disappearance    369 
Victims of extrajudicial execution  378 
 
Total number of survivors   221 
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Table D: Percentages of women represented in criminal cases completed between 1995 and 30 
June 2019, by type of case   
Total number of persons/ 
 number of whom are women 
Percentage of the total  
made up by women  
Total of absent victims (disappeared or executed):  
        747 people, 56 of them, women 
7.5% of the total of absent victims in 
whose case a final criminal verdict has 
been handed down  
         Subtotal of disappeared     
        victims: 369 people,   
         31 of them women 
8.4% of the total of disappeared persons 
in whose case a final criminal verdict has 
been handed down  
        Subtotal of absent victims,      
        executed: 378 people,   
        25 of them women  
6.6% of the total of extrajudicially 
executed persons in whose case a final 
criminal verdict has been handed down 
Survivors: 221 people in whose case a final 
criminal verdict has been handed down, 73 of 
them, women   
33 % of torture survivors in whose case a 
final criminal verdict has been handed 
down  
 
Sources for Tables A to D: Authors’ own production, using data obtained from Truth Commission reports, 
judicial verdicts, Observatorio records, and the Judicial Branch 
 
In the 2018 report we presented, for the first time, statistics allowing measuring of the reach of 
sentences concluded the domestic courts, since the end of the dictatorship, as a proportion of 
the universe of commonly acknowledged victims and survivors.  In what follows, we update that 
information by incorporating the 44 final verdicts handed down by the Supreme Court in human 
rights cases during the statistical period of the present report (July 2018 to June 2019), as well as 
some previous historical data that has come to light thanks to new information supplied by the 
judicial branch in January 2019. 
According to the Observatory’s current records, between 1995 and 30 June 2019 a total of 426 
final verdicts have been handed down in cases for crimes against humanity committed during 
the dictatorship: 365 in criminal cases (which may or may not have a civil claim component), and 
61 in cases of solely civil suits.114 These 426 verdicts have principally been handed down by the 
criminal bench of the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, they also include a few civil claims which 
culminated in the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court; as well as a smaller number of 
criminal cases which were not elevated to the Supreme Court, thereby concluding with the 
relevant appeals court sentence.115 The 365 final criminal verdicts which we have on record 
 
114 i.e. civil claims without an associated criminal investigation. The detail of most of the criminal verdicts can be 
seen on www.expedientesdelarepresion.cl.  
115 There may be some omissions or data loss in respect of the latter two categories, a margin of error that we are 
constantly seeking to reduce through access to historical records. The cases completed before the Constitutional 
Bench of the Supreme Court are the ones that were resolved before 21 December 2014.  After that date, by 
decision of a full sitting of the Court, they were redirected to the Criminal Bench.  
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correspond to a total of 747 absent victims (369 disappeared persons, DD, and 378 victims of 
extrajudicial execution, EP); plus a total of 221 survivors.   
If we consider these totals as a proportion of the universes of absent victims and survivors 
currently officially recognised by the Chilean state, 163 of the 365 criminal verdicts correspond 
to crimes committed against disappeared persons, 159 to extrajudicially executed persons, 22 to 
crimes with a mixture of category a victim (DD, EP and/or survivors). Meanwhile, 18 criminal 
cases have been finalised for crimes committed solely against survivors.116  A total of 221 
survivors presented the criminal complaints for torture or other crimes that gave rise to these 
verdicts.  Accordingly, final criminal verdicts have been issued for crimes committed against 
approximately 23.2% of those the state currently recognises as having been forcibly disappeared 
or executed.117 This represents an increase of 1.1% when compared with the same dates in 2018, 
which is consistent with the total of 29 victims of disappearance execution represented in the 
criminal cases completed in the 2018-19 period.  By contrast, only 0.58% of the 38,254 survivors 
acknowledged by ‘Valech I’ and ‘Valech II’ have seen final sentences in their criminal and/or civil 
cases,118  demonstrating a significant gap in levels of satisfaction of the right to criminal justice 
between absent victims and survivors.119  There has been no sign of state action to reverse this 
inequality, for example by complying with the state’s duty to prosecute torture that was signalled 
by the Inter-American Court in García Lucero.  The human rights programme unit continues to 
operate with a limited mandate that excludes crimes against survivors, while the denunciation 
of survived torture sense to the courts by the then subsequent of human rights of the outgoing 
administration, in March 2018, is receiving no follow-up from any state body outside of the 
judicial branch.120  
A breakdown by gender reveals that 31 female victims of disappearance are represented in the 
criminal verdicts currently concluded for a total of 369 disappeared persons; and 25 female 
victims of extrajudicial execution are represented in the criminal cases concluded for 378 such 
victims.  Thus in total 56 women feature among the total of 747 ‘absent victims’ for home criminal 
cases have been concluded, making up 7.5% of the total.  This proportion is relatively consistent 
 
116 The three completed criminal cases not included in this breakdown represent cases with no names of individual 
victims associated (criminal association, illegal exhumation, and violation of the laws on control of weapons). 
117 Calculated on the basis of a total of disappeared and executed persons of 3,216 [Observatorio’s calculation 
based on Rettig (1991) CNRR (1996) and Valech II (2011), with subsequent adjustments].  Simple addition of the 
official registers mentioned here, without any adjustments, would be 3,225 people.  In either case, the percentage 
with concluded cases does not fall below 23.1% nor rise above 23.2%.  See last year’s iteration of this report for 
more detail of the basis on which these calculations have been done. 
118 Representing an increase of 0.08% over the figure published in last year’s edition of this report.  
119 Civil claims are for the time being excluded from this calculation to minimise distortion produced by double 
counting, since a high proportion of the first wave of civil claims come after an initial criminal verdict in an 
investigation of the same incident. This is particularly true for cases of disappearance and extrajudicial execution, 
in which there is a growing tendency for different relatives to place civil claims at different times (see section 
1.2.2).  For survivors, who have historically faced higher barriers to initiation of a criminal investigation, it is more 
common to see civil claims without previous criminal investigation.  We will continue to monitor these trends for 
future presentations of quantitative data.  
120 See section 3.6.1  
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with the gender breakdown of victimisation reported by the respective truth commissions.121 
Meanwhile, 73 women survivors of torture and other crimes have seen criminal verdicts brought 
against perpetrators, constituting 33% of a total of 221 survivors in this situation. This proportion 
is clearly higher than those represented in the two relevant truth commission iterations: 
approximately 12.5% of those acknowledged by Valech I survivors were women, approximately 
16.1%, in Valech II.122  These observations suggest that women survivors are more likely than 
their male peers to initiate criminal cases, something which goes hand-in-hand with a particular 
emphasis on making visible the sexual violence there was committed disproportionately, 
although not exclusively, against women political prisoners.  It is clear that much more 
sophisticated analytical attention needs to be paid to the question of gender than is represented 
by these initial calculations by biological sex.  Ideally, such attention should form part of a broader 
gender perspective, something that is increasingly emphasised in international norms but has 
been notoriously absent in official transitional justice policy in Chile.    
3.2.3.2 Jurisprudential Tendencies in Recent Supreme Court Verdicts  
The 44 final verdicts of this period are consistent with settled jurisprudential tendencies in 
denying the applicability of amnesty or statute of limitations to crimes against humanity. They 
also consolidate the recent tendency to extend inapplicability of statute of limitations to civil as 
well as criminal action, giving rise to an increase in successful claims for compensation for moral 
harm.  The 33 sentences that consider the question of civil liability all recognised both the 
incompatibility of the statute of limitation to civil actions, and the compatibility of civil damages 
with concurrent exercise of the right to administrative reparations.123  In a number of cases, the 
Supreme Court reversed concessions of statutes of limitation by the lower courts.  As a general 
rule, these decisions were moreover unanimous within the relevant bench (criminal bench). In 
those isolated cases where a dissenting vote was emitted, this was emitted by a stand-in 
replacement, not by one of the permanent members of the criminal bench.  Of the 33 cases which 
resolved, in whole or in part, matters of civil liability, five were actions initiated by survivors. The 
remainder were initiated by relatives of disappeared or executed victims. 
The classification of certain episodes as crimes against humanity was a matter of controversy in 
two cases during this period.  In the first, the Supreme Court confirmed the suspension of the 
case due to expiry of the period set down by the statute of limitation.124 The case was over the 
death of a six-year-old child, Macarena Torres Tello, killed on 23 May 1989 by a firearm during a 
confrontation between armed uniformed police, and civilians who were attempting to hold up a 
commercial enterprise. The court found Macarena’s death to be a common crime, even though 
she was classified by the Rettig Commission as a victim of political violence.  The finding was that 
 
121 Rettig (1991), for example, reported that the universe of victims who were acknowledged was composed of 
94% men, 6% women. 
122 Source: ‘Valech II’ report on recognised survivors, breakdown by gender. The approximation is due to the fact 
that official figures appearing at different points in the publication are inconsistent one with another. 
123 The 33 include outcomes of both ‘mixed’ cases – where a criminal investigation was accompanied by a civil 
claim element – and cases where only a civil claim was at issue.  In addition, one sentence that only contained 
absolutions in its criminal component, nevertheless awarded damages (to be paid by the Treasury), since it found 
that a state agent had been involved (the agent, convicted at first instance and appeals court levels, died before 
the case reached the Supreme Court). 
124 Rol. 37.770-17, 9 July 2018. 
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the episode did not constitute a crime against humanity due to the absence of “a context of 
political persecution directed against opponents of the de facto regime”. The court also made 
reference to the fact that the investigation had found that the projectile recovered from the 
scene did not correspond to the type of weapon issued to uniformed police at that time.  In the 
second case where the category of crime against humanity was called into question by the 
defence, the court instead affirmed it. This was a case for the killing of Gabriel Salinas Martínez, 
detained in Cunco on 31 August 1975 after allegedly stealing some tools. Gabriel was shot by 
uniformed policeman Mario Osvaldo Rodríguez Canario, after having been threatened in an 
attempt to force him to confess.  On this occasion, the Supreme Court confirmed the validity of 
the category of crime against humanity “because the authorities, the political and legal context, 
and military jurisdiction applied at the time favoured impunity, paving the way for the elimination 
of people considered invisible or undesirable”.125 This case is however one of three of the period 
in which the court allowed the concession of half statute of limitation, the effect of which was to 
reduce the sentence to a sufficiently low tariff that the guilty party was given the benefit of parole 
(a non-custodial sentence)  
As regards the types of crime for which sentencing was applied, in three cases of survivors, the 
figure of aggravated kidnap was confirmed. In this way the Supreme Court bolstered the strategy 
adopted by complainants in recent times, of attempting to make court activity more accurately 
reflect the full range of crimes committed by the dictatorship, despite the inadequacy of the legal 
figures and penalties available in the criminal codes that were in force at the time.  This strategy 
aims to achieve an overall response from the criminal law that is more proportionate than the 
one that results from the sole invocation, in cases brought by survivors, of the minor crime of 
“apremios ilegítimos”, the nearest, yet wholly inadequate, equivalent of torture available in the 
criminal code of the time.  The figure of kidnap prevents the illegal and arbitrary deprivation of 
freedom that was carried out by agents of state terror from being hidden under the euphemistic 
term “detention”. A similar logic can be observed in the case of José Hernán Carrasco Vásquez, a 
victim of extrajudicial execution: the Supreme Court confirmed the concurrent application of the 
twin crimes of kidnap, and aggravated homicide.  This suggest we are moving away from a 
previously criticised tendency on the part of the higher courts to only convict for the crime 
considered most serious. 
The crime of aggravated kidnap, the figure usually applied to cases of disappearance, is the one 
that continues to produce the highest sentence tariffs.  By contrast, a more variable range of 
sentencing was applied to those convicted of aggravated homicide, although most sentences 
were of 10 years or above.  It is worthy of notice that there was a slight tendency to increase the 
proportion of custodial to non-custodial sentences: alternative sanctions were conceded in only 
three cases.  While in general, then, there is a welcome tendency to apply penalties more 
proportionate to the gravity of the crimes, the reappearance of the concession of half statute of 
limitations is a concern: the Supreme Court applied or confirmed its concession in three cases, 
leading to substantial reduction in penalties. 
Although the view that half statutes of limitations, like statutes of limitations per se, are 
inadmissible in cases of crimes against humanity has generally continued to prevail, these 
 
125 Corte Suprema, Rol.4568-2018, 19 May 2019. 
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decisions have always been made by majority, ie against the dissenting opinion of one or two 
permanent members of the Court and-or stand-in replacements.  This demonstrates the 
precarious status of the inadmissibility interpretation, and its dependence on the composition of 
the Supreme Court’s criminal bench.  Once Judge Milton Juica, who had always supported the 
inadmissibility thesis, retired, the balance of the permanent membership of the bench on this 
issue shifted.  Three of its current permanent membership of five are more inclined to favour of 
the admissibility of half statutes of limitation, although their positions differ slightly one from 
another.  Judges Cisternas y Dolmestch consider that half statutes of limitation are of compulsory 
application, and therefore vote to revoke Appeals Court sentences where they have not been 
conceded.  Judge Künsemuller, on the other hand, holds the view that they are of discretionary 
application, tending therefore to defer to the decision made in the initial verdict.  The positions 
held on this matter by the senior members of the legal profession who are called to act as stand-
ins for senior judges (known in Chile as abogadas/os integrantes) can also be decisive: in the 
three cases mentioned above, where half statutes were conceded, this was due to the vote of 
one or more stand-in adjudicators.126  This underlines the importance of this role for 
accountability outcomes.  It is therefore a matter of some concern that the present government 
has suggested using Constitutional Tribunal judges, instead of senior lawyers, in this role, given 
the notoriously regressive attitudes of many of the Tribunal’s current judges in a whole range of 
matters relevant for human rights cases (see section 3.2.5.1, below).127  
If we turn to an analysis of end results in criminal investigations, three of the cases concluded in 
this period culminated in the absolution of all suspects.  In one case, the courts were of the view 
that violence had been used in legitimate self-defence.  In the other two, lower courts had 
considered that there was insufficient evidence to link the accused to the commission of the 
crime(s).  In regard to final sentences that returned guilty verdicts, the upholding a custodial 
sentence against Rosa Ramos Hernández makes her only the second female regime agent ever 
sentenced to actual prison time for crimes against humanity. It is interesting to note that the 
Supreme Court tends, in its final verdicts, to ratify both guilty verdicts and absolutions proceeding 
from Appeals Courts.  Only in one case did the Supreme Court annul and replace an Appeals Court 
finding of not guilty, imposing a sentence on an agent who had previously been absolved.  Only 
in two additional cases were lower court findings overturned in favour of absolution. One of 
these is the case mentioned above, in which self-defence was adduced: in the other, the Court 
found that the legal threshold required for conviction as an accomplice had not been met.128  
The most significant reversals, in terms of absolutions of previously sentenced former agents, 
have instead occurred at Appeals Court level, usually going on to be ratified by the Supreme 
Court.  The main example is constituted by cases related to different episodes of “Operación 
Colombo” an international propaganda operation used to cover up the killings of over 100 regime 
 
126 Respectively: Jorge Lagos Gatica, Juan Manuel Muñoz Prado and Antonio Rojas Cabos. Stand-in lawyers (who 
substitute for temporary absences of permanent members of the Court) María Cristina Gallardo and Ricardo 
Abuabuad Dagach have also declared themselves, in dissident minority opinions, to be in favour of the application 
of half statutes of limitation, although their vote has not to date been decisive in changing the direction of a 
verdict. 
127 La Tercera: “La otra reforma judicial postergada: el fin de los abogados integrantes”. 22 June 2019. 
128 Respectively, Roles1376-2018, 18 October 2018, and 84785-2016, 6 August 2018. 
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opponents.  Five cases related to Operación Colombo were concluded in the current period, 
between them producing 86% (132) of the absolutions of individual suspects that were ratified 
at Supreme Court level.  This tendency, commented upon and further explained in last year’s 
report, has to do with the Supreme Court’s particular interpretation of the proper limits of its 
own oversight over lower court findings, specifically in regard to the evaluation of judicially-
determined facts.  A certain asymmetry can be observed in some verdicts when comparing the 
treatment given to absolutions, with that given to findings of guilt.  Where guilty verdicts are 
concerned, if defence lawyers allege a lack of sufficient grounding of the finding that their 
client(s) played a part in the offences at issue, the Court tends to analyse in some depth, the 
probatory elements that lower court sentences used in order to arrive at their attributions of 
guilt.  On the other hand, where lower court verdicts have resulted in absolutions, the Court has 
on numerous occasions preferred to defer to the initial findings (usually, the verdict of the 
investigative magistrate who oversaw the case at first instance level).  In order to do so, the 
Supreme Court makes a strongly discretional interpretation of the reference made, in art. 456b 
of the Criminal Procedure Code (Código de Procedimiento Penal, CPP) to the level of “conviction” 
[in the sense of belief] that is needed for a guilty verdict to be returned.   
The Court holds that it is legitimate for a judge to absolve if he or she has not arrived at a 
subjective inner conviction of the guilt of the accused, irrespective of the quality or quantity of 
indicators that are available to be counted as a basis for judicial ‘presumptions’, in accordance 
with CPP art. 488. Accordingly, the reasoning adduced for decisions to absolve are subjected to 
a less rigorous examination by the Supreme Court, than reasoning that has been used to convict. 
This dynamic is particularly well illustrated by the verdict in case Rol. 43.113-2017, Jorge Oyarzún 
Escobar et. al. (Rol. 43.113-2017). The Supreme Court ratified a decision by the Appeals Court to 
absolve two former conscripts who had been convicted, in the first instance verdict, of 
participation in the execution by firing squad of three victims. The Supreme Court argued that 
“the absence of conviction sufficient to condemn, is not subject to the level of formal requisites 
that the [appellant party] alleges to be deficient, since the extending of a verdict of absolution 
has distinct requirements from those applicable to a finding of guilt”.  Fortunately, some 
sentences by the Supreme Court do recognise that the requirement for solid explication of 
grounds and reasoning constitutes an important safeguard against arbitrary decisionmaking in 
both guilty verdicts and absolutions.  
Another significant occurrence during the period was the Supreme Court’s decision to organise 
a seminar in which its human rights case jurisprudence was debated in public.  The seminar, 
entitled “Human Rights and the Judicial Branch in Retrospect and Going Forward”, was held on 
Supreme Court premises on 16 January 2019.  Judge Lamberto Cisternas opened with a 
presentation on the role of the Supreme Court in transitional justice, presenting a full panorama 
of the 447 final criminal and civil sentences that the Court counts as having been handed down 
in cases for crimes against humanity, 129 as well as ongoing cases.  Comments were then offered 
 
129 The differences between the figures provided by various sources, the Observatorio included, are usually due to 
differences in definition (such as, for example, decisions as to whether to include civil claims in the count, or 
whether figures for criminal cases should include crimes such as the Berrios assassination, committed outside the 
strict time frame of the dictatorship but clearly causally connected to it). The Observatorio is in active discussion 
    45 
 
by human rights lawyer Nelson Caucoto, and by jurist Daniela Accatino, of the Universidad Austral 
de Chile. Nelson Caucoto commented on the unique nature of the event as a form of presenting 
an account of Supreme Court actions. He highlighted the increasing ascendancy of reasonably 
progressive, and previously controversial, jurisprudential positions, and positively valued the 
seminar as an exercise in transparency and communication between the courts and citizens.  
Judge Haroldo Brito, in his capacity as Supreme Court president, took a similar view, maintaining 
that “Chile has taken strides forward in the criminal sanction of human rights infractions, making 
it an example in how to advance in justice and social peace.  Aware moreover of the importance 
for the courts of forging links with citizens, we are laying ourselves open today to hearing 
appreciations of our work in this field”.  It is to be hoped that this expression of deserved 
satisfaction with the institution’s recent trajectory serves to reinforce a coherent state of affairs, 
one which does not admit backward steps such as the automatic concession of post-sentencing 
benefits or the return of half statutes of limitation.  Only in this way can the judicial branch 
maintain its founded claim to be the branch of state that has done most, in recent times, to 
comply with Chile’s international and moral obligations in this area.  Chile is undoubtedly today 
one of the countries with most experience, worldwide, in the judicalisation in domestic courts, 
of international crimes.  It seems that finally, appreciation is growing within the institution itself 
of the meaning and importance of this fact, and therefore the significance that the courts’ 
performance on this issue holds for the prestige of a judicial branch formerly characterised by 
collusion with dictatorship-era repression.  
3.2.4. Overall Trends in Criminal Justice  
According to information provided by the judicial branch, as of 30 April 2019 a total of 1,459 
criminal cases were ongoing for dictatorship-era human rights violations.130 1,114 were at 
investigatory stage (estado de sumario), 114 were in the pre-sentencing stage (plenario), and 227 
had an initial verdict (at first or second, Appeals Court, level) whose implementation was pending 
subject to appeals.  This caseload was shared between 13 investigative magistrates, seven of 
them operating in the Greater Santiago jurisdiction (see above). The data supplied by the courts 
demonstrate some suggestive patterns, although in their current presentation they do not allow 
for exact calculation of how many individual survivors, disappeared persons, or victims of 
extrajudicial execution are represented across the universe of ongoing cases.131  Nonetheless, 
the mere fact of their existence is of great value, as is the fact that the system that has been put 
into place for their production also aims in future to consolidate and publish information as to 
which, and how many, custodial sentences in finalised cases are being actively served at any one 
 
with the Supreme Court’s National Human Rights Coordination office to make these definitional decisions clearer 
in all published sources.     
130 Report supplied to the Observatorio on 28 June 2019 by the Supreme Court’s National Human Rights 
Coordination office under the direction of Judge Ricardo Blanco (document reference IDECS 1805-42). The figure 
considers ongoing cases at any stage of investigation or initial sentencing, excluding only those cases where a 
definitive sentence has been confirmed, or where a case has been subsumed into another, open, investigation or 
has been formally shelved (sobreseído).  We are grateful to Judge Blanco, and in particular to Cristian Sánchez and 
his team, for their exemplary assistance in the production and interpretation of this information over the course of 
various meetings with members of the Observatory team.  
131 An agreement was reached in principle to produce data allowing this calculation going forward. We hope 
therefore to be able to include this information in future Observatorio bulletins and editions of this report. 
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moment.  This information, despite being of clear public interest, has been repeatedly denied to 
the public by other state offices and institutions.  Its production will finally activate the 
communicative function of criminal justice, which is one of the main guarantors of public 
confidence in the justice system and the rule of law.  
 
The information currently supplied shows a clear diversification in types of criminal charges 
applied in these cases, both within any given case, and across the total case universe. The first of 
these trends – the appearance of multiple criminal charges within one single case – has two main 
explanations or contributory factors.  The first is a greater tendency to investigate, within a single 
case, a range of repressive crimes (committed against survivors as well as people who were 
disappeared or executed, for example).  The second is the deepening of a tendency, commented 
upon in previous editions of this report, to judicialize a higher proportion of the multiple serious 
crimes that were actually committed against each particular victim or survivor.  This helps to 
produce a more accurate, and more complete, picture of the full extent of the aberrant practices 
of state terror, leaving behind a more simplistic initial portrayal that tended to associate victims 
of enforced disappearance with the crime of kidnap; victims of extrajudicial execution, with 
homicide, and survivors, with torture – prosecuted moreover under the highly unsatisfactory and 
euphemistic lesser figures available in the criminal codes applicable in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Today, by contrast, 49 different types of criminal offence have been alleged, and/or are being 
investigated, across the universe of 1,459 open cases. The list includes almost a dozen 
recognisable subcategories, ranging from variations on homicide, to false testimony, crimes 
related to physical harm, and typifications that have to do with child abduction.  The list includes 
multiple appearances of figures such as “torments resulting in death” (aplicación de tormentos 
con resultado de muerte), mentioned in relation to a total of 11 victims; ilegal detention 
(detención ilegal), mentioned in relation to 432 victims, almost always in association with other 
crimes including torture, homicide, and kidnap; or illegal burial of remains (mentioned in relation 
to 139 named victims).  The frequency with which figures such as “criminal conspiracy” (in 
relation to the secret police); “illegal detention” and “arbitrary deprivation of liberty” appear, 
give the lie to any continued pretence that the actions of the dictatorship-era security and 
intelligence services had any veneer of legality or legitimacy.  On the other hand, it is notable 
that despite increasing general consciousness of the frequency and gravity of the use of sexual 
violence as a deliberate repressive strategy, rape is only mentioned with regards to 12 victims 
(although there is also one case that includes what is called “dishonest abuse” (abusos 
deshonestos) and one criminal complaint for ‘forced abortion’ or ‘induced miscarriage’ (aborto 
forzado).  It should also be noted, however, that these examples are drawn from a simple listing 
of all possible figures mentioned in the present titles of cases at quite different stages (from initial 
private complaint, through to initial verdict).  Grounded conclusions about the treatment or 
importance that particular investigative magistrates, and/or the system as a whole, give to 
certain crimes, would require a more systematic monitoring of a set of cases in time, from 
complaint through to final sentencing.  Longitudinal studies of this sort could, for example, 
illuminate any significant variation between the types of crime that are alleged by a survivor or 
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relative, those for which charges are brought, and those for which someone is eventually held 
responsible.132 
Two figures worthy of note at present feature only in denunciations or complaints (querellas), 
that is to say, they have been used by complainants or their lawyers but have not yet been taken 
up by an investigative magistrate and used as part of a formal indictment or set of charges.  These 
are “genocide” – mentioned in relation to 27 victims – and “enforced abortion” or miscarriage, 
mentioned in relation to Haydee Oberreuter, a survivor who previously brought a criminal 
complaint resulting in noncustodial sentences against the former Naval officers who kidnapped 
and tortured her, occasioning the loss of the son she was expecting at the time.  The addition of 
this new figure, together with those of criminal conspiracy and kidnap, represent new charges 
that did not feature in the original case, meaning there is no double jeopardy even though the 
same perpetrators are accused. A similar principle has been used previously by the memory site 
Londres 38, when triggering investigations for homicide in relation to victims whose 
disappearance has already been investigated and/or punished under the figure of kidnap.  
Genocide is not a concept which in its current legal definition is obviously applicable to the 
Chilean situation, since in international law it makes reference to the intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, groups defined by one or more of a list of characteristics (racial, ethnic, etc.), which, 
as is well known, exclude political beliefs or ideology.  In Argentina, where the term ‘genocide’ 
has nonetheless been adopted, and is commonly used, to refer to the atrocity crimes committed 
by the 1976-83 dictatorship, there have been particular efforts to develop new understandings 
of the concept that move beyond this existing legal framing.133 
Faced with invocation of these new criminal figures, some defence lawyers have reached new 
lows; cynically arguing, for example, that the otherwise relatively minor crime of illegal disposal 
or exhumation of remains – which would ordinarily be subject to statutes of limitation, were it 
not for the context of political violence and crimes against humanity – cannot in fact fall into the 
latter category, inter alia because what was buried or excavated was not ‘human’ but should be 
treated as a mere “object”.134   
An ever more frequent obstacle to the final resolution of cases is excessive delay in the 
undertaking of pre-sentencing medical assessements, to evaluate the mental state and 
competence of perpetrators.  These evaluations, required by art. 349 of the applicable Criminal 
Procedure Code, have to be carried out by the SML.135 Case Rol. 2.182-98, episode “Conferencia 
 
132 This type of analysis is partially facilitated by registers of completed cases such as the one created by the 
Universidad Austral de Chile (www.archivosdelarepresion.cl).  To complete the analysis, criminal complaints, 
petitions for charges to be brought, first-instance sentences, and other key events in the life of an investigation 
must also be considered. 
133 The principal referent in this field is Argentine scholar Daniel Feierstein, whose relevant works include the book 
Genocide as Social Practice (Rutgers, 2014; originally published as El genocidio como práctica social, Fondo de 
Cultura Social y Económico, 2007).  
134 Source: report by a human rights lawyer of arguments presented during an oral hearing, in March 2019, in an 
episode of the ‘Caravan of Death’ case. Name reserved at source’s request. 
135 “A report on the mental faculties of the defendant will be required when he or she is being charged with a 
crime whose possible sentences under law include the máximum grade of prison sentence… [or] when he or she is 
… over 70 years of age”  (El inculpado o encausado será sometido a examen mental siempre que se le atribuya 
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II”, for instance, has been pending before the Santiago Appeals Court since 12 June 2017, under 
reference 829-2017.  In February 2018, the Court issued an “urgent” order for medical 
assessments on a total of 19 perpetrators who had been found guilty in the first instance verdict. 
The SML initially scheduled the assessments for dates between March and August 2018, up to six 
months after the ‘urgent’ orders had been emitted.  Later, due to personnel shortages, some of 
them were postponed even further because the relevant SML personnel had to attend court to 
give evidence.  While the case was pending before the Appeals Court, two of those initially 
sentenced died before a final verdict could be made about ratification of their sentences.  
These difficulties play into impunity, insofar as they introduce further delays to the trial of 
perpetrators.  The Supreme Court has raised the issue with the legislature, as for example in 
Communiqué 29-2018, dated 8 February 2018, in which the president of the Supreme Court 
wrote, to the president of the Senate: “(…) given the scientific role and specialised nature of the 
SML, it is evident to all that it does not presently have the human and technical resources it needs 
to meet the requirements made of it: the experience of the justice system is that it is now 
common for appointments to be offered months after a judicial order has been received”.136  This 
same issue was denounced before the parliamentary commission on human Rights and 
indigenous peoples of the lower chamber,  by human rights lawyers Nelson Caucoto and 
Francisco Ugás.  The lawyers asked the commission to call a special session, inviting the Ministry 
of Justice and Human Rights, the Finance Ministry, and the SML to explain the situation, give 
information as to the adequacy of the SML’s operating Budget, particularly in mental health, and 
to detail the measures planned or already being taken to resolve the problem. The commission 
held a session on 20 January, citing Justice minister Hernán Larraín and SM director Dr. Jorge 
Rubio to appear alongside the lawyers who had made the complaint. Neither of the officials 
attended.  On 4 March 2019, a new session was held, at which only Dr Rubio was present. He 
informed the commission that that all 24 internal vacancies advertised between 2013 and 2018 
for forensic psychiatrists had had to be declared null due to a lack of qualified applicants.  He also 
reported that 1,024 forensic assessments were pending at that time, across a range of case types 
(not solely human rights cases): 611 in the Greater Santiago metropolitan district, and 413 in 
other regions.  
Unfortunately, no solution seems to be in hand.  There seems to be a lack of recognition on the 
part of the political authorities, of the serious nature of the problem, combined with a lack of 
political will to resolve it. 
3.2.5 Human Rights Cases before the Constitutional Tribunal  
This period has seen a relative decline in the use, or at least the utility, of the Constitutional 
Tribunal as a mechanism for impunity, a practice that was denounced in previous years’ reports 
(2016, 2017 y 2018).  Defence lawyers continue to bring reiterated, groundless actions alleging 
inconstitutionality, and the Tribunal is still inclined to suspend further progress in affected cases, 
pending resolution.  Nonetheless, the situation has notably improved when compared to the one 
 
algún delito que la ley sancione con presidio o reclusión mayor en grado máximo u otra superior; [o] cuando fuere 
(…)  mayor de setenta años (…)”. 
136 Corte Suprema, Oficio 29-2018, 8 February 2018, fundamento segundo. 
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described in our 2018 report, when multiple human rights cases, including the entirety of the 
caseload of one jurisdiction (Chillán) were suspended.  Some Constitutional Tribunal judges still 
manifest sympathy with defence arguments, and delays have continued to attract criticism, but 
most of the applications that were pending at the time of our last report have since been 
completed (and rejected), allowing the affected cases to retake their normal course.137  Such new 
applications as have been lodged, have generally been resolved within a more reasonable 
timeframe and/or without interim suspension of the affected investigation.138  However, four 
new applications were admitted in July and early August 2019.  Three of them were linked to the 
case of the aggravated homicide of Carmelo Soria. The applications were made by perpetrators 
Jaime Lepe Orellana y Sergio Cea Cienfuegos.139 The fourth was presented by the defence of 
Óscar Podlech Michaud, in four cases in which he has been charged.140 
 
3.2.5.1 Cases resolved in, or presented before, the Constitutional Tribunal between July 2018 
and June 2019 
Of the 24 cases that were newly presented to the Tribunal during the statistical period 
corresponding to the present report, 18 remained pending at the end of that same period (ie at 
end June 2019).141 Between July 2019 and the close of this edition (late August), all 18 had 
however been resolved.  Fourteen of them were rejected in full.142 In three more, parts of the 
applications were allowed.143 Only in one case was the application allowed in its entirety.144 
Those applications that were allowed in part were directed against the contents of art. 205 of 
the Criminal Procedural Code, CdPP, which set down how judges are to question witnesses during 
the investigation phase. The sole application that was accepted in full, in a case over political 
imprisonment and torture, made reference to art. 78 of the CdPP.  In practice, however, the 
applications that were allowed had no material effect on the cases over which they were made, 
either because the defence had already been given the case file access that was supposely in 
dispute, or because the witness questioning etc. had already occurred. This simply reaffirms the 
suspicion that the suspension of cases, and consequent delay, are the real objectives sought by 
defendants and their representatives.  
 
 
137 In his habitual annual address, given on 1 March 2019, the President of the Supreme Court made reference, , to 
increasing questioning of the role and recent actions of the Constitutional Tribunal by civil society sources, political 
and judicial authorities, and the co-legislative powers. 
138 Roles 6805 (13 June 2019) and 6985 (10 July 2019). 
139 The actions, all presented on 25 July 2019, were assigned case codes (‘rol’) 7102 (for the action declared 
admissible); 7103, and 7104 (for the two actions declared inadmissible). 
140 Rol 7142.  Consideration of admissibility was pending at time of writing. 
141 Six more had already been rejected as manifestly unfounded.  See the 2018 version of this report. 
142 Roles 3669-17-INA (5-4); 3699-17-INA (5-4); 3929-17-INA (5-4); 3948 (5-3 y 4-4); 3996-17-INA (5-3); 4180-17-INA 
(8-0); 4210-17-INA (5-3 y 4-4); 4223-18-INA (5-3, y 4-4); 4256-18-INA (6-3); 4512-18-INA (6-2 y 4-4); 4627-18-INA 
(6-3); 4703-18-INA (8-2 y 7-3); 4807-18-INA (9-0); and 4871-18-INA (7-3), where  INA denotes inapplicability. 
143 Roles 3649-17-INA; 4390-18-INA; 4391-18-INA, all rejected in general (by a 5-4 vote), accepted only in reference 
to article 205 of the Criminal Procedural Code, specifically where it uses the term “secretly” (in regard to 
questioning of witnesses). 
144 Rol 3681 (6-3 vote). 
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During the strict statistical period of this report (July 2018 to June 2019, inclusive) 15 new 
applications were made, two of which were immediately declared inadmissible.145 Ten of the 
remaining 13 were rejected, nine in resounding terms.  The resolution of each case, ie the time 
elapsed between presentation and rejection, took between four and five months on average 
(with the sole exception  of case 5952-19-INA, which took eight months, although the respective 
case was only suspended during half of this time).146  The relatively swift resolution of the 
majority of the cases coincided with a period when the Tribunal’s president was on annual 
leave.147 Action number eleven, Rol 5504, was abandoned due to the death of the appellant. The 
sole application still to be resolved at time of going to press was one presented in mid-June, in a 
case in which Judge Carroza is investigating the destruction of Army files.148  The case remained 
suspended, pending a resolution of the application. Finally, and falling outwith the strict 
comparative period of statistical analysis, in July 2019 an application was made in regard to the 
norms regulating the concession of parole (arts. 9 and 3b of the reformed Decree Law 321), in 
the case of ex CNI agent Rodrigo Pérez Martínez (rol 6985).  The application was admitted, and 
the ongoing investigation was suspended.  Of four more applications made in late July and 
August, two were immediately dismissed, while two had not yet been examined as to 
admissibility. Accordingly, no decision had yet been made as to suspension of the originating 
investigations, and so the only human rights cases where such a suspension was in force at time 
of going to press were two existing cases, roles 6805 y 6985. 
Two new judges joined the Tribunal during the period corresponding to this report, leading to a 
reorganisation of the composition of the Tribunal’s two benches. Judge Marisol Peña completed 
her appointment to the First Bench on 8 June 2018.  In response, Tribunal president Iván Aróstica 
transferred voluntarily to that bench. The Tribunal’s president has the task and of “distributing 
all cases arising, in an equitative manner between the two Benches”149, and from that date on, 
Aróstica chose to assign every new human rights cases application to his own, First, bench. This 
led almost without exception to the suspension of the ongoing investigation from which the 
application had arisen, since the First Bench, with the arrival of Aróstica, contained a majority 
(three of its five judges) who consistently vote for suspension (Judges Aróstica, Vásquez y 
Romero). In more recent times the same judges have extended the same treatment to 
 
145 The 15 are: Roles 5189-18-INA; 5192-18-INA; 5193-18-INA; 5194-18-INA; 5195-18-INA; 5436-18-INA; 5438-18-
INA; 5439-18-INA; 5440-18-INA; 5504-18-INA; 5765-18-INA; 5952-19-INA; 6805-19-INA; 5812-18-INA, and 6447-19-
INA.  The latter two are the ones that were immediately rejected. 
146 Roles 5189-18-INA (8-2); 5192-18-INA, 5193-18-INA, 5194-18-INA, 5195-18-INA (all by a unanimous 9-0 margin); 
5436-18-INA, 5438-18-INA, 5439-18-INA, 5440-18-INA (these four by an 8-1 vote); 5765-18-INA (5-5, resolved in 
favour of the president’s casting vote), and 5952-19-INA (rejected by 5 votes to 4 on 8 August 2019). 
147 During the same period, the Tribunal’s interim president assigned application Rol 5952-19-INA to the Second 
Bench, making this the only application submitted during the period of this report not to be assigned to the First 
Bench. 
148 Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago, Rol. 1775-2017. 
149 Art. 8º, subsection (b) of the Ley Orgánica del Tribunal. The respective case reference codes are: Roles 4960-18-
INA (these two during the chronological period of the 2018 version of this Report); 5189-18-INA; 5192-18-INA; 
5193-18-INA; 5194-18-INA; 5195-18-INA; 5436-18-INA; 5438-18-INA; 5439-18-INA; 5440-18-INA; 5504-18-INA; 
5765-18-INA; 5812-18-INA; 6447-19-INA; 6805-19-INA 6985-19-INA; 7102-19-NA; 7103-19-CAA (Constitucionalidad 
de Auto Acordado), 7104-19-CAA, and 7142 (these last five in July and August 2019, thereby falling outside the 
comparative statistical frame of reference of this report). 
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applications seeking to paralyse criminal investigations of corruption in the Army.  Nonetheless, 
as mentioned above, the negative results of these suspensions were at least partly alleviated by 
an increase in the celerity with which applications declared admissible by the First Bench were 
subsequently resolved – and usually roundly rejected – by a full sitting of the Tribunal.   
It is also worthy of note that due to criticism of the negative impact of suspension on human 
rights case investigations, the Tribunal’s Second bench, at least, acceded to lifting the interim 
suspension of the ten human rights cases that were awaiting resolution before it (these cases 
having been assigned to the Second Bench before Aróstica began to divert all such cases to the 
First bench).150 The lifting of the suspensions allowed the regular courts to continue to investigate 
and/or try the ten cases in all aspects unaffected by the controversy which was at issue in the 
application.  These factors, taken together, produced the overall improvement mentioned at the 
outset of this section.  These advances are nonetheless potentially reversible given the current 
configuration of the Tribunal, the manifest personal views of its members on this issue, and the 
dynamics of imminent change (at the end of August 2019, Aróstica was due to be replaced as 
Tribunal president by Judge María Luisa Brahm. Elected by vote of the whole Tribunal, Judge 
Brahm is considered liberal in issues to do with personal freedoms.  To date, she has voted 
consistently to reject the specious arguments presented by defendants in human rights cases.  
3.2.5.2 The case of Eduardo Frei Montalva 
One of the applications mentioned above was presented on 28 August 2018 in the case for the 
homicide of former president Frei. Defence lawyers representing former DINA medic Pedro 
Valdivia presented an application for unconstitutionality with respect to articles 456b, 459, 464, 
472, 473, 481, 482, 484, 497, 500 and 501 of the CdPP. The original contentions challenged 
evidentiary standards (art. 456b), rules of evidence (arts. 459 to 497), other norms about the 
formal structure of sentences, in particular rules about what they must contain (art. 500) and the 
obligation for the verdict to state whether the defendant has been found guilty or absolved (art. 
501).  The impartiality of investigative magistrate Judge Alejandro Madrid, who is in charge of 
the case, was also called into question. Admissibility hearings were scheduled for 26 September 
2018.  This represented the first time, since the end of 2017, that the tribunal had chosen to hold 
such hearings,151 a welcome development since the admissibility phase allows frivolous or 
implausible applications to be identified and eliminated, preventing their going before a full 
sitting of the tribunal.  The fact that this phase of consideration admissibility had been bypassed 
in many of the human rights cases seen since 2018 contributed greatly to unnecessary delays 
caused by interim suspensions. In the matter at hand, the application was declared admissible, 
by a 3 to 2 majority, on 27 September, solely in regard to arts. 481, 482 y 484 of the CdPP.152 
 
150 On 18 July 2018, the suspension affecting case rol. 4703-18-INA was lifted.  The same was done on 6 August 
2018 for roles 3649-17-INA, 3669-17-INA, and 3699-17-INA.  Lastly, on 24 September 2018, the cases relating to  
roles 4210-17-INA; 4223-18-INA; 4390-18-INA; 4391-18-INA; and 4627-18-INA were reactivated. 
151 The most recent previous occasion was on 28 November 2017, in Roles 3948 (Bautista van Schouwen and 
Patricio Munita) and 3996 (Operación Cóndor). 
152 By majority vote of judges Aróstica, Romero y Vásquez.  Judges Hernández and Silva entered dissenting 
opinions. 
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Subsequently, the president of the Republic and the president of both legislative chambers made 
use for the first time in human rights cases of the attributions granted to them in art. 98 of the 
organic constituting law of the Constitutional Tribunal.  The article allows the co-legislative 
powers to formulate observations to applications that are declared admissible. The observations 
submitted by President Piñera criticised the substance of the application, and called for it to be 
rejected. The application of the CdPP to the case at hand was supported, arguing that it 
constituted precisely the “due process, applied according to law” that the application alleged had 
been denied.  Calling for a swift resolution of the application, the observations further noted that 
it did not make explicit in what ways the legal precepts called into question had supposedly 
produced the constitutional violations that were alleged.153 The observations submitted by 
Senate president Carlos Montes, and Jaime Mulet, his equivalent in the lower house, also called 
for the application to be refused.154  
The tribunal’s substantive sentence opted by majority vote to reject the requirement, on the 
grounds that it had not spelt out the ways in which the questioned articles supposedly infringed 
the constitution (verdict consideration no. 24).  It was also critical of the fact that during the 
hearing of the application before the full sitting of the tribunal, the applicant had “substantially 
modified the unconstitutionality grounds contained in the application”, substituting them, in 
effect, with a critique of the supposed lack of sufficient scope for defence in the early stages of 
the investigation (verdict consideration no. 25).155 In their dissenting minority vote, Judges  
Aróstica y Vásquez reaffirmed the position criticised in previous editions of this report, that the 
old criminal procedure (still applied in human rights cases) supposedly does not offer “the 
guarantees that a just and rational process would require”.156 No grounds were offered for this 
conclusion.  Finally, a concurring opinion issued by Judge Romero supported the view that the 
impugned norms were incompatible with the Constitution, but rejected the application due to 
defects in its presentation.   
3.2.5.3 Cases investigated by Judge Mesa: serial litigation before the Constitutional Tribunal  
Our 2018 report observes that many applications for unconstitutionality appear to be carbon 
copies as regards their legal argumentation, something which runs ipso facto counter to the 
notion of such applications as a recourse to prevent a certain norm, as evoked in a particular 
case, from producing effects that run counter to the Constitution.157  and the end of 2018, this 
tendency to produce standardised or carbon copy applications began to be seen in a series of 
 
153 Presidencia de la República. Formula observaciones que indica. 18 October 2018, pp. 592-594 and ff.  
154 Presidencia del Senado. Formula observaciones. 22 October 2018, pp. 624-628; Presidencia de la Cámara de 
Diputados. Formula observaciones. 26 October 2018, fojas 650-656. 
155 Constitutional Tribunal. Sentencia de fondo Rol 5189-2018, 9 January 2019. 
156 Ibid., minority opinion of judges Aróstica y Vásquez. 
157 Jaime Bassa, “El Tribunal Constitucional”, in Bassa et. al., La Constitución chilena. Una revisión crítica a su 
práctica política. Santiago, LOM, 2015.  
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cases overseen by Judge Álvaro Mesa, of the Temuco Appeals Court.158 Here, we analyse the 
applications lodged or resolved in this period that proceed from this jurisdiction. 
 
On 31 May 2018, an application was presented in the case for the aggravated homicides of Luis 
Cotal y Gustavo Rioseco.  The application questioned those rules of the Organic Code of Tribunals 
(COT) in force at the time (1973) which established first instance criminal courts in the region; as 
well as those which gave powers to appeals courts to designate special investigative magistrates.  
Although this application was unanimously rejected, 9-0, by a full sitting of the tribunal, the case 
was on hold for almost 4 months in the interim,159 something which appears to have sparked 
copycat initiatives on the part of other defendants in the same case. On the 24 August 2018, a 
lawyer representing one such defendant presented for actions for unconstitutionality: one in the 
same case, three in other cases also investigated by judge Mesa.160  All of the applications were 
made against art. 8 of Law 19,519 and art. 483 of the CdPP, which regulate the coexistence of 
parallel criminal systems (the inquisitorial system and its adversarial replacement); and against 
arts. 45 y 561 of the 1973 version of the COT. At the admissibility stage, the first bench of the 
tribunal was in favour of admitting the actions, at least in regard to the articles of the COT.  The 
majority decision, passed due to the votes of judges Aróstica, Vásquez and Romero, also resolved 
to suspend the originating investigations.161  
 
The same defence lawyer went on to present for new applications for unconstitutionality, in the 
same four cases, on 12 October 2018; this time with regard to art. 78(i) of the CdPP.  The 
applications, containing almost identical wording, objected to the secrecy clause that can be used 
to protect evidence at the investigatory stage, in spite of the fact that the clause was not active 
in any of the four cases at issue (in two of them, the defence had been granted access to formerly 
reserved parts of the investigation. In the third, the case was at trial stage, and in the fourth, 
before the Supreme Court: both settings where the secrecy clause is not applicable). 
Nonetheless, all the actions were declared admissible, by a 3-2 majority vote.  The use of one 
single template for applications across diverse cases at distinct stages seems to reaffirm their 
merely dilatory intent. On 16 January 2019 Gonzalo García, acting (subrogatory) president of the 
tribunal, ruled that two groups of applications should be heard together, on 16 January 2019.  
The applications at issue were the four made in August over COT regulations, and the four related 
to art. 78 of the CdPP.  The applicants’ legal representatives did not even attend the hearing. 
In the first set of cases, 162 the tribunal found that the norms allegedly infringed had been 
incorrectly identified as those which allow for the designation of special investigative 
 
158 Under the terms of the redistribution of caseloads carried out by the Supreme Court in January 2017, the same 
judge also oversees dictatorship-era human rights cases from the neighbouring Valdivia and Puerto Montt 
jurisdictions. 
159 TC. Rol 4807-2018. Sentencia de fondo 25 October 2018. 
160 The three additional cases were: the torture and/or extrajudicial killings of Bernardo Nahuelcoy, Francisco 
Porma, Mauricio Huenucoy and Francisco Curamil (at time of writing in pre-sentencing stage, Rol 27.530-A); the 
extrajudicial killing of Domingo Obreque, before the Supreme Court at time of writing (Rol 5235-2018); and the 
aggravated homicides of Pedro Muñoz and Eliseo Jara (Rol 57.067). 
161 Judges Hernández and Silva voted for a declaration of inadmissibility. 
162 Roles 5192, 5193, 5194 and 5195. 
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magistrates, and also criticised the extremely generic nature of the complaint made, amounting 
to serial litigation allowing a single defence lawyer to paralyse a group of cases with one single 
application, in spite of numerous differences among the cases in regard to facts and stage of 
hearing.  This first set of applications was judged to be so defective that the verdict, issued on 
24th January, rejected them unanimously (9-0).163  The verdict also issued a reproach to the First 
Bench, noting that the decision to reject on purely formal grounds could have been made at that 
stage.  The second group of almost identical applications, those presented in October 2018 
against secrecy clause, were rejected by an 8 to 1 majority on 6 March 2019.  The grounds 
adduced were that the clause had produced no effects on the specific case in which the 
application was presented; and that the other defects alleged could and should have been 
challenged during ordinary case proceedings, using the tools and mechanisms set down for these 
effects in the applicable CdPP. 
3.2.5.4 The case of Víctor Jara and Littré Quiroga: impugning the Nuremberg Statute 
Another of the 14 applications mentioned above was made in April 2019, in relation to the 
investigation of the extrajudicial executions of Víctor Jara y Littré Quiroga.  The action, was 
presented by the defence of Edwin Dimter, found guilty in the first instance verdict. The 
application challenged the statute of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg.164 It is 
factually correct that an obiter dicta, contained in the first instance verdict as delivered by 
investigative magistrate Miguel Vásquez, cited the aforementioned statute as part of the ius 
cogens norms which establish the inapplicability of statutes of limitations to crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.  The application nonetheless contained various flaws.  As well as being 
extremely generic in character, it erroneously attributed to the Nuremberg Statute the condition 
of a “legal precept” valid in Chile. This application, which caused concern at the level of public 
opinion, was unanimously declared inadmissible on 31 May 2019.  
 
The application produced two observations (opinions concurring with the overall decision, but 
on the basis of arguments distinct from those accepted by the majority) that are worthy of 
mention. The first, and most worrying, was presented by judges Aróstica, Vásquez and Romero.  
It signalled that the inadmissibility decision had been made on the grounds of “errors of form” 
and a “lack of clear development of the argument”, claiming that this did not prevent recognition 
of supposed flaws in the legal reasoning of the challenged verdict. These flaws in their opinion 
included “reasoning based on an international instrument developed in former times (…) and 
moreover within a criminal code system [the inquisitorial system] whose constitutionality has 
been implicitly called into question by constitutional and even international jurisprudence (viz. 
the Palma Salamanca case).”.165   The opinion in effect criticises the judgement of crimes against 
humanity based on the understanding that such judgement is founded on the IMT statute used 
 
163 Constitutional Tribunal, Rol 5192 (incorporating Roles 5193, 5194 and 5195), Sentence of 24 January 2019.  The 
verdict does contain a minority concurring opinion by judge Vásquez which, while agreeing with the overall verdict, 
argues in favour of the applicability of the norms of the Criminal Procedural Code, following the line taken in cases 
rol 2991 and 3216. 
164 Rol 6447-19-INA. 
165 Constitutional Tribunal, Sentencia de inadmisibilidad. Rol 6447-19-INA, 31 May 2019, concurring minority 
opinion by judges Aróstica, Romero and Vásquez, considerando no. 9. 
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at Nuremberg, which is not the case.  It also questions, in passing, the legal reasoning found in 
the guilty verdict already emitted in the Víctor Jara and Littré Quiroga case.  Taken together with 
other actions, described above, this seems to confirm that these three judges tend to support 
the position of defendants at all costs, without taking due or correct account of international 
treaty law, nor of the limits which the constitution itself sets down on the resort to applications 
of constitutionality. 
The second observation, by judges Hernández and Silva, correctly acknowledged that the 
impugned norm is not a legal precept.  It also observed that the IMT statute “has only been 
employed as one amongst various elements” for classifying the facts of the matter as crimes 
against humanity,166 and identified the complainant’s real intention as to impugn a judicial 
resolution making such a classification.  The observation also found that the application had no 
merit due to its unduly abstract nature.  
3.2.6 The Constitutionality of Rules of Evidence   
As can be seen in the preceding sections, arguments that have found echo in minority votes 
within the Constitutional Tribunal include those which impugn the constitutionality of the 
application of CdPP rules regarding the assigning of probatory value to evidence.  Such arguments 
attempt to give juridical weight to the allegation, commonly formulated by perpetrators’ legal 
defendants or their apologists, that they have been found guilty on the basis of insufficient 
evidence.  This argument proceeds as follows: affirming, firstly,  that the CdPP sets out a system 
of legal proof that pre-determines the value to be attributed to distinct types of pieces of 
evidence; secondly, that by so doing, the CdPP violates the principle of discretionary evaluation 
of evidence; thirdly, that this discretion constitutes a necessary element of any rational and just 
process.  Similar reasoning is applied to a range of probatory rules set down in the CdPP: in 
particular, art. 488, which regulates the construction of judicial presumption, setting down 
minimum requirements for indicators that can be used as a basis for presumption; and arts. 481 
and 482, which regulates the probatory value of confessions.  The majority decisions emitted by 
the Constitutional Tribunal rejecting these propositions correctly deny that discretionary 
valuation of proof is a constitutional principle required for due process. They also highlight the 
ways in which the particular dispositions that are impugned by the defence in fact impose 
safeguards designed to ensure reliability and solidity. The dispositions thereby contribute to the 
fairness of the process, making them similar in essence to the dispositions that should be applied 
in a system of free rational valuation or healthy critique. 
 
Paradoxically, minority votes favourable to applications have been founded on arguments that 
contradict those made by perpetrators or defendants.  These votes have sustained, for example, 
that the problem in fact lies in the attributions that these dispositions give to the judge to 
“subjectively value” elements of proof, locating the appreciation of probatory value “in the 
person of the judge, since for the Code [CdPP], the adjudicator’s intimate and ineffable conviction 
 
166 Constitutional Tribunal, Sentencia de inadmisibilidad, Rol 6447-19-INA, 31 May 2019, concurring minority 
opinion by judges Hernández and Silva, considerando no.3. 
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is sufficient”.167 This argument is doubly fallacious.  First, it overlooks the fact that the probatory 
regulations of the CdPP require that the ‘inner’ conviction needed for a guilty verdict be justified 
with reference to proof that satisfies legal requisites.  Second, it fails to recognise that the rule 
of culmination of the probatory architecture of the CdPP, art. 456b, cedes to the adjudicator 
freedom to absolve, even when a particular element of proof satisfies the requisites to be 
considered as full proof, if he or she has other reasons to doubt the effective existence of the 
crime, or of the participation of the accused therein. As we have seen above, section 3.2.3, it is 
precisely this freedom to absolve that has tended to be interpreted in subjective and extremely 
discretional terms, leading the Supreme Court to (self) limit the ambit of control that it allows 
itself over the justification of absolutions conceded by lower courts.  Only in the case of guilty 
verdicts has the sufficiency of the evidentiary foundation been submitted to scrutiny.  
3.3 Milestone Cases: Paine, the “Quemados” case, and the Frei case 
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, uniformed police and civilian accomplices in the rural 
community of Paine executed or forcibly disappeared 70 men.  Truck driver Juan Luzoro led a 
group of civilians who took active part in the transport and execution of the victims. In the 
episode known as “Paine-Collipeumo”, five men were shot and their bodies were dumped in a 
canal. Only one of them survived.  The first instance sentence, passed on 31 March 2016, 
classified the crime as especially aggravated homicide, constituting crimes against humanity.168 
Luzoro was sentenced to 20 years, as a material author. The sentence was ratified by the 
Supreme Court, making Luzoro the first civilian not enrolled in the security services to be handed 
a custodial sentence for crimes against humanity.169  He is currently serving his sentence in the 
Colina I prison.  An analysis of the case and its implications was published in the 2018 edition of 
the Human Rights Yearbook (Anuario de DDHH) of the Universidad de Chile.170 
 
On 21 March 2019, Judge Mario Carroza handed down the first instance sentence in case Rol. 
143-2013, the so-called “quemados” incident, which investigates the homicide of Rodrigo Rojas 
De Negri and the attempted homicide of Carmen Gloria Quintana Arancibia.  The two young 
people were soaked with petrol and set on fire by members of a military patrol, during a national 
day of protest on 2 July 1986.  After the horrific attack, the victims were abandoned 21 km from 
the site of the crime.  Rodrigo died later in hospital, having suffered second and third degree 
burns over 65% of his body. Carmen Gloria survived, with burns to 62% of her body, including 
extensive facial injuries.  The case was supposedly investigated during the dictatorship, firstly by 
the ordinary justice system then later by the military courts.  In August 1989, the Second Military 
Court of Santiago found Pedro Fernández Dittus guilty of misdemeanour homicide and serious 
bodily harm, imposing a suspended sentence of only 300 days’ detention. On appeal, in January 
1991, the Court Martial absolved Fernández Dittus for the injuries caused to Carmen Gloria 
 
167 Respectively, Constitutional Tribunal Sentence Rol 4210-17, 2 January 2019, considerando XV and Sentence Rol 
4627-18, 11 December 2018. 
168 Sentence by judge Cifuentes, of the San Miguel Appeals Court, Rol. 04-2002(B). 
169 Corte Suprema, Rol. 1.568-2017, 16 November 2017. 
170 Francisco Jara Bustos and Francisco Ugás Tapia, “Caso Paine, episodio Collipeumo, contra Juan Francisco Luzoro 
Montenegro: el primer civil condenado por crímenes contra la humanidad en Chile”. Anuario de Derechos 
Humanos, (14), Santiago, Universidad de Chile, 2018, pp. 167-179. 
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Quintana, a decision that was ratified by the Supreme Court in 1994. In a parallel case, the same 
Supreme Court – whose sitting members included former Army Auditor General Fernando Torres 
Silva, today in prison for crimes against humanity – emitted a verdict in December 1994.  This 
verdict confirmed the first instance finding in which Fernández Dittus had been sentenced as 
material author of misdemeanour actual bodily harm against Carmen Gloria Quintana, and the 
misdemeanour homicide of Rodrigo Rojas. The total custodial sentence was only 600 days.  
The new, more recent, investigation was able to make use of the testimony of an ex-conscript 
who took part in the crime, to establish that other perpetrators had also been involved, and/or 
had ensured a coverup after the fact.  The new first instance sentence imposed ten year penalties 
on Julio Castañer González, Iván Figueroa Canobra and Nelson Medina Gálvez, as material 
authors of the aggravated homicide of Rodrigo Rojas, and attempted aggravated homicide of 
Carmen Gloria Quintana; sentencing Luis Zúñiga González, Jorge Astorga Espinoza, Francisco 
Vásquez Vergara, Leonardo Riquelme Alarcón, Walter Lara Gutiérrez, Juan González Carrasco, 
Pedro Franco Rivas and Sergio Hernández Ávila to 3 years and 1 day as accomplices. Two more 
agents were absolved. One of these was Fernández Dittus, since the court chose to consider the 
new prosecution as double jeopardy, even though it recognised that the initial case did not meet 
even minimal standards of impartiality.  The case is still pending before the Santiago Appeals 
Court.  The Association of Relatives of Victims of Politically Motivated Execution, which has 
standing in the case, has commissioned an amicus curiae brief on the application of double 
jeopardy.171 
On 30 January 2019, judge Alejandro Madrid emitted a verdict officially establishing that the 
death of former President Eduardo Frei Montalva was a homicide.  Medic Patricio Silva Garín was 
sentenced to ten years in prison as a material author; Raúl Lillo Gutiérrez, civilian agent of the 
CNI, and Luis Alberto Becerra Arancibia, Frei’s driver (and a CNI informant), to seven years as co-
authors.  Doctor Pedro Samuel Valdivia Soto was sentenced to five years as an accessory, and 
forensic pathologists Helmar Egon Rosenberg Gómez and Sergio González Bombardiere, to three 
years as accomplices after the fact. Only Rosenberg and González were given non-custodial 
sentences.  The verdict draws on various forensic procedures to conclude that the former 
president was exposed to thallium and mustard gas, compromising his defences and hastening 
to his death from septic shock, provoked in part by a second, high-risk, surgical intervention 
“which does not appear to have been clinically justified”.172 The verdict also gives an account of 
an accumulation of abnormal circumstances surrounding the hospitalisation of the former 
president, which corroborate the thesis that his death was wilfully procured.  The levels of 
expectation generated over the course of the investigation, and a series of partial press accounts 
of forensic results and other proof, meant the verdict was bound to be controversial.  While it is 
common for perpetrators and their immediate circles to criticise verdicts in human rights cases, 
in this case the doubts extended even to circles close to the victim.  Beyond the detail of the case, 
the situation invites reflection on the difficulties faced by cases worked under the old, 
 
171 It should be noted that in 2010 the Supreme Court disregarded the outcome of a similarly flawed previous 
verdict, delivered by a military tribunal over the killings of the Vergara Toledo brothers, declaring it to have been a 
mere “simulacrum” of justice (Case Rol. 7.089-2009). 
172 Rol 7.981-B, Considerando XIX. 
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inquisitorial system in creating shared public truths.  In the absence of a courtroom trial moment, 
during which the main proofs and arguments are presented orally and in public, inquisitorial 
systems have to make do with long written sentences, which are difficult to read and 
comprehend.  In this case, the verdict consists of 811 pages, 600 of which are given over to the 
enumeration and description of the 406 pieces of evidence that were finally classed as relevant.  
Improving the communicability and comprehensibility of sentences of this sort presents a 
challenge to both the judicial branch, and academia.  
3.4 Cases with an international dimension: the extradition of Adriana Rivas 
Adriana Elcira Rivas González, alias “Chani”, is a former DINA agent and sometime secretary of 
its director, Manuel Contreras. Her extradition was requested by the Chilean courts in 2014 from 
Australia, where she has resident status. Rivas has been charged as co-author of the aggravated 
kidnap (enforced disappearance) of seven people, in two episodes of the Calle Conferencia II 
case.  She went on the run in 2012, when she was on bail and supposedly forbidden from leaving 
the country. An arrest warrant issued in March 2012, and reiterated in August of the same year, 
declared her to be a fugitive from justice and placed the case against her temporarily on hold. 
Chile’s detective police, the Policía de Investigaciones, PDI, Minister establish that she was in 
Australia, leading to the issue of an international arrest warrant in August 2013.  Her presence in 
Australia became public and notorious in September 2013, when she gave a televised interview 
to the Australian SBS news channel. In it, she justified the use of torture to “break people”, and 
said that she had been helped to escape from Chile, via Argentina, back to Australia.  Only in 
February 2019 was she detained by the Australian police. In July of the same year, she was denied 
bail. At the time this report went to press, a definitive resolution of the extradition was pending. 
3.5 Agents (perpetrators)  
3.5.1 Prisoners: access to data on numbers, ages, and places of reclusion   
For over two years now, the Observatorio has received no new information about the number 
and status of persons sentenced and imprisoned for crimes against humanity, from any of the 
official sources that at one time or another provided this data (chiefly, the governmental Human 
Rights Programme, now named the Human Rights Programme Unit).  A range of organisations 
and individuals, including the journalist Pascale Bonnefoy and the memory site Londres 38, have 
had to repeatedly fight lengthy battles to acquire lists of prisoners, via resort to repetitive and 
time-consuming appeals to national transparency body the Consejo de Transparencia, CPLT.  All 
such requests are routinely appealed by the prison service before the courts, further delaying 
the handover of lists which are already out of date.  In the most recent example, on 28 March 
2019, the CPLT found partially in favour of a habeas data petition submitted by the director of 
Londres 38 against the prison service (Gendarmería de Chile). Although the decision upheld the 
privacy of data regarding those who had already served all pending sentences against them, it 
found that in regard to current prisoners, the country’s Constitution specifically requires that 
“those in charge of prisons may not receive anyone in the capacity of an arrested person, 
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detainee, defendant, or prisoner, unless there exists a record of the corresponding order, 
emitted by a proper authority, in a register that shall be public”.173  
 
The CPLT also declared it to be a matter of public interest “for it to be made known whether 
persons sentenced by a court of the Republic to custodial sentences for crimes that they have 
committed, are effectively serving those sentences”.  It thereby rejected the argument of the 
prison service, whose contention was that the unwillingness of the 120 current inmates of the 
Punta Peuco prison (which houses the majority of those sentenced for crimes against humanity) 
who had been consulted by the service, to feature on any such list was sufficient grounds for 
withholding the information.  The CPLT’s finding further noted that an essentially similar decision 
had been emitted on at least three previous occasions.174  it also affirms the principle that the 
ages of those behind bars are relevant and should be notified, since this allows independent 
monitoring of the correct concession of sentencing benefits, some of which are age-dependent.  
In passing, the Council made mention of a range of judicial sentences supporting its position; in 
particular, one by the Santiago Appeals Court which was reiterated a month after the Council’s 
decision.  The Supreme Court meanwhile declared inadmissible a complaint formulated by the 
prison service on the issue, although the rejection was based on matters of form rather than 
substance.175  
The new human rights coordination office of the judicial branch has also signalled that data about 
sentences presently being served is, in its view, a matter of public interest, not least because it 
allows for societal confidence in the efficacy of criminal justice.  However, the office is not 
presently in a position to include this information amongst the data it produces. Consulted on 
the point, the human rights Subsecretariat which oversees the work of the human rights 
programme unit, would only say that “on this occasion”, no response would be forthcoming.176  
regarding the detailed information on cases and outcomes that the programme unit previously 
produced, we were informed that once a new IT system is operational, “there will be an 
assessment of the best formats in which to publish such information as is pertinent”.177  For the 
present, the institution’s webpage offers only a series of summary reports, covering the period 
from 28 October 2016 to 14 March 2017.  The summaries consist mainly of HTTP listings linking 
to copies of the main judicial verdicts of each period, information which is already available via 
the web page of the judicial branch. A short new summary is added, and the whole document is 
then uploaded in a format that is rendered illegible by many common web browsers.  The 
 
173 Art. 19, N° 7, subsection (d) of the Constitution, cited in Council for Transparency (CPLT). Decisión Amparo Rol. 
C4086-18, 28 March 2019, Considerando no. 5.  
174 Decisions in petitions Rol C1415-11, resolved 15 March 2011; Rol C1214-14, resolved 15 October 2014; and 
C419-18, resolved 29 May 2018. 
175 The Court found that the prison service (Gendarmería) does not have the independent legal standing required 
for presenting a petition of this sort, and should have instead been represented by the Consejo de Defensa del 
Estado.  Corte Suprema. Rol. 11.560-2019. 20 May 2019. 
176 Written report provided during a face to face meeting on 21 June 2019. 
177 Idem. 
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information therefore offers no added value over bulletins already published by FASIC, or indeed 
by the Observatorio.   
Accordingly, we once again find ourselves unable to supply reliable information on this issue. 
From the perspective of the right to justice and the right to truth, it is unacceptable that such 
important information should be denied time and time again, despite numerous judicial decisions 
finding that it should be in the public domain. We are therefore grateful to the judicial branch’s 
national coordination office for their statement of intent, and we exhort the prison service and 
the human rights programme unit to take similar steps to initiate or recommence the proactive, 
periodic publication of this data.  Only in this way can the national community and universal 
human rights system have confidence in domestic Chilean justice, and be enabled to carry out 
the monitoring function that is proper to external actors. 
One peculiar situation arising came in late 2018, when a complete copy of a report requested 
from the Ministry of Justice and human rights by UDI member of parliament Osvaldo Urrutia 
appeared on the website of the lower legislative chamber.  The document, accompanied by a 
copy of the memorandum sent from the undersecretary of justice to the lower chamber, 
consisted of three annexes providing individualised information, even about prisoners now 
deceased.  Each page was headed with the legend “reserved [ie restricted] information”.  Annex 
one listed the names, side of reclusion, number and tariff of sentences, date of imprisonment 
and projected release date, date when application for parole will be possible, and even 
evaluations of conduct behind bars, for a total of 174 perpetrators who were in prison on the 
date the report was produced (which is not specified, but can be deduced to be July 2018).178 
Annex 2 provides data on 18 individuals who died serving sentences, and annex 3 details each of 
475 applications for parole or similar made between 2015 and 2017, adding, where relevant, the 
reasons why the benefit was denied. The outcome is that the actions of a parliamentarian who 
has made no secret of his open sympathies for perpetrators prompted the publication and free 
circulation of information which they themselves had insisted should be kept out of the public 
domain. 
Meanwhile, on 29 October 2018, the newspaper La Tercera revealed that the entirety of the 33 
requests for parole made by inmates of Punta Peuco in the most recent round of applications, 
had been turned down. The grounds were that the applicants could not be considered “corrected 
nor rehabilitated (…) since the accompanying psychological evaluations establish that they do 
not express acknowledgement of the crimes committed.”179  These decisions were the product 
of the first new round of applications after the so-called “Supremazo” of mid-2018, when the 
criminal bench of the Supreme Court allowed habeas corpus writs presented by seven 
incarcerated perpetrators, leading later to the concession of parole to five of the seven.  The 
decisions caused national and international controversy, even leading to an unsuccessful attempt 
to impeach the judges responsible (see our 2018 report). They also gave rise to the introduction 
of a new law, Ley 21.124, which since January 2019 has provided for additional requisites to be 
 
178 Ord. Nº 5081, dated 22 August 2018, and three accompanying appendices.  On file with the Observatorio. 
179 La Tercera: “"No están corregidos para la vida en sociedad": Niegan libertad condicional a los 33 reos de Punta 
Peuco que postulaban al beneficio”. 29 de octubre de 2018. 
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applied if parole is to be conceded to perpetrators of crimes against humanity (see above, section 
3.2.2). 
3.5.2 Guilty Verdicts  
Fig. 3: Verdicts and numbers of persons convicted or absolved in Supreme Court final verdicts 
in dictatorship-era human rights cases between July 2010 and June 2019 inclusive, by twelve-
month period 
 July 
2010 
– 
June  
2011 
July 
2011 
– 
June 
2012 
July 
2012 
– 
June  
2013 
July 
2013 
– 
June 
2014 
July 
2014 
– 
June 
2015  
July 
2015 
– 
June 
2016  
July 
2016 
– 
June 
2017  
July 
2017 
– 
June 
2018  
July 
2018 
– 
June 
2019  
Number of cases 
completed before the 
Supreme Court  
23 18 4 12* 44** 58˚ 55ˣ 37ˣ 44˚ 
Total absolutions 12 12 0 10 26 10 44 4 154  
Total convictions 84 49 11 49 159 122 212 102 128  
▪ Number of custodial 
sentences 
34 13 5 18 132 81 179 67 113  
▪ Number of non-
custodial sentences 
50 36 6 31 27 41 33 35 15  
Total number of discrete 
individuals affected by 
convictions and/or 
absolutions  
64 48 11 53 103 98 155 78  281 
▪ Number of those 
agents convicted in at 
least one case 
52 40 11 43 73 88 127 68 77  
* One of these dealing solely with civil liability 
** Four of these dealing solely with civil liability  
˚ 16 of these dealing solely with civil liability  
ˣ Six of these dealing solely with civil liability  
 
Source: Authors’ own production, using data obtained from judicial verdicts  
 
The list of sentences and individuals sentenced in the 28 criminal cases finalised in the Supreme 
Court in this period shows two concessions of half statutes of limitation and a high number of 
absolutions (the total number of which is, for the first time, greater than the total of findings of 
guilt).  Those findings of guilt however produced a high proportion of custodial sentences (88%, 
the highest proportion in the nine consecutive years for which we have produced comparative 
results).  Three quarters of the cases seen produced at least one guilty verdict, while in half of 
the 28 cases, all sentences imposed by the verdict were custodial in nature.  Ten cases however 
concluded without a single custodial sentence, five due to the concession of non-custodial 
alternatives, and the other five because no guilty verdict was brought. 
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3.5.3 Deceased and Fugitive Perpetrators  
According to press sources, at least seven perpetrators of crimes against humanity died during 
this period, in prison and/or having been sentenced: Altez España Risiere Del Prado, ex PDI and 
ex DINA, convicted of the enforced disappearance of Antonio Patricio Soto Cerna; ex-Colonel 
Sergio Carlos Arredondo, convicted in the Caravan of Death case; former police officer Leonidas 
Bustos San Juan, aged 87, convicted of the homicide of urban shanty town dwellers in 
Quilicura; Armando Cabrera Aguilar, serving life for the murder of Tucapel Jiménez, among other 
crimes; former DINA agent Carlos López Tapia, sentenced to over 87 years’ imprisonment for 14 
enforced disappearances and three extrajudicial executions; former Air Force colonel and 
Comando Conjunto agent Edgar Cevallos Jones, freed from prison for health reasons having been 
convicted of the torture, leading to death, of general Alberto Bachelet (father of exPresident 
Michelle Bachelet), and former police officer José Luis Guzmán Sandoval, convicted of the 
homicide of Nicanor Moyano Valdés.  
 
Over the same period, four former agents who were fugitives from justice, were captured: two 
in Chile, two overseas. The period also saw the detention, pending extradition hearings, of 
Adriana Rivas (see above).  The two on-the-run agents tracked down in Chile were Juan Eduardo 
Rubilar Ottone, ex Army Colonel convicted of four counts of homicide, captured in the town of 
Pucón in July 2018, and Demóstenes Cárdenas Saavedra, former DINA agent captured in 
November 2018 after two years on the run.  Cárdenas was sentenced in 2016, for the enforced 
disappearance (kidnap) of four people. In July 2018, Argentinian federal police detained Sergio 
Francisco Jara Arancibia, convicted in Chile in 2017 for two homicides.  On 4 June 2019, former 
military officer Walter Klug was detained in Italy, pending the outcome of an extradition request 
from Chile, where he has an outstanding ten-year sentence for kidnap and murder.  In May 2019, 
Hartmutt Hopp was freed of all charges by the German justice system, two years after his 
extradition to Chile, where he was convicted of the sexual abuse of minors, was refused.  The 
German prosecutor decided that there was insufficient evidence to charge him with either sexual 
abuse or human rights violations, despite his long career as right hand man of paedophile and 
dictatorship collaborator Paul Schaefer, the now deceased cult leader of the notorious Colonia 
Dignidad. 
 
3.5.4 Denunciations of supposed ill-treatment and ‘persecution’ of perpetrators 
On 5 July 2019, the Comptroller General’s office published its report of an investigation triggered 
by denunciations presented by well-known dictatorship sympathiser and former UDI 
congressman Jorge Ulloa. Ulloa alleged irregularities in the prison service in relation to post-
sentencing benefits and hospital visits for perpetrators imprisoned in Punta Peuco.   
The report found gaps in the provision of rehabilitation workshops and some administrative 
procedures, but found no merit in any of the allegations that prison regulations had been broken 
in ways that were detrimental to inmates.180   Meanwhile, in August 2019 the self-styled “Military 
and Police Human Rights Observatory”, in practice an organisation that defends perpetrators, 
took advantage of a speech by the President of the Supreme Court to launch a delirious attack 
 
180 Comptroller General’s Office (Contraloría General de la República), “Informe de Investigación Especial No 437-
2017 Gendarmería de Chile sobre eventuales irregularidades - julio 2019”. 5 July 2019. 
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on the process of justice for human rights violations.  The group called into question, with no 
evidence or grounds, the “ethical credentials” of the SML, for emitting technical-forensic reports 
which the group considers prejudicial to the perpetrators they defend.  Unfounded accusations 
that investigative magistrates had “failed to apply the law” were also made.   The statement 
revived old resentments over an incident in 2017 in which judge Arancibia quite properly ordered 
the arrest of a convicted perpetrator who failed to present himself on the date he and his defence 
had negotiated to begin serving his confirmed sentence.  The (informal) procedure whereby 
perpetrators are allowed to stipulate or propose dates at their own convenience is itself a 
significant concession, rarely if ever made available to other convicted criminals.  Ironically, to 
bolster its unfounded accusations of “inhuman” treatment, the association appended to its 
mailshot, a series of letters and reports containing personal and medical information of a much 
more sensitive nature than data that perpetrators have themselves attempted to keep out of the 
public domain (see section 3.5.1, above).181 
3.5.5 Economic Complicity with the Chilean dictatorship  
The period of this report saw the publication of the book Complicidad económica con la dictadura 
chilena: Un país desigual a la fuerza,182 analysing economic complicity with the dictatorial regime.  
Below, the book’s co-editors present some of the key arguments presented in the text.  
Chile´s military coup, the consolidation of the Pinochet regime, and the atrocious crimes 
perpetrated by the dictatorship were utilised to create the conditions for the implementation of 
neoliberal economic policy.183 Dictatorship-era rationality was fundamentally economic in 
nature, which means that any complete historical narrative must take into account the often-
ignored matter of the responsibility of economic actors.   The concept of “economic accomplices” 
stretches beyond solely the web of corruption and illicit enrichment revealed by the Riggs case 
investigation.  Complicity denotes, rather, all the contributions that paved the way for the 
commission of crimes or made them easier.184   These contributions came from private as well as 
public companies, as is demonstrated by ongoing criminal investigations of the fishery company 
Pesquera Arauco,185 or the LAN Chile airline.186 A wide range of practices that fall under the 
heading of collusion include incitement of the repression and killing of regime opponents;  
lending premises and vehicles used for torture and enforced disappearance; providing financial 
assistance, manipulating press reports and developing arguments to justify repression.  Economic 
resources were also used to generate support for the dictatorship among powerful actors, by 
way of tax incentives; industrial, forestry, and extractive subsidies; prison, taxation and monetary 
 
181 Electronic mail with the subject line “Humanising the Legal Profession (‘Humanizar la Profesión de Abogado;’)”; 
which was circulated on 20 August 2019, with attachments including a letter to the Supreme Court and copies of 
medical reports from Army and SML sources, relating to an individual currently serving a prison sentence for 
crimes against humanity. On file with the Observatorio. 
182 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky et. al. (eds.), Complicidad económica con la dictadura chilena. Un país desigual a la 
fuerza, Santiago, LOM, 2019. 
183 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, “La complicidad en contexto: ¡Es la economía, estúpido!”, in Bohoslavsky et. al. (eds.), 
op.cit., pp. 25-43. 
184 Comisión Internacional de Juristas, Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability, Ginebra, vol. I, 2008, pp. 9. 
185 Karinna Fernández and Magdalena Garcés, “Los casos de la Pesquera Arauco y Colonia Dignidad”, en 
Bohoslavsky et al (eds.), op. cit., pp. 389-404. 
186 Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (Rettig Report’), Tomo 2, Santiago, 1996, pp. 722-7.  
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policy, and the privatisation of state companies.  The common denominar of these policies was 
economic benefit for elites and national or transnational capital, at the cost of increasing 
inequality.  
A closer look at these dynamics – which included, for instance, the incorporation of business 
sector representatives directly into the supposedly technical corps providing expert advice to the 
dictatorial regime – betrays a blurring of cause and effect. Did the dictatorship extend economic 
benefits to business sectors in order to prop itself up in power; or did economic elites support 
and promote the coup so that the military would implement policies favourable to their 
interests?  The question leads us to re-examine our suppositions about who was the accomplice, 
who the protagonist.  The commission of economic crimes that benefited civilian elites and the 
military, was a tool for the strategic distribution of resources to buy loyalty.  At the same time, 
economic entities such as chambers of commerce publicly supported the dictatorship and kept 
silent about crimes against humanity.187  The complicity of some media sources, think tanks, and 
academics is explained not only by political and ideological affinity, but also by traffic in material 
benefits.188  
The macro-level correlate of these micropolitics was a radical redistribution of wealth away from 
the working class toward business elites, translating into a brutal increase in inequality. Resulting 
discontent was contained via state violence toward trades union leaders and a substantial 
weakening of the power of collective negotiation, resulting in deterioration of working 
conditions.189  Counter to a strong prevailing tendency of overall fiscal restraint, police and 
defence spending increased their share of public spending from 14.9 %, in 1969, to 23.3%, in 
1982. Social spending dropped over the same period.190 The underlying logic of use of state 
resources is clear: financially sustaining an efficient bureaucratic-repressive apparatus to allow 
for the implementation of economic policies whose regressive nature generated social and 
political resistance.  
As we have seen above (section 1.1.2), the Chilean agenda in truth, justice, reparations and 
institutional reform has focused almost exclusively on crimes involving bloodshed.  This emphasis 
has led to marginalisation of the role, and possible responsibilities, of economic accomplices.  
Debate about the economic rationale at the heart of the regime has been limited to particular 
cases, such as revelations about the corruption practised by the dictator and his relatives.  
Occasional breakthroughs in holding economic actors to account for their responsibility in crimes 
of enforced disappearance and execution, such as the successful prosecution of Francisco Luzoro, 
 
187 Rodrigo Araya, “El apoyo de las cámaras empresariales a la dictadura”, in Bohoslavsky et al, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 
209-224. 
188  Bohoslavsky, op. cit., p. 28. 
189 Ángela Vergara and Peter Winn, “Los empresarios hacen lo que quieren: sindicatos y trabajadores bajo la 
dictadura de Pinochet”, and Daniela Marzi, “Derecho sindical: la antisindicalidad como triunfo neoliberal”, both 
chapters from Bohoslavsky et al (eds.), op. cit., pp.  pp. 287-301 and 303-334. 
190 On military spending: Thomas Sheetz, “Gastos Militares en Chile, Perú y la Argentina”, Desarrollo Económico 25, 
1985. On social spending: Jorge Marshall, “El Gasto Público en Chile 1969-1979”, Colección Estudios CIEPLAN, 51, 
1981, p.18. For labour market and social spending indicators between 1970  and 1990, see Javier Rodríguez, 
“Promover y asegurar la desigualdad: las consecuencias distributivas de la dictadura”, in Bohoslavsky et al (eds.), 
op. cit., p. 187. 
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former president of the powerful truckers’ association in Paine, or of executives of the CMPC 
paper mill, have been isolated instances.  
A full account of the dictatorship would require consideration of the responsibility of economic 
accomplices, the role of businesses and the business class, and the economic policies that were 
pursued, making links to the current social justice agenda and asking to what extent dictatorship-
era policies and their outcomes, are reproduced in the democratic period.  Accountability is a key 
component in the consolidation of justice and democracy, and requires a broader frame of 
reference than the criminal law. This is particularly evident if we consider the current social, 
economic and political landscape, much of it shaped and imposed by the dictatorship, the legacy 
of which still weighs down Chilean society.191 
3.6 Key actors and institutions in transitional justice matters  
3.6.1. Human Rights Programme Unit  
In May 2019, lawyer Mauro Torres took over as new head of the Human Rights Programme Unit 
of the Human Rights Subsecretariat of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, bringing to an 
end a situation of uncertainty that had persisted since early 2018, when the office’s then 
Executive Secretary was suspended, pending the outcome of a disciplinary procedure.192  
Although members of the legal team stood in as coordinators of the legal team, and an interim 
director was installed, the situation clearly restricted the potential for decisionmaking and 
strategic planning. Those of us who follow Chile’s transitional justice trajectory closely from a 
non-state perspective undoubtedly missed the levels of fluid communication and active public 
diffusion of the office’s work that had been put into place in former times. The definitive 
resolution of the situation reassigned the post held by the person who was suspended, freeing a 
space at the requisite level to allow the naming of a new head of the office.  It is to be hoped that 
this allows the Unit to recover its previous position as a reference point for those of us who lobby 
for the state to fulfil its duty to be a protagonist in truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of 
non-repetition.  
 
At the beginning of March 2019, the Programme Unit did not appear to present oral arguments 
in favour of a petition for charges that the Unit itself had submitted.  Since the defendant is 
former general Bruno Villalobos, ex-director of the uniformed police, Carabineros, this omission 
was heavily criticised by human rights sectors and by congressman Miguel Cristi. The criticism 
was further accentuated when the outcome of the hearing became known, as the Appeals Court 
chose to reject the petition, overturning the charges. According to press reports, the decision not 
to appear was considered justified because other parties to the case would be arguing on behalf 
of the motion.193  In practice, those other parties were lawyers representing relatives of the 
victim, a student who was tortured and murdered in 1985.  The actions of private casebringers 
ought not to be placed on a par with the position that the state is duty bound to take in the face 
 
191 Julio Pinto, “Chile actual: genealogía de un paraíso empresarial”, in Bohoslavsky et al (eds.), op. cit., pp. 455-
475. 
192 The procedure was finally resolved in February 2019. Irrespective of the outcome of appeals that were ongoing 
at time of writing, the person concerned will not be returning to the Unit. 
193 El Mostrador: “Programa de DDHH del Ministerio de Justicia justifica ausencia en alegatos para mantener 
procesamiento a Villalobos porque pensaba que ‘otros irían’”. 7 March 2019. 
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of any serious crime, particularly crimes against humanity, whose criminal persecution is 
obligatory. The force and meaning of state action over these issues does not reside solely in the 
achievement of a particular case outcome: it also lies in the communicative purpose served when 
the social body, as represented by the State, expresses repudiation of what has been done. 
 
In June 2019 the Observatorio held a meeting with the Undersecretary of Human Rights, her chief 
of staff, and the new head of the Programme Unit, to discuss requests for information submitted 
for the purposes of this report, as well as queries submitted at various points since late 2018, 
that had gone unanswered.  The meeting was followed up with e-correspondence.194 We were 
told that, of the three staff members added to the team in 2017, in principle to strengthen the 
search for the disappeared (see 2017’s edition of this report), one is instead preparing a report 
on all state actions in truth, justice and reparations since 1990, due for publication at the end of 
2019.  The other two are not preparing a National Search Plan, a promise made under the original 
published version of the National Human Rights Plan which has now been abandoned. Instead, 
the team members are embarked upon a “set of actions” to support the activities of the courts 
in judicially-framed search, including taking part in the Interinstitutional roundtable described 
above.  We were also informed that the National Human Rights Plan mentioned above has never 
been technically valid or in force, despite which, the current administration affirmed that it was 
working towards the same goals enunciated in the document as published.195  We were further 
told that, although work continues to be done towards the production of an accurate and 
consolidated number and list of persons recognised by the state as having been disappeared, “no 
updated figure is yet available”.  For questions relating to the structure and architecture of 
search, we were referred to the official report presented before the respective UN Committee 
(see above). This response in effect confirms that no role for civil society participation is 
contemplated beyond that of channelling information to the judicial branch, directly or via the 
Subsecretariat. Finally, we were assured that “the State is seeking to intensify its efforts to search 
for the disappeared”, although in the absence of a National Plan or any channels for genuine 
participation, it is difficult to see what these intensified efforts consist of. 
 
Consulted as to official perceptions of transitional justice advances in the period, the Under-
secretary made reference to the consolidation of the area of projects and memorials (with the 
 
194 Face to face meeting held on 21 June 2019, subsequent electronic communications received on 15 and 21 July 
2019. 
195 In the face to face meeting mentioned above, and in the followup communication received on 15 July 2019, we 
were told that “no National Human Rights Plan is currently, or has ever been, in force” (‘no existe un Plan Nacional 
de DDHH vigente, ni nunca ha existido’), with the explanation that the version published by the previous 
administration lacked the Comptroller General’s nihil obstat without which the respective Presidential Decree in 
not fully valid.  We were also told that the updated (modified) plan prepared by the present administration had 
not, as of 15 July, been through this process; but that nonetheless none of the Plan’s original goals had been 
modified during its updating, and interim work towards the Plan’s objectives had continued meantime, “on a good 
faith basis” (‘actuando desde la buena fe’). Sources: as above, preceding note.  After the original version of this 
report went to press, we were told that the new Presidential Decree, Decreto Supremo no. 368, dated 9 July 2019, 
had been submitted to the Comptroller General’s office on 5 September 2019, with a resolution expected by 
October. The contents of the modified text, available from https://planderechoshumanos.gob.cl/files/plan_v2.pdf, 
is discussed in other chapters of this Report and will be analysed in future Observatorio bulletins and reports. 
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hiring of more staff), and the new IT system referred to above, which has been in construction 
since April 2019.  In the legal area, the Unit reported that it was party to a total of 817 criminal 
investigations, relating to crimes committed against 1,469 victims; and that between 2017 and 
April 2019, the Unit had financed interventions requested by investigative magistrates to a total 
cost of CLP $530.170.000.  The Unit also intervened to support the reactivation of a budget item 
within the SML that is used to fund identification work on remains.  As regards to 
memorialisation, competitive funding awards continue to be offered for civil society groups in 
two main areas: memory sites, and cultural activities.  In 2019, 13 projects were awarded, for a 
total of CLP $103.231.896.  The Unit’s social work team continued its activities in support of 
relatives.  
 
As regards survivors, we were informed that the office that deals with people blacklisted or 
sacked for political reasons during the dictatorship – the Oficina de Exonerados Políticos – “is not 
part of the remit” of the Subsecretariat or justice ministry, continuing instead in its somewhat 
anomalous adscription to the Ministry of Home Affairs and Public Security, Ministerio del Interior 
y Seguridad Pública.  The position first enunciated in 2018, that the “legal mandate of the Human 
Rights Programme Unit does not include this category of person [ie survivors], was repeated, 
without explanation as to why or in what senses the Subsecretariat considers itself to be subject 
to the same limitation.  “Actions” to improve waiting lists for the PRAIS health reparations 
programme (which attends survivors as well as relatives) were nonetheless mentioned, as were 
measures to inform leaders of relevant associations about existing reparations entitlements in 
the area of access to social housing.  We were also informed that the Unit/ Subsecretariat has 
taken steps to “identify children of former political prisoners who would be eligible for fee-free 
access to higher education: we have already set out, in section 1.2.2 above, the reasons why we 
believe that this access cannot be considered a reparations measure.  The Subsecretariat also 
communicated that the generic criminal complaint for torture that was placed before the justice 
system by Lorena Fries in her final week as Undersecretary of Human Rights, and is signed by her 
in that official capacity, is in their view not part of their purview, since it “was not the 
Subsecretariat, institutionally, that presented the complaint” (email communication received 15 
July 2019). A followup query observing that the document carries that title and heading, received 
the following reply: “the presentation was made by the former Undersecretary in her capacity as 
a civil servant, rather than as head of service, and therefore there is no institutional involvement 
on the part of the service [Subsecretariat]” (email communication received 31 July 2019). 
 
3.6.2 National Coroner’s and Forensic Service (Servicio Médico Legal, SML) 
Major developments related to the search and identification of the disappeared, one of the main 
areas in which the SML’s work is relevant for transitional justice, are reported in section 1.3, 
above.  Other relevant SML news includes a reorganisation, in February 2019, of the most 
explicitly human rights focused dimensions of the Service’s work with the creation of a Human 
Rights Unit. The Unit is directed by Marisol Intriago, formerly coordinator of the SML’s Special 
Forensic Identification Unit, UEIF, which now falls under the umbrella of the new Unit.  The UEIF 
operates in cases related to dictatorship-era human rights, but also complex contemporary 
criminal cases and identifications needed after natural disaster.  The Unit will also bring together 
work previously done elsewhere in the service.  They apply a rights perspective to public policy 
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and SML work related to torture, children, young people, and women; and to people trafficking.  
The SML in general is working towards the creation of a National Forensic Identification System, 
SNIF, and a national IT system that will assist institutional standardisation and communication 
around forensic procedures.  
 
Under the auspices of the new Unit, the 35 members of the interdisciplinary UEIF team will 
continue to assist justice system operatives in everything related to identification of human 
remains, determination of causes of death etc.  Over the period covered by this report, the team 
made a total of 16 interventions in the field, spread over six of the country’s regions. The 
objectives included search and excavation, restitution and inhumation, and the recovery of 
posthumous reference samples from deceased relatives of the disappeared.  Three exhumations 
were carried out, to confirm the identity and/or cause of death of victims of political execution. 
Family members of the disappeared continued to be traced and interviewed, with a total of 73 
new reference samples taken to add to around 5,000 already held in the existing database of 
genetic profiles.  A little-known but demanding aspect of the UEIF’s work consists of responding 
to reports of possible finds, something which often requires resource and personnel-intensive 
fieldwork, which often results in the discounting of the find as being of non-human origin, or 
clearly dating from a much earlier time period. This latter was the final outcome in regard to 
remains that had been stored at the headquarters of relatives’ association the AFDD, which were 
briefly in the news in May 2018.  The remains were submitted by the SML under judicial order.  
Upon examination, they proved to be of human origin, but of archaeological interest (dating from 
pre-modern times).  
On 2 October 2018, the Unit presented a balance of advances and milestones since its creation 
in 2011, at a public event which was addressed by International Committee of the Red Cross 
forensic consultant Dr. Morris Tidball-Binz, founder member of EAAF Argentina and an eminent 
expert in the field of forensic practice for human rights.  Dr. Tidball-Binz stressed the strong 
international interest in the SML’s work in this area, and paid tribute to Dr. Patricio Bustos, RIP, 
who did so much during his time at the head of the service (2007 to 2016) to earn the respect 
and prestige that the unit enjoys today.  In the written summary that the unit made available at 
the event, emphasis was placed once again on the importance of stable funding and permanent 
efforts at interinstitutional coordination. The need for a permanent state office to coordinate 
classification of victim cases was underlined: exemplified by the fact that formerly 
unacknowledged victims of disappearance and execution discovered through the Unit’s work are 
currently not recognised.196 In later communication with the Observatorio, the unit also drew 
attention to the importance of the training of local forensic teams, and permanent exchange 
between the service and national and international academic circles.  The diverse nature of the 
Unit’s work is also worthy of mention: (search, recovery, identification and restitution; but also 
 
196 Special Forensic Identification Unit, Unidad Especial de Identificación Forense ‘Avances y Grandes Hitos en 
Derechos Humanos, 2011-2018’ November 2018.  On file with the Observatorio. 
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accompaniment, awareness raising, taking of samples, and attention to reparations and 
guarantees of non-repetition).197 
3.6.3 National Human Rights Institute (Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos, INDH)  
The section on Truth, above, discusses the useful information supplied by the INDH about its 
work with the Valech archive.  In section 1.1.1, we also made reference to the complementary 
reports presented by the Institute as part of the process of submission of reports by Chile to the 
universal human rights system.  The INDH also continues to be active in the cases known as the 
“disappeared in times of democracy”, and its 2019 annual report will contain special analysis 
about the search for the disappeared, both contemporaneous and from the dictatorship period.  
Consulted by the Observatorio regarding society’s right to access information about the status of 
serving sentences by perpetrators of human rights violations, while the Institute did not adopt 
an official position, it made reference to a range of analyses, memos, and publications in which 
it has argued for a perspective of guarantees of non-repetition. The contents of these materials 
emphasise the importance of penalties being seen to be proportional to the harm caused, and of 
the ability of the community to be reassured that these penalties are being served, and that any 
benefits are properly conceded. 
 
The INDH has seen an unusually high rotation in its directorship since Branislav Marelic chose to 
turn his early 2018 dismissal by the board of directors into a legal battle. The matter was settled 
in September 2018, when the Supreme Court rejected his appeal in full.198   This very public airing 
of internal differences undoubtedly rebounded to the benefit of political forces hostile to the 
Institute and its mission.  These opponents later proposed the incorporation of police 
representation onto the board of the Institute, something which would contravene every 
principle of autonomy as set down in the Paris Principles, in effect the international standard for 
institutions of this type.  A motion was even placed before Parliament attempting to require the 
removal, in her turn, of Marelic’s replacement as Director.199  Finally, in July 2019, Sergio Micco 
took over as the third director of the institution in just 18 months. His term will in principle run 
until 2022.  Micco’s appointment was immediately questioned in some circles, due to his 
personal views on abortion.  It is to be hoped that the directorship of the Institute is not 
transformed into a party political battleground, since its mandate transcends particular political 
configurations, and its mission to monitor state actions requires stability, legitimacy, and 
autonomy.  The overall conduction of the Institute is in any case a matter for its board of 
directors, to which both the most recent ex-presidents continue to belong.  Meanwhile, from a 
gender parity perspective it is notable that the current board counts only three women among 
its 11-strong membership. 
  
 
197 Source: written responses to questions submitted for purposes of the present report, received by the 
Observatorio in June 2019. 
198 Rol. 8135-2018, 24 September 2018. 
199 El Mostrador, “Crisis migratoria pone al INDH en la mira de la derecha”. 19 July 2019. 
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4.  Guarantees of non-repetition  
Draft Bill to promote memory and human rights teaching at primary and middle school level 
On 11 October 2018, Communist Party Congresswoman Carmen Hertz presented a draft bill to 
make teaching on memory and human rights compulsory in primary and middle school 
education.  The stated objective is to “contribute to the formation of new generations in 
knowledge about our recent history, in particular, state terror and the systematic human rights 
violations committed by the civil-military dictatorship.200 An open letter signed by more than 50 
academics and teachers expressed support for the proposal.201   
 
The bill is currently in its first reading stage before the lower chamber, whose human rights 
commission emitted its first report on 9 April 2019.  Some deputies from the ruling right-wing 
coalition questioned the project’s focus on the teaching of the history of the recent past; while 
others agreed with assessments produced by the Library of Congress’s analysis section  
(Departamento de Asesoría de la Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional), to the effect that the 
creation of new elements in the school curriculum is an exclusive prerogative of the executive 
branch.  The human rights commission of the lower house reached two agreements, by majority 
vote. The first was to recommend emphasis on teaching dictatorship-era violations using Chile’s 
two truth commission reports (Rettig and Valech) as a basis. The second was that such teaching 
should fall under the curricular recommendations already existing thanks to Law 20.911, passed 
in 2016, which created a plan for civic education in state recognised educational establishments. 
From a transitional justice perspective, the initiative must be positively valued as offering a 
valuable, albeit belated, implementation of truth commission report recommendations geared 
towards the consolidation of human rights culture through education.202  The commission’s 
rejection of four modifications proposed during the debate of the draft is, however, worrying.  
The first three made reference to the incorporation of the same curricular elements into the 
training programs of the Armed Forces, uniformed police, detective police, and the prison 
service. The rejection of this measure doubtless constitutes a lost opportunity to rectify 
deficiencies and gaps that have been pointed out by various organs of the universal human rights 
system.203 
The fourth modification that was rejected proposed that a normative statement should be 
incorporated into the Decree with Rank of Law (Decreto con Fuerza de Ley, DFL) N°1 issued by 
the Ministry of Education.  The statement would have obliged all universities that carry out 
teacher training to include a human rights module.  This suggestion was rejected, despite the fact 
that the Rettig report calls for university level education “to also incorporate these issues into 
curricula, in particular (…) teacher training”.204  It is to be hoped that the draft bill comes to 
fruition, promising as it does to contribute to the shaping of informed, critical citizens committed 
 
200 Text of Draft Bill (Boletín) 12167-17.  
201 Radio Uchile.cl: “Derechos Humanos, el contenido ausente en la educación chilena”. 13 January 2019. 
202 Rettig Report (1991), p. 1291, and Valech Report (2004), p. 529.  
203 See, for example, section 1.1.1 of the present report. 
204 Rettig Report (1991), p. 530.  
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to democratic principles, values which all mainstream political parties in the country have 
acknowledged are fundamental for national life. 
5. REPARATIONS    
5.1 the general state of public policy on reparations 
In previous reports, and in section 1.3, we have made reference to the right reparation, the 
corresponding duty on states to provide it, and the enshrinement of that duty in a range of 
international instruments, some of them binding. We have similarly analysed reparations 
implemented in Chile in the light of these obligations, formulating recommendations aimed at 
enhancing the internal and external coherence that international law requires (where internal 
coherence refers to the fit between one reparations measure and another, and external 
coherence looks for fit between reparations and the other dimensions of transitional justice)  The 
section which follows pays particular attention to this theme. We start from the premise that 
reparations is one of the transitional justice measures that was attended to soonest, and in some 
senses most comprehensively, in Chile.205  True reparation however requires the delivery of 
services to be accompanied by a message that recognises relatives and survivors as rights 
holders; repudiates the violations that they suffered, and seeks to regain their trust.  Accordingly, 
we attend to these elements in our evaluation.  Over the course of May 2019, the Observatorio 
requested information and follow-up meetings from a range of relevant state institutions,206 and 
met with representatives of some survivors and relatives’ associations.207  We also consulted 
some former state officials, secondary literature, and relevant norms and standards. 
5.1.1 Problems of Access to Reparations   
Provision of effective access to reparations measures is an important consideration for any public 
policy on reparation.  Chile’s two truth commissions – Rettig and Valech, in the latter’s two 
iterations – have, over time, become the main and almost the only turnstile for access to many 
administrative reparations programmes.  The Commissions however had a time limited 
existence, and controversies have arisen regarding the possible margin of error in their 
acknowledgements of individual cases, plus the limited nature and specific parameters of their 
mandates.  This has in practice resulted in the denial of access to a presently unknowable, but 
certainly significant, number of survivors and relatives.  It has also made it impossible for victims 
newly accredited by way of the judicial process, to be administratively recognised by the other 
branches of state. The partial acknowledgement of these deficiencies was one motivation for the 
second iteration of the Valech commission carried out in 2011.  Nonetheless, the fact that this 
iteration was also time limited, together with the complete absence of a process for 
reconsideration of cases that were not recognised, only increased pressure for the creation of a 
permanent mechanism.  The National Human Rights Plan published by the outgoing 
 
205 2011’s iteration of this report, section 1.6. 
206 Requests were sent to the Instituto de Previsión Social, IPS; the Ministry of Education, health reparations 
programme PRAIS; the Oficina de Exonerados Políticos, and the Subsecretariat of Human Rights.  
207 Specifically with Haydee Oberreuter, member of the Unitary Command of former Political Prisoners and 
Relatives, Comando Unitario de ex Prisioneros Políticos y Familiares, and Alicia Lira, President of the Association of 
Relatives of Victims of Political Execution, Agrupación de Familiares de Ejecutados Políticos, AFEP. 
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administration in 2017 mentions the creation of such a commission;208 an aspiration that was 
also mentioned by the new administration’s Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Hernán 
Larraín, when he was called before a parliamentary human rights commission on 6 June 2018.  
As this report went to press, however, there was no sign that any such commission would be set 
up.    
 
The existing truth commissions moreover limited themselves to assessing individual cases of 
people who were forcibly disappeared, extrajudicially executed, or subject to political 
imprisonment and/or torture.  Reparations measures that were introduced before or alongside 
the operation of these commissions, and/or for other categories of victimisation, set their own, 
sui generis, access requirements.  In regard to exiles, for example, Law 18.994, introduced in 
1990, created the National Office for Return (Oficina Nacional de Retorno), for people exiled for 
political motives who wished to return to Chile. The same law however stipulated that the Office 
would cease to function as of 20 September 1994.  In practice, therefore, the measures that it 
provided for – principally, customs waivers and some educational support – were only available 
to those who were in a position to act upon their desire to return, within the specified period.  
Subsequently, and through to the present day, there is no state institution available to support 
former exiles or their offspring.  The recent emergence of an association of ‘children of exile’, 
“Agrupación de Hijos e Hijas del Exilio” (see the 2018 version of this report) constitutes the 
clearest possible signal that there are still multiple needs in this area that have gone 
unaddressed.    
In relation to those who lost their jobs and/or were blacklisted for political motives (referred to 
as ‘exoneradas y exonerados políticos’, three specific pieces of legislation established some 
reparatory measures. Law 19.234, from 1993, established some measures for people who lost 
their jobs in political reprisal for their opposition to the regime.209  To qualify, those affected had 
just a year to apply to a special office, the Oficina de Exonerados Políticos, set up within the 
Ministry of the Interior.210  This deadline proved to be so peremptory that two further laws were 
passed to extend the initial period, each time by 12 months (Law 19.582, of 1998, and Law 
19.881, of 2003).  Over these three time periods, 257,624 individual applications were received 
by the office.211 Closed to new applications since 2004, the office has now spent over a decade 
and a half on the task of assessing and approving existing applications. In 2011, they reported 
 
208 “Promote the creation of a Permanent Classification Commission for the clarification of all human rights 
violations committed during the dictatorship (extrajudicial execution, enforced disappearance, and torture), 
(Promover la creación de una Comisión Calificadora Permanente para el esclarecimiento de todas las violaciones a 
los derechos humanos cometidas durante la dictadura (ejecución política, desaparición forzada y tortura)’ First 
National Human Rights Plan, Primer Plan Nacional de Derechos Humanos, Gobierno de Chile, version published in 
2017. p.24. 
209 In some cases, the measures included monetary payments, but in others, lost pension credits were simply 
restored. In still other cases, acknowledgment had no financial implications. Documents available from 
www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl.  
210 Law 19.234, art. 7, section 1. 
211 Data supplied by the Oficina to the Observatorio de Justicia Transicional in June 2019. 
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that 157,000 cases had been assessed, with a further 93,000 still in process.212 In 2015, then-
President Bachelet made reference to the subsequent resolution of just over 10% of outstanding 
cases in her annual state-of-the-nation address in May.213 The Observatorio has not been able to 
discover any subsequent mention of the work of the Office either in annual reports of the work 
of the Ministry of the Interior, or in presidential state-of-the-nation addresses.  
For the purposes of the present report, we contacted the Office to ask for an update. We were 
told that, exactly 15 years after the closure of the last deadline for presenting applications, 
thousands of cases are still awaiting definitive resolution. Specifically, we were informed that a 
total of 158,778 applications have been approved, 19.468 were declared inadmissible, 2,954 
were assessed but rejected, and 76,424 are still awaiting qualification. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has stated that reparation programmes must guarantee “the right 
to receive a decision which is based on a publicly scrutinisable process and sets outs the reasons 
and basis on which it was made; the right to a reasonable time frame; and the right to judicial 
review of administrative decisions”.214 In the case of those thousands of applicants whose cases 
are yet to be resolved, the wait has without a doubt been significantly longer than could be 
considered “reasonable”.  
It should be noted that the Office informed the Observatorio that a new work plan has been 
adopted, which aims to improve the process of acquiring the data needed to resolve outstanding 
cases. Channels of communication have been established for the exchange of information with 
the country’s main social security agency, the Instituto de Previsión Social, and with the 
Agricultural and Livestock Service, Servicio Agrícola y Ganadero, SAG.  This latter agency is 
relevant for accrediting previous employment in a rural occupation, and/or claims to land title 
distributed under land reform but later seized without compensation.  The Office also informed 
us of additional innovations including letters to applicants informing them of the current status 
of their application and/or informing them of interim steps and decisions.   The long hiatus that 
these measures attempt to alleviate owes much to the absence of a stipulated or normed 
procedure for assessing applications. This apparent legal vacuum simply means, however, that 
general norms of administrative procedure are the ones that should apply.  As this has not been 
done, the assessment process has suffered from a lack of transparency and the absence of due 
administrative process.215  In the circumstances, the efforts of the current staff are to be praised, 
 
212 Approximate figures supplied by the Oficina’s then-director and reported in the 2012 iteration of the present 
report, at p. 45. 
213 Presidential State of the Nation address (Mensaje Presidencial), 21 May 2015, Michelle Bachelet. 
214 OAS Document OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131 Doc. 1, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (CIDH). ‘Lineamientos 
principales para una política integral de reparaciones. 19 February 2008, point 10.  Although the document makes 
particular reference to Colombia, it is clear in the text that the underlying principles are treated as general. 
Reference is also made to OAS report OEA/Ser. L/V/II.129, Informe sobre el acceso a la justicia como garantía de 
los Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales, of September 2007. 
215 Weaknesses which undoubtedly contributed to irregularities, discovered in 2008, that included cases of 
unwarranted classifications, some of them fraudulent.  The uncovering of these cases was used as a pretext to 
question the integrity of all applicants. (See the 2012 and 2013 iterations of this report).  
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but the glaring absence of a comprehensive policy to resolve the underlying problem is ever more 
apparent.216  
Another issue worthy of mention in relation to the same Office is one that was raised by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case García Lucero v. Chile.  The information 
supplied to the Oficina de Exonerados Politicos as part of the application process includes a large 
number of testimonies giving accounts of serious human rights violations, including torture and 
kidnap, perpetrated by state agents.  In pursuit of external coherence between reparations 
measures and other dimensions of transitional justice, this information should be proactively 
studied to assess its possible judicial relevance.  It is therefore curious to note that neither 
administrative nor judicial authorities appear ever to have taken such action, especially given 
that the testimonies are not subject to any embargo or secrecy law such as currently impedes 
access to the files of the Valech Commission.  
Returning to the question of access, the State has an obligation to promote conditions of equal 
access and enjoyment of the measures that are offered.  While recognising rights to pensions, 
educational scholarships, and other measures is a valuable first step, it does not by itself 
constitute a guarantee of effective delivery and takeup of those rights by rightsholders.  Access 
barriers may include lack of awareness, lack of trust, fear of the authorities, and the costs 
associated with certain bureaucratic procedures. Taking as an example the actual disbursement 
of reparations pensions to former political prisoners recognised as such by the state, a first 
observation is that almost a quarter of these people were either acknowledged only after their 
death, or have died subsequently.  According to information from one association that groups 
together organisations of former political prisoners and/or their relatives (the Comando Unitario 
de ex prisioneros políticos y familiares), as of April 2016, reparations pensions had at some point 
in time been paid to 34.705 of the total universe of 38,254 survivors acknowledged by the Valech 
I and Valech II commissions.  Payments are ongoing with regard to 26,663 people, but there are 
467 individuals accredited by the Commissions on whose behalf no-one has ever made use of the 
economic reparations entitlement.  That is to say, 467 pensions have never been received either 
by the original rights holder or by a surviving spouse, in the event of the rights holder’s death.217 
In this regard Haydee Oberreuter, of the Comando Unitario, informed the Observatorio of actions 
taken by the association itself to contact and inform the rightsholders, assisting them where 
necessary to complete the required paperwork.218  The size of the challenge has led to a ‘virtuous 
circle’ of cooperation with state bodies including the Civil Registry, Registro Civil. 219   While this 
has served as a positive example of participation and joint working between civil society and the 
 
216 This gap is accentuated, in the opinion of the Observatorio, by the continued administrative dependence of the 
Oficina on the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Publica).  Reassignment to the Human 
Rights Subsecretariat would make much more sense. 
217 Data supplied by the IPS to the Unitary Command.  The many peculiarities of reparations measures in Chile 
include an inexplicable gender bias that dictates that only widows can inherit a ‘Valech pension’ as the surviving 
partner of a former political prisoner recognised by the Valech Commission.  Widowers receive nothing.  
218 Interview with the Observatorio, 9 June 2019, and see Informe 2018. 
219 See Informe 2018. 
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state, the Comando is an entirely voluntary and self-funded organisation which has neither the 
resources nor the powers of state bodies to whom, moreover, the responsibility really belongs.  
Social services entity the Instituto de Prevision Social, IPS, is the body in charge of paying out 
economic reparations when these are of an administrative nature.  The Comando asked the IPS 
to inform it how many people had never received their Valech pension, and to reveal what 
measures the IPS had taken to trace them.  Faced with a negative reply, the Comando was forced 
to resort to the national Council for Transparency, Consejo para la Transparencia, to get access 
to the required information.  As it turned out, the IPS has finally begun to contact the people 
involved,220 an outcome that if anything underlines the nonsensical nature of their initial refusal. 
When public administration and civil society groupings share a particular interest or goal, it 
should be simple common sense for the State not only to accept, but to actively propose joint 
working.  Such an approach would not only improve the efficacy of state actions, it would also 
deliver on the right to participation. This right, which has been asserted in relation to all the 
dimensions of transitional justice, requires that survivors and relatives “become active subjects, 
and not only objects, of [transitional justice] measures”.221 It is also important that the State 
make every effort to carry out its transitional justice duties by the most sensitive, and reparatory, 
means possible.  Since in this example the Comando Unitario moreover has a closer relationship 
with survivors, the actions needed are likely to be more effective and appropriate on multiple 
levels, if state and civil society work together and collaborate.222 Accordingly, while it is doubtless 
positive that the IPS has recently begun to be more proactive in guaranteeing the 
operationalisation of the right to reparation, it would be appropriate for them, like other state 
bodies, to lose their apparent fear of working alongside or communicating openly with nonstate 
groups.  
When considering the potential of the judicial route (civil claim-making) as an alternative channel 
for making effective the recognition of state responsibility and its duty to offer remedy, we 
should start by asserting that this route ought not to be considered mutually exclusive with use 
of the administrative route.  That is, anyone who has made use of their rights under a particular 
administrative reparations programme should not on those grounds be prevented from bringing 
a civil claim before the courts, not least because the type of harm that is being (partially) 
remedied is different in one and in the other setting.  This position is today supported by a 
majority of members of the Criminal Bench of the Supreme Court, and was even recognised by 
the Chilean state before the Inter-American Court in the Órdenes Guerra case.  There are, 
however, evident differences in levels of access to the judicial route.  Although many of these 
may be endemic to access to justice in general, they are potentially exacerbated by the effects 
of the same grave violations that the courts are being asked to remedy, inasmuch as those 
violations often caused ruptures in life plans and career trajectories, including through the loss 
of the principal breadwinner in many families.  The effect on a family’s socioeconomic situation 
 
220 According to Patricio Coronado, IPS director, in a meeting with the Observatorio on 10 June 2019. 
221 Paula Saffon and Viviana Tacha, La participación en las medidas de la justicia transicional. Un estudio 
comparado, Bogotá, Centro de Estudios de Derechos, Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia, 2018, pp. 85. 
222 UN Document A/69/518, Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of 
Non-Recurrence, 2014. 
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can be dramatic and longlasting.223  Civil claim-making before the judicial branch implies certain 
costs (payment of document certifications, notary fees etc, and, sometimes, lawyers’ fees). It is 
not within the means of all survivors or relatives to cover these costs.  
Accessing the justice system also requires a certain level of knowledge and information about 
one’s rights, and how they can be asserted and defended.  In this sense, the judicial route to 
reparations is more accessible to those who have higher levels of formal education and/or 
economic resources; thereby favouring the least, rather than the most, disadvantaged.  For all of 
these reasons, the State must provide assistance to ensure effective and equal access to justice, 
whether in its criminal or civil forms. Amplifying the mandate of the existing Human Rights 
Programme Unit would be a useful first step,224 and should include both the mandating of the 
Unit to act in cases of crimes committed against survivors, and permitting its lawyers to support 
relatives in the civil claims aspect of the criminal cases in which they currently act.  
At the very least, and as we have repeatedly insisted, the State should desist from actually 
opposing compensation for relatives and survivors, as it does currently via the actions of the 
Consejo de Defensa del Estado, CDE.  Even after the admissions made by the state in the Órdenes 
Guerra case, it is still routine for CDE lawyers, acting in the name of the state, to appear before 
the courts invoking statutes of limitation, and/or alleging ‘excepción de pago’, in relation to civil 
compensation .225 In the process, phrases are used that seek to play down the suffering of those 
who were harmed by the state, such as by making reference to supposedly “excessive” requests 
for damages,226 or insisting that survivors should “consider themselves to have [already] received 
full reparation”.  
This phrase was used in an oral hearing in a case over torture.  The CDE lawyer went on to 
exemplify this reparation by citing the work of the human rights programme unit, whose work 
on behalf of survivors is in fact, as we have seen, non-existent. 227  This kind of behaviour is not 
only incoherent and contradictory with the state’s international obligations: it also constitutes a 
new offence for victims and survivors who make use of the courts.  Eliana Largo Vera, sister of a 
victim of disappearance, recently wrote to the CDE’s governing Council to explain the profound 
impact that it had on her to hear the CDE using terms such as “excessive” and “groundless” 
 
223 This is one of the reasons that many survivors take offence at the suggestion that tuition-fee-free University 
access - introduced under the second Bachelet presidency to assist students from lower socioeconomic strata – 
makes reparations in the form of study scholarships redundant.  In the words of one survivor: “they made us poor, 
then they turn round and say “being poor is your reparations”.”” 
224 This also appears in the text of the original National Human Rights Plan, as published in 2017.  
225 During the period of the report, the CDE has attempted to invoke the statute of limitation (prescripción) in 
before civil courts, in cases including Roles C-7564-2019 and C-9565-2018, before the Second Civil Court (2° 
Juzgado Civil) of Santiago; C-5701-2019, of the Fifth Civil Court (5° Juzgado Civil) of Santiago; and Roles 2813-2019, 
4352-2019, and 3576-2019 of the Santiago Appeals Court. 
226 In two recent motions, the CDE referred to amounts requested by claimants as “excessive and unfounded” 
(excesivos y carentes de fundamento): Rol. 143-2013, ‘Quemados’ episode; and Rol. C-37.023-2017, civil claim over 
the disappearance and subsequent killing of Luis Alejandro Largo Vera. 
227 Source: oral arguments conducted in April 2016, attended by the Observatorio’s director. 
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(‘carente de fundamento’) in relation to her civil claim.228  In response, the president of the CDE 
said only that their action “was related to the responsibilities that the law sets down for us to 
defend Treasury resources” and “was what the law required”.229  The reply did not however offer 
any legal or factual justification for the choice of the adjectives “excessive” and “groundless”. 
While it is certainly true that the CDE’s job is to legally defend the interests of the state, its actions 
must adhere to the existing legal order, which includes the constitution and all international law 
and treaty law valid for and in Chile.  Its actions in these cases seem bereft both of solid legal 
reasoning, and of any indication that the CDE understands itself as part of a state which has 
transitional justice duties that include dignified treatment of people who have suffered at the 
state’s hands. 
5.1.2 Internal and external coherence in reparations policy 
There is no single entity in Chile able to coordinate state actions in reparations, nor to channel 
communication between the state, survivors and relatives. Pensions, scholarships, compensation 
payments and other measures are each administered by different state departments, leading to 
fragmentation and impeding a holistic and truly reparatory rights-based policy approach.230  The 
measures do not adequately take account of multiple offences committed against the same 
person, nor do they accompany affected persons throughout the life-cycle. The almost complete 
absence of channels for feedback, evaluation and participation moreover means that 
improvements are rarely made.231  There is a perception among relatives and survivors that 
existing measures are a mere sop, offered in an attempt to pacify their demands, and survivors 
associations report having been informed that their demands are simply not a priority for the 
present administration.232  The absence of a single specialised body is perfectly remediable within 
existing institutionality, particularly since the Sub Secretariat of human rights was created, in 
2017, and entrusted with the functions of “promoting the creation of policies, plans and 
programmes in human rights issues”, and drawing up an annual human rights plan which includes 
“promotion of the investigation, sanction and reparation of crimes against humanity”.233  
The same problems that detract from internal coherence of reparations measures can be 
observed in relation to their external coherence with other dimensions of transitional justice. 
One paradigmatic example is law 19.992, which while establishing limited reparations for 
survivors of political imprisonment and torture, imposed a 50 year embargo on their testimonies, 
placing an obstacle in the way of the achievement of truth and justice. Another example, already 
 
228 Terms used by the CDE in an appeal before the First Civil Court of Santiago, case Rol No. C-37023-2017, 28 
January 2019. 
229 Communication dated 17 April 2019, signed by María Eugenia Manaud Tapia, CDE president, addressed to 
Eliana Largo Vera. 
230 The Presidential Advisory Commission on the Pensions System, Comisión Asesora Presidencial sobre el Sistema 
de Pensiones, known as the “Comisión Bravo”, found that the relationship between reparations pensions and the 
‘solidarity’ (non-contributory) pensions system is such that the specifically reparatory aspect of the former is lost. 
Comisión Asesora Presidencial sobre el Sistema de Pensiones, “Informe final”, 2015, pp. 144. 
231 PRAIS is one of the few programmes that does have a built-in user consulation, via User Committees. 
232  Words of the Coordinator of the national network of survivors of political imprisonment and torture, mesa 
nacional unitaria de sobrevivientes de prisión política y tortura, addressing a public event held at the former 
Congress building on 1 July 2019. 
233 Law 20.885, of 2016, which created the Human Rights Subsecretariat.  
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mentioned, the practice of supporting criminal prosecution of perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity, yet opposing claims for the civil liability that arises.  The overall effect of this lack of 
coherence is to detract from both the nature of the measures and their reparatory effect, in 
circumstances in which the state should be exercising the greatest of care to eliminate 
contradictions, vacuums, and secondary harm. 
5.2 Reparations for Persons Deprived of Land: an example of monetised logic 
Although the dictatorship arbitrarily deprived thousands of peasant farmers of their lands, the 
post dictatorship state did not give a holistic response to the generalised dispossession of the 
group known as “exonerados de tierra”, people who lost their land.234  The persistence in the 
Senate of authoritarian enclaves, implacably opposed to any kind of land redistribution, made it 
difficult to return dispossessed lands by way of legislation.  Instead, grace and favour presidential 
pensions were utilised. Pensions, administered through the state Institute of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario, INDAP, were awarded to 3,574 former peasant 
farmers over the course of the three subsequent presidential periods.235  
 
While the effort to provide some kind of response is praiseworthy, looked at from today’s 
viewpoint the assignation of monetary pensions seems insufficient to take account of the 
multiple violations that were committed.  In particular, the response discounted demands made 
by some of the affected parties, who both before and after the transition lobbied instead for the 
constitution of a common land fund.236  In so doing, the state ignored those international 
standards that speak of restitutio in integrum as the yardstick or preferred goal of reparation.  
Recent actions by peasant farmers and workers associated with the former Forestry and Logging 
Complex (Complejo Forestal y Maderero) of Panguipulli expose the enormous debt that the state 
still owes to this particular group of affected persons.237  
5.3 Symbolic Reparations 
Civil claimants who bring actions do not always request economic reparations.  Relatives and 
survivors of Colonia Dignidad, for example, have attempted to use the courts to secure symbolic 
reparation.  In May 2015, the civil aspect of a criminal investigation over disappearance was 
granted, with the court ordering what the relatives’ and survivors’ association behind the case 
had asked for: the creation of a Memory Museum at the site; the protection and preservation of 
now-excavated mass graves, and the installation of signage at former sites of torture on the 
Colonia’s estate.  Unfortunately, in August 2018, the Supreme Court ratified an earlier Appeals 
Court decision which found in favour of the CDE’s contention that the associations involved (the 
 
234 Decree Law 208, of 1973, excluded approximately 5,000 former land reform activists from land title. According 
to Faiguembaum this decree, in combination with new agriculture policies, dispossessed between 33.000 and 
50.000 families. Sergio Faiguembaum, Toda una vida. Historia de INDAP y los campesinos (1962-2017), Santiago, 
INDAP and FAO, 2017. 
235 The great majority (2,999) during the presidency of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle.  Interview with Liliana Barría, 
formerly on the staff of INDAP. 
236 Elizabeth Lira and Brian Loveman, Políticas de reparación. Chile 1990-2004, Santiago, LOM, 2005, pp. 349-372. 
237 On 21 June 2019, former workers blocked the route between Llifén and Maihue, in protest at denial of access 
by new owners of lands forcibly seized by the dictatorship, and later privatised. On 1 July 2019, representatives of 
seven associations, with a total membership of 3,000, testified before the Senate Human Rights Commission. 
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Corporación Parque por la Paz Villa Grimaldi" and the "Asociación por la Memoria y los Derechos 
Humanos, Colonia Dignidad".  did not have standing (legitimación activa) to bring the claim.238  
In a similar case, seen in September 2018, first instance judge Mario Carrozza chose rather to 
reject the CDE’s contentions that the claimbringer had already received full reparation and that 
in any case, the statute of limitations should be invoked.239 The claim, brought by Paulina Veloso, 
the wife of Alexei Jaccard, forcibly disappeared as a consequence of Plan Condor, demanded that 
the state actively search for the whereabouts and/or remains of her husband; forbid the carrying 
out in public spaces of acts of homage to direct perpetrators and the dictatorship-era high 
command, and publish the outcome of the case in a media outlet with national reach.  It also 
required the creation, financing and maintenance of acts of memorialisation consisting in 
improvements to public green space; the installation of a human rights library in the schools her 
husband had attended, and the provision of a scholarship in his memory, at the university where 
he had studied.  The CDE opposed every single aspect of the claim.   
 
Although judge Carrozza did not accept the CDE’s position, he did decide that he had no powers 
to order any measure that would require the disbursement of funds normally allocated in annual 
budgetary legislation (the Ley de Presupuesto). He also refused to order some of the other 
measures on the grounds that they would require actions that fall under the exclusive purview 
of local authorities.240 He concluded that “although it falls outside of [my] powers to order the 
State to carry out each of the actions requested in the form in which they have been presented, 
I can make recommendations and acknowledge the existence of other, non-pecuniary, forms of 
reparation, and therefore the claim is partially granted”.241 This partial acceptance took the form 
of accepting the petition to order publication of part of the verdict – designating the judicial 
branch website www.pjud.cl as the relevant medium – and exhorting the state to comply with 
the terms of  Armed Forces Service Regulations DNL-912.242  
While the content of the civil claim in this case is certainly unusual, it is fully in line with the kinds 
of measures that the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, and other parts of 
the universal system of human rights protection, have ordered or recommended to states in 
relation to reparations obligations.  Once again, therefore, we see the CDE adopting an 
anomalous and inflexible position which seems quite unjustified.  In the opinion of the 
Observatorio, the final verdict represents a partially wasted opportunity, the judicial branch 
having been offered the chance to apply international reparations standards at the domestic 
level.   The measures requested differed little if at all, in essence, from actions ordered by other 
venues for the adjudication of international law in real cases (including cases involving Chile).  
There is also a seam of analogous case law in other national courts, such as those of Colombia, 
who have ordered the publication of verdicts, the placing of commemorative plaques, and the 
 
238 Rol 2.182-1998, Villa Baviera, episode Álvaro Modesto Vallejos Villagrán, first instance verdict, 7 May 2015; 
Santiago Appeals Court, Rol 1.051-2015, 10 April 2017; Supreme Court, Rol 19.127-2017, 7 August 2018. 
239 Rol 2.182-1998, consideration (considerando) 186, in relation to grounds (fundamentos) 179 to 180 (i). 
240 Ibid., grounds 186 to 193. 
241 Ibid., grounds 191. 
242 Article 155, letter (g) of the relevant Armed Forces Regulations (Reglamento de Servicio de Guarnición de las 
Fuerzas Armadas) forbids the rendering of funeral honours to Armed Forces personnel who have been found guilty 
of offences carrying a custodial sentence. 
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offering of public apologies.  In terms of the substance of Judge Carrozza’s misgivings, while it is 
true that, as a general rule, no judicial actor or sentence can or may encroach on terrain that is 
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive or Legislature, it is also true that every time a court 
orders the payment of compensation as reparation – as has become relatively common practice 
in recent years – resources that fall under budgetary law are involved.  It should also be 
considered that the satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition, that the measures aim to 
deliver, are components of the reparation which it is the state’s obligation to provide.243  
Another legal action with a symbolic reparation component worthy of mention is a writ of 
protection (recurso de protección) submitted by the National Human Rights Institute, INDH, on 
behalf of Tamara Lagos Castro (see section 3.3).  Despite the favourable eventual outcome of the 
case – in which the Court recognised the symbolic importance, for Tamara, of having the state 
recognise her status as the daughter of Mario Lagos Rodríguez– international law concerning 
reparations was not cited among the grounds for the finding.244  
6. MEMORY   
6.1 Memorialization and celebration of iconic human rights defenders  
In August 2018, a mural was inaugurated in Santiago in honour of the recently deceased Ana 
González Recabarren, founder member of the Association of Relatives of the Disappeared, AFDD, 
and public face of the SML’s campaign to collect DNA samples from relatives.  Ana lost four 
members of her immediate family to the dictatorship’s repressive violence: her husband, Manuel 
Recabarren, their two sons, Manuel Guillermo and Luis Emilio, and her daughter-in-law Nalvia 
Rosa Mena, who was pregnant at the time of her disappearance.  In the same month in which 
the mural was unveiled, the distinguished and much-loved human rights lawyer Andrés Aylwin 
died at the age of 93.  His wake took place in the former Congress building in Santiago, and was 
attended by relatives of many of the victims whose cases he represented.   In late January 2019 
Elena Muñoz, known as the “Purísima de Lonquén”, died. Elena was a human rights activist, and 
the mother and wife of five of the victims of disappearance whose bodies were discovered in 
1978 in the lime kilns of Lonquén.  The following month, Violeta Zúñiga Peralta died at the age of 
86.  Violeta, an indefatigable AFDD activist, was known for her solo interpretation of Chile’s 
national dance, the ‘cueca’, which she would perform in lament and protest over the 1976 
disappearance of her husband Pedro Silva, kidnapped by the DINA.  In June 2019 a mural was 
inaugurated at the Sindicato community centre in Quinta Normal in honour of Dr. Patricio Bustos, 
ex director of the SML and Villa Grimaldi survivor, highly respected, inter alia, for his strenuous 
efforts to rebuild the confidence of relatives in identification efforts when he was appointed to 
head the service after the Patio 29 identification errors had come to light. Dr. Bustos was also 
commemorated in an event at Villa Grimaldi in the same month, marking a year from the date of 
his death from cancer.  The year has also seen the sad loss of many other relatives, survivors and 
human rights activists, who did not live to see full truth and justice in the cases to which they 
dedicated their lives.  While we cannot mention each one here by name, their loss impoverishes 
the human rights community and society as a whole. It should also inspire us to redouble our 
 
243 UNGA Resolution 60/147, from 2005, “Basic Principles and Directrices…”, op. cit., Principle IX. 
244 Although reference was made to the right to personal identity established in articles 7 and 8 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. 
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efforts to move ahead more rapidly in creating answers and solutions for others who have 
already waited too long.   
 
6.2 Public Debate, Veracity and Democratic Values  
The memory field can be considered both a place of symbolic reparation and a means of non-
repetition. It is also a terrain that is in constant dispute.  Physical attacks on memory sites is one 
of the most visible public expressions of denialism about human rights violations and hatred 
towards those who refuse to forget them.  These attacks are associated with the proliferation, in 
recent years, of groups and entities of an openly neofascist character which celebrate the 
dictatorship and even its most abhorrent crimes.  This tendency can be seen in social media 
postings and websites which groups of this kind use to spread their messages of hate.  Although 
the regulation of virtual space presents both technical and legal challenges, the experience of 
other countries demonstrates that it is possible to unmask those who attempt to hide behind the 
anonymity of the web to inflict physical and psychological harm on others, or incite third parties 
to do so.  
It is also important that the authorities, and society as a whole, send clear and consistent 
messages about the unacceptability of these messages and the anti-values that lie behind them.  
It is incumbent on all of us to seriously and soberly consider the limits of the leeway we want to 
allow, and to allow ourselves, in the name of open debate of ideas.  In this vein it is at best 
unfortunate that recent trends in national television programming seem to favour the creation 
of supposed ‘formats for debate’ which do little more than generate empty polemic in a search 
for ratings.  There is no apparent concern whatsoever with fact checking, veracity, the 
truthfulness or otherwise of what is said, and subsequent consequences. In October 2018, the 
television programme “Mentiras Verdaderas” chose to bring Communist party mayor Daniel 
Jadué head to head with ultra-right wing figure José Antonio Kast.  Scrolling onscreen banners 
accentuated the air of a Roman circus that surrounded the event by billing it as the “‘round’ 
we’ve all been waiting for”. Camila Flores, a member of parliament for the right wing Renovación 
Nacional party, also took part in the programme. Flores added to her already sadly notorious 
record of inept pronouncements betraying a profound ignorance, making ludicrous allegations 
that the Communist Party had committed ‘massacres’ during the Popular Unity government of 
1970-1973 and mistaking the Ramona Parra Mural Brigade for an ‘armed extremist group’ (sic.).  
She went so far as to assert that “according to press cuttings” renowned human rights lawyer 
Carmen Hertz had supposedly “called for people to be assassinated” during the dictatorship. This 
final blatant lie led current Communist Party parliamentarian Hertz, whose husband, Carlos 
Berger, was assassinated by the Caravan of Death in 1973, to announce that she would be suing 
Flores for slander. 
In May 2019, the current affairs discussion programme Estado Nacional invited Carmen Hertz to 
join a panel alongside Mauricio Rojas, the man who lasted less than a weekend as Culture 
Minister in 2018 after it transpired that he had previously railed, in print, against the Memory 
and Human Rights Museum, describing it as a “put up job” (montaje). After the programme aired, 
Hertz was subjected to a barrage of virulent abuse on social media, accentuated after she and 
two female colleagues were verbally attacked by RN parliamentarian René Manuel García, who 
went on to physically attack a journalist who asked him about the incident.  In an age of 
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widespread and increasing incivility in the public sphere and in politics, in Chile and elsewhere, it 
is incumbent on our democratic representatives and the media to consider how to act 
responsibly, particularly in the very parliament which is supposedly the seat and guarantor of 
democracy.  
Meanwhile, there has been little progress in regulating the expression of homage to figures 
associated with the dictatorship and its crimes. Although the lower legislative chamber approved 
a declaration in 2017 requiring the removal from public spaces of monuments which exalt 
members of the dictatorship-era military juntas (see this report’s 2018 version), this has not been 
turned into a legal measure.  Another initiative introduced in 2017 that did take the form of draft 
legislation was draft bill Boletín 11.424-17, which sought to typify the crime of inciting violence.  
The draft would have rescinded one article of the current law on freedom of information, 
opinion, and the journalism profession, which was adopted in 2001.  The effect would be the 
abolition of the particular sanction that article 31 of the law establishes for “social 
communications media that produce publications or transmissions destined to promote hatred 
or hostility”.  The argument put forward for the rescinding is that the new prohibition established 
by the draft bill would apply to the media as to any other potential transgressor, making the 
special 2001 article unnecessary and “placing media professionals on the same footing as all 
other persons.”245 At first glance, this argument does not seem to address or take account of the 
greater weight, social reach, and therefore power that media figures enjoy when compared to 
other natural persons.  In 2018, a session of the Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples 
Commission of the lower chamber introduced into the bill, as a sanctioned behaviour, denial of 
crimes against humanity documented by Chile’s two truth commissions. This despite the fact that 
parliamentarians from the right-wing Chile Vamos coalition managed to include modifications 
that would limit the power of the article to impose sanctions.246  In any case the draft bill remains 
at the first stage of discussion, and has not been assigned the priority status (urgencia) without 
which it is unlikely to become law. 
6.3 Attacks on Memory Spaces: material expressions of denialism and hatred  
During the period of this report, attacks on memory sites and commemorative artefacts have 
continued.  Since 1990, 27 former illegal detention and torture centres have been declared 
national monuments in Chile based on requests and applications made by civil society 
organisations.   Hundreds of monuments and memorials have also been erected to victims, 
survivors, opponents of the dictatorship and human rights defenders.  These are more likely to 
be protected by Law 17.288, as public monuments, due to their location in public space.   Despite 
this supposed legal protection, various sites and artefacts have been subjected to attacks, 
evidence that the rejection of historical truth about state terrorism still persists, or may even be 
resurgent.  In Santiago, the self-styled “Social Patriotic Movement” (Movimiento Social Patriota) 
launched two attacks on the Villa Grimaldi Peace Park (in August 2018 and January 2019).  The 
memory site José Domingo Cañas suffered damage and the depositing of human excrement on 
 
245 Presidential Message Nº 115-365, 4 September 2017, accompanying the presentation of draft bill (Boletín) 
11.424-17.   
246 Adding, as a precondition of sanction: “… on the condition that said incitation causes a breach of public order, or 
impedes, obstructs, and restricts to an illegitimate degree, the exercise of a right on the part of the offended party”. 
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its premises in August 2018, and an attempted robbery in March 2019.  In April 2019, paint was 
daubed on the plaque in the Estación Central district of the capital where Carmen Gloria Quintana 
and Rodrigo Rojas De Negri were burned alive by a military patrol in 1986.  In May 2019, a 
memorial to victims of enforced disappearance in the city of Antofagasta was sprayed with the 
legend “Long Live Pinochet”, an attack similar to one that took place in Valparaíso in April 2018 
(see last year’s version of this report).  
 
Former detention centres transformed into memory sites are public property, making it 
particularly important that public authorities respond swiftly and with firmness to efforts to 
destroy what is now social patrimony. In June 2019, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights 
replied to a request made by the social collective “Popular Declassification”, invoking the Access 
to Public Information Law. The request asked for sight of the text of a supposed protocol or 
established procedure for reporting damage to memory sites.  The Ministry had made reference 
to the supposed protocol in April, in response to a query made by the lower house.247  The June 
2019 reply admitted that the protocol that had been referred to did not in fact exist, announcing 
that a roundtable would be convoked to create one.248  
There are also a series of former detention centres that are still under the control of the Armed 
Forces, and suffer deterioration or destruction in spite of having been given the status of national 
monuments.  Examples include the former Morro fort in Talcahuano, and the Rocas de Santo 
Domingo site, which have both been exposed to attacks from vandals.  The refusal of public 
authorities to take these sites out of military hands prevents both public access and work to 
preserve them. It leaves them vulnerable to illicit attempts at obliteration like those which have 
already affected Villa Grimaldi and José Domingo Cañas. 
The current state of monuments and memorials which are sited in open public space, and are 
accordingly more exposed, shows up the insufficiencies of a symbolic reparations programme 
that limits itself to funding works, without assigning resources for later upkeep or repair or 
delegating responsibility to local authorities.  The monument to women victims of the 
dictatorship that was inaugurated in 2006 on the central reservation of the Alameda, Santiago’s 
main thoroughfare, has been in a state of complete disrepair and virtually total destruction for 
years (see previous editions of this report).  The memorial to Littré Quiroga and Víctor Jara 
located in the Lo Espejo district, is now the site of regular, and apparently deliberate, dumping 
of rubbish and rubble.  In August 2018, the Hualpén memorial was vandalised with swastikas, a 
crime attributed to the neofascist movement ‘Chile Action for Identity’ (Acción Identitaria Chile).  
Between August and September, the Neltume Cultural Centre and Museum reported the loss of 
two of six plaques that record the names of MIR activists killed by the dictatorship in 1981.  The 
names of two other activists were obliterated from a memorial in the town, and all the names 
on a memorial sited in Llancahue, at the entrance to the Valdivia prison, were painted over. The 
Los Ríos regional office of the INDH lodged a criminal complaint over the incident.  
 
247 Ordinance Nº 2213, 11 April 2019, issued by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, in reply to Oficio Nº 
20948, 22 January 2019. 
248 Ordinance Nº 502, 4 June 2019, issued by the Human Rights Subsecretariat of the Ministry of Justice and 
Human Rights. 
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6.4 Archives 
Situation of Archives that Document Human Rights Violations  
The right to access information about crimes against humanity is held by society as a whole as 
well as by victims or survivors, and has been enshrined in various international norms and 
documents.  These set out that the right to know implies the preservation of archives that 
document past crimes.  This requires protective measures to prevent the theft, destruction, or 
misappropriation of relevant documentation, whether state produced or not.  It also requires the 
production of inventories that identify the location of relevant archives, at home and abroad, 
and where necessary establishes international cooperation for consulting them and/or ensuring 
their repatriation.  Regulations to facilitate access and consultation are also needed if 
documentation is to be used effectively to combat denialism and manipulation.249 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has stipulated that states, in particular their Armed 
Forces, cannot invoke national security exceptions when faced with requests for information on 
grave violations included enforced disappearance.  It has also considered that maintaining 
relatives of the disappeared in ignorance about the whereabouts of their loved ones constitutes 
inhuman and degrading treatment.250  Meanwhile, those who deny or conceal information about 
the whereabouts of a victim of enforced disappearance can be considered co-responsible for the 
crime, since the denial of information is consubstantial with the definition of the crime. 
 
Towards the end of the Chilean dictatorship, the impeding of access to documentation about 
grave violations began with Law 18.771 of 1988, which modified article 14 of Decree Nº5200 of 
1929.  The decree instructed state bodies to make annual deposits of their documentation to the 
National Archive.  The 1988 law established exemptions from this obligation for the Ministry of 
Defence, Armed Forces, security forces, and other establishments linked to defence, which would 
henceforth be allowed to archive or destroy their documentation as they saw fit. In 2015, the 
Londres 38 memory site launched a campaign to modify Law 18.771.  An associated draft bill, 
Boletín 9958-17, sponsored by parliamentarians from a range of parties, attempted to reverse 
the modification introduced in 1988.  The bill is at its second stage, but has no priority status.  
Previously, in 2007, member of parliament Jaime Naranjo had presented a draft bill stipulating 
that archives of the former DINA and CNI should be transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, 
and from there to the (at the time embryonic) INDH.251  This bill did not prosper either, and is 
currently archived.  Nor has the ‘Valech secret’ been derogated, despite repeated international 
organisation recommendations to that effect.252  
Against this backdrop, a project carried out by the National Archive in 2017 is worthy of praise.  
It undertook an analysis and cataloguing of a range of its ministerial holdings from a human rights 
perspective.  Two hundred volumes of files from the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, dated 
 
249 UN Document A/72/523, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of 
Non-Recurrence, 12 October 2018, on prevention. 
250 OAS, ‘Access to Information on Human Rights Violations’, thematic report by the Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression, 2010. 
251 Draft bill (Boletín) 5167-06. 
252 OAS/ Ser.L/V/II; IACHR/RELE/INF.16/17, ‘Special Report on Freedom of Expression in Chile’, IACHR, 15 March 
2017.  
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between September 1973 and mid-1980, were included in the first run.  The aims included 
identification of documents whose potential relevance to human rights violations had previously 
been overlooked due to their classification under apparently unrelated headings.253 
Civil society also has important holdings of human rights related documentation, some of which 
were added to the UNESCO Memory of the World register in 2003. The Museum of Memory and 
Human Rights has identified and listed many of these sources, around the country.  Recent 
academic work coordinated from the Universidad Alberto Hurtado has explored archives that 
were amassed in the course of defence and support of people targeted by repression.254 
Dictatorship-era human rights organisations including the ex Vicaria de la Solidaridad archive 
FUNVISOL, FASIC, and the Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos chose to keep their own 
documentation and to undertake conservation and archiving work without official support.  In 
2013, the building that currently houses the Comision – and was formerly the clandestine 
detention and torture centre known as the “Clínica Santa Lucia” – was burgled.  This prompted 
the Comisión to deposit some of its documentation in the National Archive, for safekeeping.  
However, the Comisión continues to receive documents donated by individuals and by other 
organisations. FUNVISOL and FASIC meanwhile respond on an ongoing basis to court orders 
requesting papers that may serve as proof in ongoing criminal investigations.  
FASIC continued to offer direct legal assistance to relatives and survivors until the mid-2000s, 
and still supplies documents that users might need to open civil claims and/or exercise their right 
to administrative reparations.  These organisations have had no solid or regular state support for 
this work, which has had to be done through a mixture of shoestring budgeting, sporadic income 
from competitive funding bids, and above all, donated labour in the form of voluntary work.255 
The lack of reliable finance and support puts the future of the archives, and access to their 
contents, in jeopardy, despite the fact that in two cases (FASIC and the Vicaría) they are in theory 
protected under their status as national monuments.256  
6.4 Controversies over historical monuments and criticism of the new Ley de Patrimonio 
In July 2019, the president of the right-wing UDI party was joined by other right-wing politicians 
in railing against the awarding of the status of historical monument to a complex which includes 
a former clandestine camp used by MIR armed opposition members during the dictatorship.  The 
status was conceded in December 2017, but only recently signed into effect via official 
publication.  The current minister for Culture, the Arts, and Patrimony responded to criticism by 
explaining that she did not have the power to reject the measure, although she made sure to add 
that “any citizen is free to request the reconsideration of a decision made by the Council for 
 
253 Website of the National Archive, News section, ‘Descripción documental. Fondos Ministeriales y su dimensión de 
derechos humanos’. 24 January 2018.  
254 The university research project ‘Tecnologías Políticas de la Memoria’, housed at the Universidad Alberto 
Hurtado, can be seen online at: 
www.memoriayderechoshumanosuah.org/tecnologias-politicas-de-la-memoria/. 
255 In 2018, for the first time, an agreement was approved transferring CLP $67.340.000 from the National Service 
for Cultural Patrimony (Servicio Nacional del Patrimonio Cultural) to FUNVISOL. The grant was renewed in 2019. 
256 The FUNVISOL archives were given National Monument status in 2017, with FASIC’s following suit in 2018. In 
both cases, the process was initiated by the organisation itself.  
    86 
 
National Monuments”.257 The controversy threatens to convert the Council, and the whole 
concept of national monument, into a party political football, something that would militate 
against the very nature of the organism and its activities.  In mid-August, feminist groups and 
associations of former political prisoners strongly questioned the sale of a former torture centre 
to a property developer.  The site, located on Iran Street in the Santiago district of Macul, is 
notorious for having been a focus of sexual violence used as a method of torture.  The site was 
declared a Historic Monument in 2016, which means that according to the law, the state should 
have a preferential option to purchase should its private owner decide to sell. The Council said it 
had not been notified of the intended sale, and announced its intention to study options for legal 
recourse.  A draft bill proposed by the government in June 2019 to replace the current Law of 
National Monuments, which dates from 1925, was criticised for the meagre participation 
contemplated for civil society and “overrepresentation of state bodies”.258 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The 46th anniversary of Chile’s 1973 coup takes place in a context that promises little by way of 
action to better meet the numerous urgent moral debts that the Chilean state owes to its citizens 
over dictatorship-era violations.  In the area of truth, continued secrecy, uneven criteria, and 
contradiction prevail, as is illustrated by the repeated reluctance or downright refusal by the 
prison service to provide information that the national Council for Transparency and the courts 
have both repeatedly found to be of legitimate public interest. The CDE’s behaviour is meanwhile 
founded on the citation of internal norms, mandates or rules as if they provided justification for 
actions that run counter to the state’s obligations under international law; displaying a profound 
lack of comprehension on the part of state entities of their shared responsibility for compliance 
with those obligations.  In the justice arena, advances in the recognition and punishment of a 
broader range of criminal offences, and in the co-ordination, prioritisation and communication 
of ongoing cases are all welcome. It is however worrying that the jurisprudential consensus 
regarding the inapplicability of crimes against humanity seems increasingly under threat.  The 
failure to recognise various incidents documented by the Rettig report, as crimes against 
humanity meanwhile serves as a salutary reminder that the 1978 Amnesty Decree Law is still in 
force and could in theory be invoked in such circumstances.  More than a thousand people 
subjected to enforced disappearance are yet to be traced, and the promise of a dedicated 
national action plan to prioritise the search for them has been reneged upon.   
 
Reparations, a particular focus for this year’s report, has been insufficient and often also badly 
administered even where it has existed.  In the area of guarantees of non-repetition, state made 
pronouncements before international organisations do not match either the actual state of 
legislative progress, or the observable behaviour of the uniformed police on the streets, in 
secondary schools and poor urban areas, and toward vulnerable groups.259 Their appalling 
 
257 Electronic newspaper El Mostrador: “Ministra Valdés por monumento al MIR: ‘No tramitar este acuerdo 
significa caer en notable abandono de deberes’”, 19 July 2019. 
258 Newspaper La Tercera: “Expertos de la UC critican nueva ley de Patrimonio”. 19 August 2019. 
259 Note to the English edition: this report was written before the widely reported police violence that was 
unleashed on protesters who took to the streets in mid-October 2019. This violence included dozens of incidents in 
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behaviour in Patio 29 of the General Cemetery during commemorations of 2019’s coup 
anniversary is simply one more example of an established pattern of unnecessarily brutal and 
violent behaviour.   In the areas of prevention and of memory, the continued rise of denialist 
tendencies has most unfortunately been boosted by lamentable attempts to instrumentalise, for 
ideological purposes, bodies whose correct functioning requires that politicians of all stripes 
respect their autonomy and independence.  
8. RECOMMENDATIONS  
For the first time in the nine consecutive years in which the Observatorio has been responsible 
for preparing this chapter of the UDP annual human rights report, it is not possible to identify a 
single one of last year’s recommendations that has been put into practice.  Given their 
importance and urgency, we reiterate them, as well as adding others which reflect this year’s 
spotlight on the reparations dimension of transitional justice.  
 
In the interests of furthering its compliance with the duties of the state in truth, justice, 
reparations, memory and guarantees of non-repetition in relation to the grave human rights 
violations committed during the 1973-1990 civil-military dictatorship, the Chilean state should: 
1. Create a permanent, dedicated and adequately staffed and funded body to coordinate all 
public policy related to truth, justice and reparations, in order to achieve internal and external 
coherence of policy measures; ensure full participation for relatives and survivors; consider 
new applications to existing categories of recognised victim and survivor and assess the need 
to create new ones; and promote the search for the disappeared.  Improve existing 
reparations programmes, create new ones that respond to the mass violation of social, 
economic and cultural rights committed during the dictatorship, and implement a gender 
perspective.  Consider expanding the current attributes and mandate of the Human Rights 
Programme Unit and/or the Subsecretariat of Human Rights to which it belongs, for this 
purpose. 
 
2. Implement accompaniment and legal advice/ legal representation programmes for relatives 
and survivors who want to inform themselves about and/or activate paths to reparation, 
including the bringing of civil claims for compensation.  Instruct the Consejo de Defensa del 
Estado that its pronouncements and actions must respect the state’s duties and obligations 
under international law, in particular so that it ceases unjustifiably opposing the exercise of 
rights to holistic reparation.  
 
3. Create a National Search Plan for the Disappeared that complies with, inter alia: the 
numerous recommendations made by the UN Working Group in 2013; Chile’s duties under 
the International Convention against Enforced and Involuntary Disappearance and its 
regional counterpart, and the search principles adopted by the relevant UN Committee in 
2019.  This Plan should be implemented by an agency that collaborates actively with the 
 
which protesters and bystanders were blinded by the deliberately reckless use of plastic bullets and tear gas 
canisters fired indiscriminately, and at head height, into crowds.  
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justice process and ensures direct, permanent and full participation by relatives and, where 
necessary, by suitably qualified representatives of civil society 
 
4. Recognise and proactively take steps to comply with the final recommendations made by the 
Chilean state as the outcome of its presentations before the UN Committee Against Torture, 
in 2018 and the Committee against Enforced Disappearance, in 2019.  Similarly, acknowledge 
and implement the recommendations proceeding from Chile’s Universal Periodic Review 
before the UN in 2019.  Comply with the remaining outstanding measures ordered by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the cases Almonacid, García Lucero, and Órdenes 
Guerra. 
 
5. In particular, take all necessary steps to achieve the passing and implementation of the 
typification of enforced disappearance as an ordinary crime (outside of contexts constitutive 
of crimes against humanity), and of all other pending draft bills mentioned by the State in its 
presentations before the aforementioned UN Committees but which currently have no 
priority status assigned and/or report no recent movement.  
 
6. Modify the current draft bill on Patrimony so that it provides for a greater role for the active 
participation of civil society groups with relevant expertise; and introduce a draft bill and 
practical mechanisms for the protection of memory sites, similarly provided as regards 
participation.  
 
7. Respect and defend the formal, financial, and funcional autonomy of the Instituto Nacional 
de Derechos Humanos. 
 
8. Resolve, as a matter of urgency, the “bottleneck” which currently affects the SML’s carrying 
out of assessments of mental faculties and other procedures that are essential to the justice 
process in dictatorship-era human rights cases. 
 
9. Ensure that the laws regulating release on parole or licence (libertad condicional), the current 
executive-sponsored draft bill on the substitution of non-custodial sentences in case of illness 
or infirmity, and related legal dispositions that currently exist or may be introduced, are 
formulated, interpreted and applied in such a way as to respect the state’s duty to provide 
effective and proportionate penalties for grave human rights violations.  
 
10. Affirm, protect, and deepen the measures taken by the Supreme Court and its Coordinación 
Nacional de DDHH to galvanise the justice process; find ways to actively promote public 
awareness and knowledge of the outcomes of this process, including providing public 
information about the serving of sentences and any post-sentencing benefits conceded to 
perpetrators   
 
